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Sol Worth and the Study of Visual Communications 
Larry Gross 
The central thread that runs through Sol Worth's research 
and writings is the question of how meaning is communi-
cated through visual images.1 Coming to academic life 
after careers in painting, photography, and filmmaking, 
Worth was imbued with the conviction that visual media 
were forms of communication that, while fundamentally 
different from speech, could and must be seriously 
examined as ways human beings create and share mean-
ings. Focusing on film he began with the question, "What 
does a film communicate, and how does this process 
work?" (1966:322). The answers he began with grew out 
of his practice as a teacher of film. 
Teaching Film as Communication 
In Worth's initial experience in teaching film, as Fulbright 
Professor in Finland (1956-1957), he had utilized a 
method he later described as follows: "The teacher would 
make a film; the students would work along with him, 
learning and doing at the same time. Class discussions 
would be held in which the various aspects of the film 
were developed and demonstrated" (1963:54). The film 
he made during this process of teaching was Teatteri, 
now in the permanent collection of the Museum of Mod-
ern Art. When he came to the Annenberg School of 
Communications at the University of Pennsylvania to set 
up and teach a course in documentary film, however, 
Worth adopted a different approach: the students would 
make a film. This choice was decisive in orienting him 
toward questions and perspectives that influenced all his 
subsequent work. It led Worth to consider problems few 
film scholars had posed or pursued. 
The most immediate consequence of this pedagogical 
decision was a concern over the inexperience of his stu-
dents: 
The young men and women in my class were bright, but they 
had never before made a film. They had never used a camera, 
edited a shot, or written a script. There was not enough time. 
And I was worried. If I made a film, I could control it; if I let thE 
students make their own films, they could fail. The films migh1 
be bad or unfinished, the cameras and equipment might be 
ruined, film might be wasted. [1963:55] 
Larry Gross is Associate Professor of Communication at 
The Annenberg School of Communication, University of 
Pennsylvania, and is co-editor of Studies in Visual 
Communication. 
This concern proved unfounded. The students suc-
ceeded in making films and the workshop technique 
seemed to engage them in the process Worth deemed 
appropriate to a school of communications: 
The process of changing back and forth from conception as 
paramount, to the actual visual document as paramount, 
seems to me the key learning process in the Documentary 
Film Workshop. It is the way in which the students learn to 
see. It is the process by which they train themselves to find a 
meaningful visual image in relation to a concept which is 
usually literary or philosophical in nature. The purpose of the 
Workshop is not to produce films (this is our pleasure), but 
rather, to provide an environment in which students learn to 
see filmically; to provide an environment where they can learn 
about the techniques and the thinking necessary to com-
municate ideas through the filmed image. [1963:56f] 
It was the final stage in the Workshop, however, that led 
Worth to the next set of questions. When the films were 
completed, they were screened before an audience of 
students, friends, and faculty. "It is in the period after the 
lights go on, when the comments are made, that the stu-
dent begins to know how very complex and difficult the 
art of film communication is" (1963:57). The students 
weren't alone, as Worth himself became increasingly in-
trigued by a pattern he found in the responses of diverse 
audiences to the films made by his students: 
The greatest involvement, identification, and understanding 
seems to come from the young and the untrained. The 
greatest hostility and incomprehension seems to come from 
the adult professional in the communication fields .... Ado-
lescents find these films easier to understand than do adults. 
[1965:12] 
The Bio-Documentary 
In trying to make sense of this unexpected pattern of 
responses Worth first clarified the nature of the films he 
was screening. He realized that the inexperience of the 
student filmmakers (their lack of socialization in tradi-
tional film codes), and his insistence that "the subject 
~atter evolves from the student's own interests and expe-
nences" (1963:56), lead to a particularly subjective kind 
of film. Worth called this kind of film "bio-documentary": 
... a film that can be made by a person who is not a profes-
sional filmmaker; or by someone who has never made a film 
before. It is a film that can be made by anyone with enough 
skill, let's say, to drive a car; by a person of a different culture 
or a different age group, who has been taught in a specific ' 
way to make a film that helps him to communicate to us, the 
world as he sees it, and his concerns as he sees them. 
[1964:3] 
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In posing the concept of a bio-documentary Worth was 
clearly concerned with analogies between subjective 
films and dreams as forms of visual imagery: 
A bio-documentary is a film made by a person to show how he 
feels about himself and his world. It is a subjective way of 
showing what the objective world that a person sees is really 
like . . .. In addition ... it often captures feelings and reveals 
values, attitudes, and concerns that lie beyond the conscious 
control of the maker. [1964:3] 
But it wasn't enough to see the bio-documentary as a 
subjective, individual statement by a novice filmmaker. 
That might explain why adults could not "understand" 
these films, and especially why "hostility seems to be 
found most frequently among filmmakers, film critics, and 
communications professionals . .. (e.g. 'I think you are 
intellectually irresponsible to teach young people to 
make films like this ... I think the whole thing is a hoax 
.. .')" (1965:7). After all, it is hardly a novel observation 
that those most engaged with a set of conventions in art 
are the most outraged at innovations or variations that 
ignore, challenge, or undermine these conventions. 
It still remained to ask why young viewers responded 
with enjoyment and understanding; after all, even if they 
were not professionals, they were used to seeing "con-
ventional" films. Worth decided that there was something 
in the subject matter and the structure of the films that 
was comprehensible to young viewers because it was 
closer to their way of talking and thinking. In particular he 
felt that the films used ambiguities and hints in a fashion 
that adults were no longer comfortable with, but which 
younger viewers found "safer and more c.omfortable fo~. 
certain themes than [they] would an outnght statement 
(1965:18). . 0 • 
Although he himself probably d1d not see the Implica-
tions of his inquiries at this point, Worth was laying some 
of the foundations for an important analytic shift that 
gradually became explicit in his thin~ing. I b~lieve that he 
was already expressing some uneasmess w1th the psy-
chological approach noted above-e.g., bio-documen-
taries as "dream-1 ike" revelations of the unconscious. Al-
though much of Worth's research on film during th.e rest of 
the 1960s is clearly dominated by the psychological 
model of individual expression, he increasingly focused 
his attention (often simultaneously, even contradictorily) 
on film as cultural communication. Even at this point, 
then, Worth was beginning to formulate two rel~te.d sets 
of questions which he pursued for the rest of h1s l1fe. 
First, he was led to tackle the question of how m~aning 
can be communicated in various modes and med1a: are 
visual images in general , and film in particular, b~tter. 
understood in light of an overall theory of commun1cat1on 
as symbolic .behavior; and what would this theory look 
like? 
Second, he understood that his experience with novice 
fi-lmmakers suggested a radical innovation in the way 
the film medium could be used as a research tool. If 
anyone could be taught to make a film that reflected his 
or her own world view, and the values and concerns of his 
or her group, then the direction of the film communication 
process could be reversed. This meant using the medium 
"to see whether the visual world offers a way of communi-
cation that can be used not only for us to communicate to 
them, but so that we might make it easier for them to talk 
to us" (1965:19). 
Although these two sets of questions were pursued in 
tandem, and their interconnections formed the basis of 
much of Worth's intellectual development, it will be nec-
essary for the purpose of exposition to discuss them sep-
arately. 
The Navajo Project 
The first fruits of the bio-documentary approach and the 
realization of the potential it offered for communication by 
"them to talk to us" were not long in coming. In his first 
exposition of the bio-documentary film concept, at the 
1964 Meeting of the Society for Applied Anthropology, 
Worth already saw the possibility of using this method to 
explore the world view of another culture. 
In a documentary film about the Navajo you look for an objec-
tive representation of how they live as seen by an outsider. In 
a Bio-Documentary about the Navajo, the film would be made 
by a Navajo. One would not only look to see how the Navajo 
live, but one would also look to see how a Navajo sees and 
structures his own life and the world around him. [1964:5]2 
In this capsule "proposal" for a research project, Worth 
later realized he was obeying Malinowski's injunction that 
"the final goal, of which an Ethnographer should never 
lose sight ... is, briefly, to grasp the native's point of 
view, his relation to life, to realize his vision of his world" 
(1922:25). In this context, it is interesting to note Worth's 
sensitivity to one of the most important but often ne-
glected problems in anthropological theory and practice: 
the influence of the researcher's own values and biases. 
The proposed use of the bio-documentary approach was, 
to use a term that achieved currency in later years, reflex-
ive: 
Of course no view by one man of another is entirely objective. 
The most objective documentary film, or report, includes the 
view and values of the maker. The standard documentary film 
tries, however, to exclude as much as possible of this per-
sonal value system. The Bio-Documentary, on the other hand, 
encourages and teaches the filmmaker to include and to be 
concerned with his own values .... The Bio-Documentary 
method teaches the maker of the film to search for the mean-
ing he sees in his world and it encourages the viewer to 
continue that search by comparing his values with the values 
expressed by the filmmaker in the film. [1964:5] 
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This interest in what "other people had to say about 
themselves through film, and how one could teach them 
to say it" (Worth and Adair 1972:30) led to the Navajo 
Filmmakers Project conducted in the summer of 1966 by 
Worth in collaboration with John Adair, an anthropologist 
long familiar with the Navajo, and assisted by Richard 
Chalfen, then a graduate student working with Worth. 
The project addressed a series of research objectives 
and issues: 
1 To determine the feasibility of teaching the use of film to 
people with another culture. [Worth and Adair 1970:11] 
2 To find out if it was possible to systematize the process of 
teaching; to observe it with reference to the maker, the film 
itself, and the viewer; and to collect data about it so as to 
assist other ongoing research exploring the inference of 
meaning from film as a communicative "language." [ibid.:12] 
3 [To test the hypothesis that] motion picture film, conceived, 
photographed, and sequentially arranged by a people such 
as the Navajo would reveal something of their cognition and 
values that may be inhibited, not observable, or not analyza-
ble when investigation is totally dependent on verbal 
exchang8-€specially when it must be done in the language 
of the investigator. [ibid.] 
4 [To] create new perspectives on the Whorfian hypothesis, 
work on which has for the most part been limited to linguistic 
investigation of cognitive phenomena. Through cross-cultural 
comparative studies using film as a mode of visual communi-
cation relationships between linguistic, cognitive, cultural 
and visual phenomena might eventually be clarified. [Worth 
and Adair 1972:28] 
5 [To see whether] the images, subjects and themes selected 
and the organizing methods used by the Navajo filmmakers 
would reveal much about their mythic and value systems. [ It 
was] felt that a person's values and closely held beliefs about 
the nature of the world would be reflected in the way he edited 
his previously photographed materials. [ibid.] 
6 To study the process of "guided" technological innovation 
and observe how a new mode of communication would be 
patterned by the culture to which it is introduced. [Worth and 
Adair 1970:12] 
The Navajo project was enormously successful. The 
films made by the Navajo filmmakers were widely 
screened and discussed as "a breakthrough in cross-
cultural communications" (Mead 1977:67). Worth's in-
volvement with anthropology deepened after the comple-
tion of the project and the publication of its results (Worth 
and Adair 1967, 1970, 1972). He became increasingly 
identified with the revitalization of a subfield, the an-
thropology of visual communications, a term he proposed 
as an alternative to the earlier term visual anthropology. 
Worth felt that most anthropologists viewed film and 
photography only as ways to make records about culture 
(usually other cultures) and failed to see that they could 
be studied as phenomena of culture in their own right, 
reflecting the value systems, coding patterns, and cogni-
tive processes of their maker. His experience with bio-
documentary films had clarified this distinction for him 
and he saw it as crucial to the understanding of visual 
communications. Pursuing this distinction leads to three 
issues which Worth was concerned with: 
1 The denial of the possibility of an objective, value-free film 1 
record and the assertion of an inherent cultural bias of a 
filmmaker raises serious questions about the way we all 
view photographic images, and our tendency to accept 
them as evidence about the external world. In particular 
Worth was disturbed by the lack of understanding and 
sophistication on the part of anthropologists regarding 
their own use of visual image technologies. 
2 The use of these technologies to record the lives of others 
for our purposes, and the purveying to others of our own 
cultural products and technologies (again, usually for our 
own profit), raise serious ethical issues about the power 
and the use of media which we ourselves do not 
adequately understand. 
3 There is a need to understand the nature of film as a 
medium of communication-is there a film code and 
what are its properties? 
I will begin with the last of these, which takes us back 
to the question of how meaning is communicated through 
film. 
Film as Communication 
In the process of analyzing the early bio-documentary 
films made by his students, Worth had realized that al-
though they were subject ive they were not wholly 
idiosyncratic. In his discussion of these films he noted 
that "the films all employ similar grammars (in the sense 
of editing devices and filmic continuities) ... grammars 
of argot rather than of conventional speech" (1965:18). As 
I have noted, the decision to view these films as social 
rather than merely individual expressions led to the ques-
tion of whether there were underlying rules for the shap-
ing and sharing of meanings in film. 
Worth began by employing a communications theory 
model , in which film is seen as "a signal received primar-
ily through visual receptors, which we treat as a message 
by inferring meaning from it" (ibid .:323, emphasis in orig-
inal). The implications of this last point were to become 
increasingly central in Worth's work, but he already was 
insisting that "there is no meaning in the film itself ... the 
meaning of a film is a relationship between the implica-
tion of the maker and the inference of the audience" 
(ibid.). But how did this process of implying and inferring 
meanings actually occur? In two of his early papers 
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(1966, 1968) Worth laid out an init ial model, some of 
which was retained and developed in future work, and 
some of which was mod ified or discarded as his thinking 
progressed. 
Because much of the model of film communication 
presented in these papers is repeated in the paper "The 
D_evelopment of a Semiotic of Film" (1969), I will briefly 
d1scuss some aspects of the earlier papers which were 
less prominent in the later effort. In addition, I will focus 
on what I feel are the weaknesses as well as the 
achievements of Worth 's approach as represented by al l 
three of these papers. 
In these initial papers Worth drew heavily upon a psy-
chological framework for understanding film, again mak-
ing an analogy to the dream as an "intrapersonal mode of 
communicat ion through image events in sequence. The 
fi lm is a similar mode of communication but most often 
extended to the interpersonal domain" (1968:3) . He pro-
ceeded to outline :·an intuitive experient ial model " of film 
as a process which beg ins with a "Feel ing Concern ... to 
communicate something," a concern "which many psy-
chologists feel is almost a basic human drive" (1966:327). 
This feeling concern should not be seen as an explicit 
message that one wants to commun icate; it "is most often 
imprecise, amorphous, and internalized. It cannot be sent 
or received as a film in th is internalized, 'fee ling' state" 
(1968:4). 
Here Worth makes a further point which he did not 
pursue at the time, but which can be seen as an early 
indicator of what later became an important part of his 
view of communicative phenomena: 
Obviously, inferences can be made about internal feel ing 
states by observing a subject's gestures, body movements, 
and so forth . ... [However] there is an important d ist inction 
which must be made between the inferences we make from a 
person's own behavior, which can have a great v.ariety of 
reasons explaining and motivating them, and the inferences 
we make from a coded expression in linguistic or paral inguis-
tic form whose purpose is primarily communicat ive. [ibid.] 
If the filmmaker is to communicate this feeling concern, 
then, Worth continued, the "sender must develop a Story 
Organism-an organic unit whose basic function is to 
provide a vehicle that will carry or embody the Feeling 
Concern" (1966:327). In practice, the story organism may 
be a story in the usual sense of the word , even a shooting 
script, but Worth was dealing more with the "organization 
into a system of those beliefs and feelings that a person 
accepts as true and related to his Feeling Concern" 
(ibid. :328). 
The final stage in the encoding process occurs when, 
"after recognizing the feeling concern and finding the 
story organism, ... the communicator [begins] to collect 
the external specific Image Events which, when se-
quenced, will become the visible film communication" 
(1968:4). 
Meaning as Mirror Image 
Worth then proceeds to define the receiving process "as 
a kind of mirror image of the sending process" (1966:328). 
Because I feel that this position contains a fundamental 
error (and one which Worth later recognized) , I will quote 
it in full: 
The viewer first sees the Image Event-the sequence of 
signals that we call a film. Most often he knows nothing of 
what went on before. He doesn't know the film-maker and his 
personality, and he usually doesn't know what the film is 
about, or is meant to communicate. Should our viewer choose 
to treat these signals as a message, he will first infer the Story 
Organism from the sequenced Image Events. He will become 
aware of the belief system of the film-maker from the images 
he sees on the screen. 
From this awareness he will , if the communication "works," be 
able to infer-to invoke in himself-the Feeling Concern. 
As you can see from th is suggested view of the total proc-
ess, the meaning of the film for the viewer is closely related to 
the Feeling Concern of the film-maker. The single Image 
Events of the film are the signals, these specifically se-
quenced Image Events are what we treat as messages, and 
our inference about the Feeling Concern of the maker is what 
we ca ll the meaning of the film. [1966:328] 
This view is explicitly tied by Worth to a psychological 
model of communication in art enunciated by Ernest Kris 
in his Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art (1952). Worth 
quotes Kris's statement that communication "lies not so 
much in the prior intent of the artist as in the consequent 
recreation by the audience of his work of art. What is 
required for communication therefore is similarity be-
tween the audience process and that of the artist." 
The primary problem with this argument is that it does 
not, in fact, represent the experiential realities of film 
communication. 3 Simply put, it is unreasonable to ever 
expect the process of viewing a film to mirror the process 
of making that film. Given Worth's own model of the 
filmmaking process, it should be clear that the maker 
interacts with the film in the process of creation in a way 
which can never be repeated by himself or by anyone 
else. The very acts of filmmaking are different in time, 
space, and pace from any act of viewing . Moreover, the 
model implies a static, unchanging feeling concern 
which leads to a fixed story organism, which in turn is 
represented by a sequence of image events. In reality, of 
course, the process of filmmaking-as Worth's own de-
scriptions show-often involves changes and modifica-
tions in what one wishes to say and how one tries to say it. 
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The filmmaker's experience is one of choosing among 
alternatives, attempting to realize intentions, and assess-
ing achievements as a means of confirming or altering 
those intentions. The viewer confronts only the arranged, 
final set of images, and can only deal with them in terms 
of conventional and specific expectations, and in light of 
assessments of the filmmaker's control and skill in choos-
ing, sequencing, and implying meanings. This is hardly 
the same thing as "[reversing] the process by which the 
encoder made the film" (1969:290). 
But if this position is so patently untenable, why did 
Worth hold to it for several years and repeat it in a series 
of papers? I think there may be several reasons for this. 
First, I believe that Worth was heavily influenced by his 
e~periences in teaching students in his Documentary 
F1lm Workshop. His method of teaching concentrated on 
forcing the students to clearly articulate their intentions 
and their decisions in selecting and arranging images in 
order to convey ideas and feelings. The model of a feel-
ing concern that leads to a story organism which is em-
bodied in a sequence of image events may not capture 
the experience of all filmmakers, but it does characterize 
the method used in Worth's workshop-. 
Second, the influence of the student workshop experi-
ence may have contributed another flaw of the mirror-
image model: the implication that films are typically 
made by individual filmmaker-communicators. This "mis-
take" is all the more odd given Worth's years of experi-
ence as a professional filmmaker. There is no doubt that 
he was aware that film is among the most collective of 
media and that most films could in no way be described 
as the embodiments of any one author's feeling concern. 
Worth was certainly not a naive auteur theorist· rather 1 thi~k we can see here, again, the influence of the psy~ho­
loglcally based, individually oriented communications 
theory Worth was using at that time. 
In his 1969 paper Worth had already begun to retreat 
from his claim of isomorphism between the receiver's and 
the sender's experience of a film. In this paper he gives 
~everal examples of possible viewer interpretations of a 
film (Red Desert by Antonioni) and concludes: 
Most film communication is not. .. that perfect corre-
spondence between the Fee!ing Concern, ~he Story Organism 
1 
and t.he Image Ev~nts t.hey ?1ctate, and the1r reconstruction by . 
the v1ewer. Most. film s1tuat1ons, depending as they must on 
the ~aker and h1~ context (both social and psychological), 
the v1ewer and h1s, and the film itself, are imperfect com-
municative situations. [1969:295] 
Note, however, that perfect communication is still defined 
as the achievement of isomorphic correspondence; con-
tex~ and other factors are still viewed as "imperfections" 
wh1ch muddy the communicative stream. 
Film as the Language of Visual Communication 
Despite their unfortunate devotion to the mirror-image 
model, these early papers were valuable for an under-
standing of film as communication. By using an approach 
that drew upon linguistics, communications theory, and 
psychology, Worth was explicitly differentiating himself 
from the evaluative concerns of film theorists who ap-
proached film primarily as an art form. The title of his 
1966 paper, "Film as a Non-Art," was meant to assert 
provocatively this emphasis on looking "at film as a 
medium of communication, rather than as an art or an art 
form" (1966:322). He was determined that we understand 
t~e. "difference between evaluation and meaning" 
(1bld.:324): 
My concern is not whether film is art or not, but whether the 
process by which we get meaning from film can be under-
stood and clarified .... While all art might be said to com-
municate, all communication is certainly not art. [ibid .] 
Having elaborated a model of the film communication 
proc~s~, he saw as the next step the analysis of the 
med1atmg agent-the film itself. 
The study of the Image Event. .. -its properties, units, ele-
ments and system of organization and structure that enable 
~s t~ infer meaning from a film-should be the subject of our 
1nqu1ry, and of our professional concern. [ibid.] 
lnyursuit of this inquiry Worth followed the analytic paths 
la1d down by linguists in describing and analyzing the 
structure and functionings of lexical communication. He 
adopted, in fact, the heuristic strategy "that film can be 
~tudied as if it were the 'language' of visual communica-
tion, and as if it were possible to determine its elements 
and to understand the logic of its structure" (ibid.:331). 
Worth called this visual analogue to linguistics vidistics, 
and proceeded to elaborate a model of filmic elements 
and principles based on those of structural linguistics. 
Vi?ist!cs in this early stage is concerned, first, with the deter-
mmatlon and description of those visual elements relevant to 
the process of communication. Second, it is concerned with 
t~e de.termination of the rules, laws and logic of visual rela-
tionship that h~lp a vi~wer to infer meaning from an Image 
Ev~n~, and the mteract1on of Image Events in sequence. Film 
as 1f 1t were language, ~~studied vidistically, is thus thought 
of as t~e study of spec1f1ed elements, elements in sequence, 
operat1ons on these elements, and cognitive representations 
of them that act as a mediating agent in a communication 
P.rocess between human beings-between a filmmaker and a 
v1ewer-between a creator and are-creator. [ibid.] 
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Worth presented his solution to the first of these 
questions-the identification of the basic filmic unit, or 
visual element-through an account of the development 
of the film medium and of the theories that accompanied 
its growth. This account, given first in his 1968 paper, 
"Cognitive Aspects of Sequence in Visual Communica-
tion ," was elaborated in the 1969 paper "The Develop-
ment of a Semiotic of Film." After presenting various 
theorists' positions, Worth casts his vote with Eisen-
stein, who isolated the "shot" as the basic element-"the 
smallest unit of film that a filmmaker uses" (1969:297). 
This seemed "the most reasonable" choice, "not only be-
cause it is the way most filmmakers construct films, but 
because it is also possible to describe it fairly precisely 
and to manipulate it in a great variety of controlled ways" 
(1969~ 299). 
Moreover, the Navajo filmmakers "who were taught only 
the technology of filmmaking without any rules for com-
bining units seemed 'intuitively' to discover the shot as 
the basic sign for the construction of their films" (ibid.). 
However, as Worth himself noted in his historical ac-
count, the first filmmakers saw the "dramatic scene" as 
the basic film unit. This was essentially a theatrical con-
cept: "the first filmmakers pointed the camera at some 
unit of action and recorded it in its entirety" (1968:9). It 
look several years before Porter, in 1902, "discovered" 
that "isolated bits of behavior could be photographed 
and glued together to make a scene" (ibid.:10). In retro-
spect, we might wonder how naive the Navajo actually 
were (most had seen at least some commercial films), or 
whether Worth had been able to limit his instruction, as 
intended, to "the technology of filmmaking without any 
rules for combining units." 
Worth used the term videme for Eisenstein's basic unit 
of film communication, previously called an Image Event, 
"that is accepted by viewers as something that repre-
sents the world" (1968:13). However, Worth then argued 
that a finer distinction was required "if we are to attempt 
further scientific analysis .... The shot is actually a 
generic term for two kinds of shots: the 'camera shot' and 
the 'editing shot' " (1969:299). The camera shot, which 
Worth called the cademe, is "that unit of film which re-
sults from the continuous action of the movie camera ... 
from the moment we press the start button to when we 
release it" (ibid .). The editing shot, called the edeme, is 
"formed from the cademe by actually cutting the cademe 
apart and removing those segments one does not wish to 
use" (1968:14). The process of filmmaking, then, involves 
the shooting of cademes and their transformation (in 
whole or part) into edemes. It is then possible to se-
quence these resultant edemes in ways that are deter-
mined by the individual filmmaker, his communication 
needs, his particular culture, and his knowledge of the 
"language." 
The edeme thus becomes the hypothesized basic 
element and building block of the language, upon which 
all language operations are performed, and a basic 
image event from which all meaning is inferred (1968:14). 
Much of the balance of the 1968 paper was devoted to a 
discussion of parameters along which this basic element 
can vary. This discussion has much in common with the 
work of other writers on film (e.g., Spottiswoode 1935) 
who used the "film language" concept. However, Worth 
felt that "none of these authors developed a theory of 
grammar embodying 'linguistic' elements or rule-like or-
ganization capable of syntactic structures" (1968:12). 
In Worth's linguistic analogy, the parameters of motion, 
space, and internal time are thought of as semantic ele-
ments. Sequence, however, including the manipulation of 
apparent time, belongs to a discussion of the syntactic 
aspects of the film "language" because it deals with more 
than one edeme at a time. "Sequencing edemes can be 
thought of as applying syntactic operations to edemes. 
This does not in itself imply a code, a set of rules, or a 
grammar-but it does make it possible to test visual 
communication phenomena along these lines" (1968:17f). 
Sequence becomes the fulcrum upon which Worth sup-
ported his analysis of filmic communication: 
Sequence is a strategy employed by man to give meaning to 
the relationship of sets of information, and is different from 
series and pattern. As I will use the word here, sequence is a 
deliberately employed series used for the purpose of giving 
meaning rather than order to more than one image event and 
having the property of conveying meaning through these-
quence itself as well as through the elements in these-
quence . . .. Man imposes a sequence upon a set of images 
to imply meaning. [1968:18]4 
However, at this stage, Worth was still preoccupied 
with the quest for a universal vidistic syntax analogous to 
those identified by linguists and psycholinguists in the 
analysis of lexical communication. Following Chomsky 
(1957), he saw the goal of vidistics as the development of 
a grammar of film syntax, "whose rules we can describe 
in such a way that we can distinguish between what is a 
grammatical sequence and what is an. ungrammatical 
sequence" (1966:334). Unfortunately for this enterprise, 
Worth admitted that he found "it almost impossible at this 
point to construct a sequence of shots that an audience 
will say is ungrammatical" (ibid.). Not willing to discard 
the concept of grammaticality in film, Worth hoped to 
utilize the notion of a semantic space having dimensions 
of meaning such as that developed by Charles Osgood, 
to arrive at "a grammar of probability, a system of possi-
ble, of more or less meaningful, sequences based on a 
concept of dimensions of syntax" (ibid.). · 
This prospect was explored in a series of studies Worth 
conducted along with Shel Feldman, a psychologist then 
at the Annenberg School. Some of this work was 
sketched in his 1968 paper, and further publications were 
promised, but events led him to other approaches and 
this line of investigation was dropped. 
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The Semiotic Model 
Two factors played a role in shifting Worth away from the 
attempt to formulate a psychological and linguistic 
model of film communication. First, the Navajo project, 
which might have served to intensify his search for a 
universal "psycho-logic" of visual syntax "determined by 
cognitive processes that all human beings share" 
(1966:339), demonstrated instead that members of a cul-
ture developed film "syntax rules" which could be related 
to their lexical syntax and to their patterns of story-telling 
and their systems of value and belief. 
Second, as he read more widely in linguistics and, 
increasingly, in the literature of semiotics-de Saussure, 
Pierce, and Morris-Worth found his central concern 
shifting to the role of social and cultural influences and 
away from the cognitive and psycholinguistic models he 
had earlier employed. 5 Rather than a grammar of film as 
the language of visual communication, he now looked to 
the broader scope of semiotics for an understanding of 
the rules by which we make inferences from sequences of 
signs. 
... the development of a semiotic of film depends not on 
answering linguistic questions of grammar, but on a determi-
nation of the capabilities of human beings to make inferences 
from the edemes presented in certain specified ways. 
[1969:317] 
This shift permitted Worth to place the linguistic model 
in a perspective which had previously eluded not only 
him but many other film scholars. As he noted, "most 
theoreticians from Eisenstein to Bazin have at one time or 
another used phrases such as 'the language of film', 'film 
grammar', and 'the syntax of film' " (1969:302). More in-
sidiously, these metaphoric uses often served more as a 
hindrance than an aid to the understanding of film com-
munication. Film was all too often stretched on a Procrus-
tean bed of linguistic models and its contours destroyed 
in the attempt to fit it to an uncongenial frame. Worth 
came to the realization that tremendous care must be 
taken if one is to use "that most scientific of sign disci-
plines" for the study of film. He returned to his initial 
conception of the linguistic approach as a heuristic strat-
egy with a far more modest estimate of its utility. The 
strategy had, however, led him to a better understanding 
of how film might be scientifically analyzed. 
I am suggesting, then, that linguistics offers us some fruitful 
jumping-off places for the development of a semiotic of film, 
but not a ready-made body of applicable theory leading to 
viable research in film. If we accept Chomsky's definition of 
language we must be forced to conclude that film is not a 
language, does not have native speakers, and does not have 
units to which the same taxonomy of common significance 
can be applied as it can to verbal language. At this point our 
aim should not be to change the definition of language so as 
to include the possible rules of film, although this may well be 
a result of further research in film, but rather to develop a 
methodology and a body of theory that will enable us to say 
with some certainty just how it is, and with what rules, that we 
make implications using film signs with some hope of similar 
inferences. [1969:318f] 
In most of his work after 1969 Worth followed this pre-
scription, but his focus shifted from film in particular to 
the larger class of visual images in general and, although 
the-two sides of the communications process were al-
ways taken into account, increasingly his primary objec-
tive was to understand better how meaning is interpreted 
by viewers rather than how it is articulated by the im-
agemaker. Before discussing these investigations, how-
ever, I want to turn to some important papers in which 
Worth applied the lessons of his theoretical research to 
the practice of those engaged in the use of visual media 
in anthropology and education. 
The Politics of Anthropology 
The most immediate application of Worth 's emerging 
semiotic approach to film communication was in the field 
of anthropology. I have already mentioned his involve-
ment with the sub-discipline of visual anthropology. With 
the completion of the Navajo project Worth found himself 
near the center of a growing "invisible college" of an-
thropologists interested in going beyond the limited uses 
of visual media characteristic of most work in the field. 
Visual anthropology, despite the important early contribu-
tions of Bateson and Mead, had come, for the most part, 
to mean the taking of photographic or film records in the 
field , and the use of these materials as illustrations to 
accompany verbal accounts or as "evidence" uncritically 
accepted as objective records of objects and events. 
In a paper presented to the American Anthropological 
Association in 1968, entitled "Why Anthropology Needs 
the Filmmaker," Worth took strong exception to these as-
sumptions and to the biases and limitations they entailed. 
In the first place, he maintained that we could not simply 
accept photographic or film images as "evidence" be-
cause they always reflect human decisions (conscious 
and unconscious) and technological constraints. 
Further, he argued that by defining film exclusively-
and naively-as a record about culture, anthropologists 
tended to ignore the study of film as a record of culture, 
".reflecting the value systems, coding patterns and cogni-
tive processes of the maker" (1972a). Here, in addition to 
the obvious echoes of the Navajo project, Worth is ex-
plicitly drawing upon Hymes's concept of the "ethnog-
raphy of communication" in which one is interested in 
what things are said (or not said), why, to whom, and in 
what form. 
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As a corollary of this position, Worth was led to the 
view that any film can be used for ethnographic 
analyses-of the culture of the film's subjects or of the 
filmmaker, or both; consequently, 
[t]here can therefore be no way of describing a class of films 
as "ethnographic" by describing a film in and of itself. One 
can only describe this class of films by describing how they 
are used, and assigning the term "ethnograph ic" to one c lass 
of descriptions. [1972a] 
Worth's argument was controversial , for it implicitly de-
nied the inherent ethnographic validity of much "an-
thropological film"-it was not ethnographic just because 
an anthropologist made it. In fact, he went much further 
and attacked the "visual anthropologists" for their lack of 
sophistication in the use of film, a condition which he 
attributed in part to their naive view of film as "objective 
record": 
The only group or professionals involved in the making and 
use of anthropological films who have no training AT ALL in 
the making, analysis, or use of film are anthropologists. One 
can count on the anthropologists who are trained to study 
films, not as a record of some datum of culture, but as a 
datum of culture in its own right. [1972a:359] 
By the late 1960s Worth was actively engaged in efforts to 
change this state of affairs. He was involved with the 
American Anthropological Association 's (AAA) Program 
in Ethnographic Film (PIEF) and in 1970, in collaboration 
with Margaret Mead and others, he helped found the An-
thropological Film Research Institute at the Smithsonian 
Institution. In the summer of 1972 he organized and 
taught, along with Jay Ruby, Carroll Williams, and Karl 
Heider, a summer institute in visual anthropology funded 
by the National Science Foundation. That fall , at the an-
nual meeting of the AAA, Worth was instrumental in the 
transformation of PIEF into the Society for the Anthropol-
ogy of Visual Communication. He served a term as presi-
dent of the society and was the founding editor of its 
journal , Studies in the Anthropology of Visual Communi-
cation. 6 The society and the journal provided a continu-
ing form and context for Worth and others to advocate 
and demonstrate the rich potential of the approach they 
represented. 
The Ethics of Anthropology 
The issues Worth was raising in the late 1960s and early 
1970s did not exist in a vacuum; in a real sense they were 
in the air. Anthropologists along with the rest of academia 
were facing political and social realities which cast into 
question many of the untested assumptions of their disci-
plir.e. !n 1972 a volume of essays appeared under the title 
Reinventing Anthropology, edited- by Dell Hymes, in 
which sixteen authors discussed the field as a product of 
"a certain period in the discovery, then domination, of the 
rest of the world by European and North American 
societies" (Hymes et al. 1972:5). The essays in the book 
addressed many assumptions, biases, and limitations of 
anthropological theory and practice, exposing flaws and 
ethical problems and questioning whether it was possi-
ble to "reinvent" a more responsible and self-conscious 
discipline. 
Worth contributed a chapter to this book in which he 
explicated many of his concerns about the way an-
thropologists have used and misused, understood and 
misunderstood the visual media in studying and report-
ing about various groups around the world. He identified 
a series of intellectual and ethical problems that have 
resulted from the development and diffusion of visual 
communication technologies. 
For the field of anthropology Worth argued that "an 
ethnography of communication developed on the basis 
of verbal language alone cannot cope with man in an age 
of visual communication" (1972b:349). He maintained, as 
I have already noted, that the naive belief in film as objec-
tive record must give way to a more sophisticated under-
standing and use of visual media as research tools and of 
visual images as research data. 
Worth also criticized the inertia of academic disci-
plines which leads us to "continue examining and think-
ing about only inherited problems, rather than those 
problems and modes our children, our students, and 
even ourselves pay most attention to" (ibid.:350). We 
cannot ignore the growing centrality of the visual media 
in all cultures, not only in Western industrial society. He 
spelled out in this paper some of the ways in which social 
scientists can become more sensitive students of con-
temporary, "visual culture." 
The ethical problems he articulated are more difficult 
to resolve. When Worth first began to develop the bio-
documentary method, he saw it as a way to learn "how 
others see their world," to "make it easier for them to talk 
to us" (1965:19). The Navajo project was an expression of 
his belief in the potential of film to reverse the one-way 
flow of most anthropological communication. But, in this 
paper, he reveals a considerably less sanguine view of 
the role of visual media in the lives of "others" in the 
modern world. 
The Navajo project had as one of its aims the study of 
the "guided" introduction of a communications technol-
ogy into a new cultural context. In the 1972 paper Worth is 
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all too aware of the realities of technological diffusion in 
the modern world. For most cultures and societies the 
question is not whether they will encounter and come to 
live with these new visual media, but when and how. 
In teaching people to read, we implicitly teach them what to 
read .. . . The use of a mode of communication is not easily 
separable from the specific codes and rules about the con-
tent of that mode. [1972b:351] 
One central problem, therefore, is that our technologies 
may carry with them "our conceptions, our codes, our 
mythic and narrative forms" (ibid. :353) unless we also 
make clear to other cultures that these new media "need 
not be used only in the ways of the ... societies that intro-
duce them" (ibid.). 
Another ethical question raised in this paper focused 
on the importance of control over information as an in-
strument of power. Worth noted that "anthropologists 
are notorious for studying everyone but themselves" 
(ibid. :355). Is it appropriate for us to encourage others to 
reveal themselves when we do not? As visual tech-
nologies spread to groups in our society and to other 
cultures unused to manipulating these media, 
what is our responsibility to help them to understand a world 
in which their every act of living can be televised and viewed 
by a watching world? .. . Should we teach them not only to 
make their own films but to censor ours as well? The problem 
as I see it is: What reasons do we have not to insist that others 
have the right to control how we show them to the world? 
[ibid. :355-358] 
Film in Education 
Although I have concentrated on Worth's extensive in-
volvement with anthropology, some of his earliest 
academic endeavors were in the field of education. His 
interest in this area was revived in 1971 when he was 
invited to contribute to a Yearbook which was to focus on 
communication and education. He agreed to write a 
paper on the use of film in education and he took the 
opportunity to draw together and to clarify several 
strands in his previous and current thinking. 
Worth began by examining three perspectives which 
he saw as exercising major-and pernicious-influence 
on "the educational and film communities but with very 
little research evidence in their support" (1974a:273). 
First, and most intensely, he takes issue with Rudolf Arn-
heim's position, which he characterized as "visual pri-
macy." Worth argued that Arnheim's theory of "visual 
thinking" carries to an unreasonable extreme the "rea-
sonable assertion that visual perception contains or is 
part of what we normally call'thinking"' (ibid.). 
1 believe that this is a fair characterization of Arnheim's 
work, and Worth goes on to pinpoint some of its major 
flaws. Rejecting in Arnheim an extreme version of the 
psychological, perceptual-cognitive "bias" he himself 
had earlier manifested (although he never expressed 
such a strongly "Gestalt" position), Worth concluded that 
Arnheim "underestimates or denies the extent to which 
symbolic systems or conventions mediate our knowledge 
of the world" (ibid.) . 
The particular error Worth located in Arnheim was most 
clearly manifested in his denial of the cruc ial role of cul-
ture in determining what and how we "see": 
True visual education presupposes that the world can present 
its inherent order to the eye and that seeing consists in under-
standing this order. [Arnheim 1966:148] 
In contrast to this position Worth aligned himself with 
most contemporary thinkers in saying that 
what we see and what we think about is determined at the 
least as much by our symbolic systems and convent ions for 
representing that universe as by the universe itself. 
[197 4a:278] 
Worth went on to outline the other two perspectives-
that of certain film theorists (represented by Gene 
Youngblood) and film educators-which he felt were as 
inadequate and misleading in their own areas as Arn-
heim was in his. What these criticisms have in common is 
Worth's dismay at the failure of so many researchers and 
educators properly to understand or utilize film as a 
process of communication. 
In the remaining sections of the paper Worth presented 
his own current view of how film could be understood as 
communication and how knowledge of this process en-
ables us to use film in the very process of education 
itself. He restates an abbreviated version of the feeling 
concern/story organism/image event model (these terms 
are not used), but with several significant modifications. 
In this account the complexity and non-linearity of the 
filmmaking process are now emphasized, moving the 
model away from the somewhat misleading implication 
that the filmmaker moves in strict, irreversible steps from 
feeling to story to image sequence. However, the model 
is still conceived in "single author" terms. This is shown 
explicitly when Worth describes the completion of 
filmmaking: 
At some point he decides to "release" his film. It is now no 
longer a personal act but a public and social one; it is a 
symbolic form available for participation in a communication 
process. [ibid.:285] 
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Worth was also ready to abandon the mirror-image 
model of viewer reception, if somewhat re luctantly: 
When another person sees this film, he must (depending on 
how one talks about such acts) receive it, decode it, or re-
create it. Since meaning or content does not exist within the 
reel of acetate, the viewer must recreate it from the forms, 
codes, and symbol ic events in the film .... For communica-
tion to occur, meaning must be implied by the creator and 
inferred by the viewer or re-creator. [ibid.] 
Note that, while perfect communication is no longer 
defined in terms of the viewer's ability to trace the 
filmmaking process in reverse and reach the author's 
feeling concern, the terminology suggests an ambiva-
lence that probably reflects a genuine state of intellectual 
trans ition. Worth shifts between "receive," "decode," and 
"re-create" to describe the viewer's ro le in the process of 
communication, still echoing the isomorphic implications 
of "recreation" as he had used the term in earlier papers. 
Yet he also makes explicit the role of "conventions 
through which meaning is transmitted between people 
by a process of implication and inference" (ibid.). 
Worth was now coming to focus more and more on the 
process of interpretation-how meaning is created by 
viewers-rather than on the process of articulation by 
imagemakers (as in the bio-documentary and Navajo 
projects). In order to clarify the importance of this shift, I 
have to backtrack to an earlier stage in Worth's work. 
Ignoring Interpretation 
In one of his earliest papers Worth had introduced a dis-
cussion of audience reactions to his students' films with 
the comment, "Perhaps, in an attempt to understand a 
particular act of communication we can approach under-
standing by examining the reaction to the act, rather than 
the act itself" (1965:3). However, in most of his work over 
the next six years Worth focused more on the act of mak-
ing than on that of interpreting meaning from images. In 
the study of bio-documentaries made by various groups 
in our society (reported in Worth and Adair 1972, Chapter 
15), and in the Navajo project, it was the films and the 
activity of the filmmakers, not the viewers, that Worth was 
interested in. 
In his 1966 paper, "Film as a Non-Art," Worth appeared 
willing to forego the investigation of the interpretive side 
of the communicative process: 
This particular area of study-the interaction between per-
sons and groups, and the stimuli they relate to-has been 
undertaken by the social and behavioral scientists. Although 
relevant to our interests, the specific study of the relationships 
between peop!e and events cannot be the professional con-
cern of those interested in visual communicat ion. [1966:330] 
Although I believe he was primarily distancing himself 
from an overly subjective approach which centers on in-
dividual viewers' reactions, Worth is clearly advocating 
the priority of the "study of the Image Event" itself. The 
extent of this "bias" is shown by the perfunctory way in 
which Worth and Adair assessed the reactions of other 
Navajo to the films made by their fellows. The account 
given by Worth and Adair of the films' world premiere on 
the reservation (attended by 60 Navajo) is the shortest 
chapter in their book (1972:128--131), but it is most 
revealing. 
They make clear the fact that the idea of holding the 
screening at all originated with the filmmakers, not the 
researchers. More importantly, the account reveals how 
unprepared they were for this crucial opportunity to in-
vestigate the interpretations and responses of the Navajo 
viewers. Only nine viewers were questioned, and the 
questions failed to explore fully their reactions. 
Two of the Navajo reported that they did not understand 
certain of the films. These were films judged by Worth 
and Adair to be "somewhat outside the framework of 
Navajo cognition" (ibid.) either in form or subject matter. 
The way these viewers expressed their lack of under-
standing was to say that they didn't get the meaning be-
cause the films "were in English." This is a most intriguing 
response, considering that none of the films had any 
sound at all. However, Worth and Adair continue: 
Since these interviews were conducted in Navajo, we didn't 
see the translated tapes until we left the reservation, and have 
not been able to question our informants further along these 
lines. [ibid.:131] 
By the early 1970s, in contrast, Worth was clearly insist-
ing on the need to include the perspectives of both the 
interpreter and the imagemaker within the scope of inves-
tigation. In part, as I have indicated, this insistence was 
influenced by Hymes's advocacy of an "ethnography of 
communication."7 However, in order to fully describe the 
development of Worth's work at this time, I have to dis-
cuss my own involvement with it. 
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Personal Interlude 
I met Sol Worth in the spring of 1968 when I visited the 
Annenberg School for the first time. My decision to join 
the faculty of the school (as opposed to taking a job in the 
field-social psychology-in which I had just received a 
Ph.D.) was motivated in large part by Worth's presence. It 
was immediately clear that we shared a strikingly similar 
set of interests and intellectual inclinations; and it was 
Worth who convinced me that my interests in the study of 
art and culture could be pursued far more readily in a 
communications program, where they were seen as cen-
tral, than in a psychology department where (I already 
knew) they would be seen as peripheral. Certainly, my 
experience with the psychology of art subfield had been 
disappointing: those who seemed to have a feeling for art 
used poor psychology (e.g., Arnheim), while those who 
were psychologically rigorous did not seem to under-
stand art (e.g., Berlyne). The field of communications-at 
least as it was represented at the Annenberg School-
appeared to offer a framework in which the varieties of 
symbolic behavior (especially the kinds we call art) 
could be studied with a sensitivity to the role of psycho-
logical, social, and cultural determinants. 
From the outset Worth and I engaged in discussions 
and arguments which helped both of us clarify and, I 
hope, improve our understanding of communications 
phenomena. In these discussions, I made clear my belief 
that the interpreter's role was at the center of the com-
municative process. Put most simply, I argued that before 
one could become a "sender" one had to become a "re-
ceiver." The competence needed for articulation derived 
in large part from one's prior experience in interpretation. 
Specifically, in the realm of art I maintained that "the 
process of artistic creation itself presupposes and arises 
out of the process of appreciation" (Gross 1973:115). 
This position reflected two basic considerations. The 
first was the simple fact of ontological sequence: we all 
encounter symbolic events first as consumers and only 
later, if at all, as producers. "Only upon the basis of the 
competence to appreciate meaning presented in a sym-
bolic mode can one hope to achieve the realization of 
creative potential in that mode" (Gross 1974:71). 
Second, I was arguing that symbolic behavior occurs 
in a variety of distinct modes, and that meaning can be 
understood or purposively communicated only within 
these modes. "These modes are partially but not totally 
susceptible to translation into other modes. Thus they are 
basically learned only through actions appropriate to the 
particular mode" (ibid.:57). 
Two papers which I wrote in 1971-1972 presented the 
outlines of a theory of symbolic competence and aes-
thetic communication which incorporated this position 
(1973, 197 4 ). These papers and the theory they presented 
owed much to Worth's influence. At the same time my 
views and emerging theoretical formulations helped 
shape his views on a number of isues. The paper Worth 
wrote on film and education reflects our discussions. By 
the fall of 1971 these discussions had led-via an infor-
mal research seminar we conducted-to collaborative 
projects carried out by several of our students, and even-
tually to a joint paper. 
Th is paper, written in 1972-1973 and publ ished in 1974, 
presents the out I ines of a theory of interpretation-the 
assignment of meaning to objects and events. Because I 
feel that the presentation in the paper is often unclear and 
overly terse, and because the model introduced in th is 
paper figures importantly in Worth's subsequent writings, 
I will risk the appearance of immodesty and attempt to 
remedy some of the paper's defic ienc ies by discussing 
its contents in somewhat greater detail than I have de-
voted to the other papers. 
Interpretive Strategies 
The questions we focused on in our discussions and re-
search centered around the pecu liar properties of visual 
images. Although our paper addressed the general issue 
of how people assign meaning to objects and events, in 
retrospect it seems clear that our concerns were mostly 
directed towards the visual mode in general , and film or 
photographic images in particular. The basic question 
we were asking might be phrased as: what can we 
"know" from these images and how can we know it? We 
felt that the first step towards an answer was to draw two 
basic d istinctions in describing interpretive processes. 
The first dist inction we made was between those ob-
jects and events which do and those which do not "evoke 
the use of any strategy to determine their meaning" 
(Worth and Gross 1974:29). Most of the objects and 
events we encounter are interpreted "transparently" in the 
sense that we "know what they mean" without any con-
scious awareness on our part of any interpretive activity. 
We generally respond to their presence (or absence) in a 
way which ind icates (analytical ly) that a process of tacit 
interpretation has occurred: our behavior has been af-
fected by the presence (or absence) of some object/event 
in some fashion . We simply haven't needed to "think 
about it." Such tacit interpretations range from our "un-
thinkingly" extending our hand to open a closed door 
when we leave a room, to our ability to drive a car along a 
familiar route wh ile absorbed in conversation or reverie. 
Worth and I used the term "non-sign events" to identify 
the events that we ignore or code "transparently." The 
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objects and events which do evoke an interpretive proc-
ess we called sign events. However, we continued, these 
are not predetermined or fixed classes: 
It is important to note that the distinction between sign and 
non-sign events must not be taken as a categorical classifica-
tion of persons, objects, and events. Any event, depend ing 
upon its context and the context of the observer, may be 
assigned sign value. By the same token, any event may be 
disregarded and not treated as a sign. [ibid .] 
The purpose of this first distinction, therefore, was not 
to isolate two kinds of objects and events in the world, but 
two ways in which we respond to the presence or ab-
sence of objects and events. Having made this distinc-
tion we turned our attention to the ways in wh ich sign 
events are interpreted. Our second discrimination was 
between those sign events we called natural and those 
we called symbolic. 
Natural events, as we used the term, are those which 
we interpret in terms of our knowledge (or bel ief) about 
the conditions that determine their existence. The mean-
ing of these events for us, in fact, can be said to deri~e 
precise ly from those existential conditions. They are In-
formative about the stable and/or trans ient condit ions of 
the physical , biolog ical , and/or social forces that deter-
mined their occurence (or non-occurrence) and config-
uration. The important point here is that, while we assign 
meanings to such events on the basis of knowledge (or 
belief) about the forces that caused them to exist, we do 
not see them as having been caused (to any important 
degree) in order to convey these meanings to us_. There-
fore, while they inform us about those factors wh1ch we 
assume (or know) to have caused their occurrence, we do 
not sense an authorial intent behind them. 
Natural events may be produced by either human or 
non-human agency. "However, the signness of a natural 
event exists only and solely because, within some con-
text, human beings treat the event as a sign" (i~id.) : To 
give a simple example, if I observe a tree bendmg 1n the 
wind , my knowledge of meteorology may lead me to 
interpret it as a sign of a coming storm. My interpretation 
is based upon my knowledge of the forces that caused 
the event to occur. 
Similarly, I may decide that a person I observe on the 
street is a former member of the armed forces because I 
notice that he has a crew cut, very erect posture, and 
walks with a slight limp. In this case I would be basing my 
interpretation upon stereotypic knowledge of the f_ac_tors 
that would result in this configuration of charactenst1cs. 
Needless to say, I could be mistaken. The point, of 
course, is that I would be treating the signs I attende~ to 
as informative about stable and/or transient charactens-
tics of the persons I observe and/or their interactions with 
the situations in which I observe them. 
In contrast, symbolic events are events we assume to 
have been intended to communicate something to us. 
Further, we assume that these events are articulated by 
their "author" in accord with a shared system of rules of 
implication and inference. That is, they are determined 
not by physical or psychological "laws" but by semiotic 
conventions. To assess a sign event as symbolic, then, is 
to see it as a "message" intended by its "author" to imply 
meaning(s) which can be inferred by those who share the 
appropriate code. 
If I were to observe, for example, that the man I saw on 
the street, in addition to having a crew cut, erect posture, 
and a slight limp, wore a lapel pin which read "V.F.W.," I 
could then draw the inference that he was, in fact, a 
veteran and, moreover, that he was communicating rather 
than merely revealing this fact (I leave aside the obvious 
possibility of deception, both communicative and "exis-
tential"). 
Worth and I called the interpretation of natural events 
"attribution" and the interpretation of symbolic events "in-
ference." The former term was adapted from the area of 
attribution theory within social psychology. Originally de-
veloped by Fritz Heider in the 1940s, and revived in the 
late 1960s by Harold Kelley (1967) and others, attribution 
theory focuses on the process by which individuals inter-
pret events "as being caused by particular parts of the 
environment" (Heider 1958:297). However, our use of the 
term attribution as a label for the interpretation of natural 
events is narrower than that used in social psychology, 
because we limited it to those interpretations which do 
not assume authorial intention. 
On the basis of these distinctions we proposed a defi-
nition of communication which , in effect, is limited to the 
articulation and interpretation of symbolic events: 
Communication shall therefore be defined as a social proc-
ess, within a context, in which signs are produced and trans-
mitted, perceived, and treated as messages from which 
meaning can be inferred. [Worth and Gross 1974:30] 
Although I have presented these distinctions and defi-
nitions in a rather general fashion, we had in mind a 
particular set of events and situations-those not obvi-
ously and easily defined as natural or as symbolic. We 
were interested, that is, in what we termed ambiguous 
meaning situations. 
Most of the time there is little difficulty in deciding 
whether an object or event we notice is natural or sym-
bolic. Most people who might observe the wind bending 
a tree outside their window and decide to take an um-
brella when they go out would not think the wind was 
"telling" them that it might rain. Similarly, if we meet 
someone who speaks English with a distinct accent we 
may attribute foreign origin to the person but we are un-
likely to decide that the accent was intended to com-
municate the speaker's origin (however, if we find out that 
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the speaker left his or her native country many years 
before at an early age, we may wonder about that as-
sessment). 
When we encounter a symbolic event, on the other 
hand, we are likely to see it as intentionally communica-
tive. We usually have little difficulty recognizing these as 
communications addressed to us as individuals or as 
members of a group, provided we know the code. And we 
usually have little difficulty interpreting them, again pro-
viding we know the code. Traffic lights are rarely mis-
taken for Christmas decorations. 
One further clarification needs to be made. We were 
focusing on the perspective of the person who observes 
the sign event and interprets it. A sign event is symbolic 
(i.e., communicative) only if it is taken as having been 
formed (to an important degree) with the intent of telling 
something to the observer. That is, if the observer is 
watching two people converse and knows that they are 
unaware they are being observed, their conversation, 
while it is a communicative event for them, is a natural 
event for the observer. It was not intended to tell the ob-
server anything, and so it can only be seen as informative 
about the speakers' stable and/or transient characteris-
tics as revealed in that situation. Of course, certain as-
pects of the observed event, such as the participants' 
clothing or hairstyles, might be assessed as being "mes-
sages" addressed not just to the other participant but to 
the "public" at large; these aspects might then be as-
sessed as symbolic vis-a-vis our observer. 
Life vs. Art 
With all these concepts in mind, we turn to events we 
encounter not through direct observation but through 
photographs or film. Here we find the situation to be more 
complex and more interesting. The point of the exercise, 
really, was to develop a way of dealing with the interpreta-
tion of those mediated events (although mediation can 
occur through words and paintings, etc., as well, photo-
graphic mediation is the most ambiguous and therefore 
the most interesting case). 
In our paper we make the suggestion (supported by 
empirical studies) that there is a learning process by 
wh1ch we come to know how to interpret mediated sym-
bolic events such as films. At the simplest level we 
merely recognize the existence of persons, objects, and 
events in the film and rnake attributions about them 
based on our stereotypic knowledge of such things in 
real life. With somewhat more sophistication we can see 
relationships between objects and events that are con-
tiguous in time and/or space-they go together. The cru-
cial step, then, is to see this contiguity as the result of an 
intention to tell us something-to see it as a sequence or 
pattern which is ordered 
for the purpose of implying meaning rather than contiguity to 
more than one sign event and having the property of convey-
ing meaning through the order itself as well as through ele-
ments in that order. [ibid.:32] 
The final stage in this hierarchical process is when we 
recognize the structure of a sign event, an awareness of 
the relations between non-contiguous elements and their 
implicative-inferential possibilities: the beginning and 
end of a story, variations on a theme, prosodic 
patterns, etc. 
When we look at a scene recorded on film we need 
to decide whether the event was (among other pos-
sibilities): (1) "captured candidly" as ~t unfolded naturally 
in front of the camera, with the participants seeming not 
to know they were being filmed ; (2) photographed unob-
trusively so that, while the participants knew about it, it 
was done in such a way that they "almost forgot" they 
were being filmed; or (3) scripted, staged, and directed 
by an "author" working with actors. 
If we settle on the first alternative, we are likely to feel 
justified in making attributions about the persons in the 
film (their characteristics, their feelings, their relation-
ships, etc.). If we choose the second alternative we may 
feel somewhat less col}fident in making such attributions, 
as we wi II feel that the behavior we observe was some-
what constrained by their knowledge that they were 
being filmed. That is, their behavior may be less informa-
tive because we know it is also "messageful." 
If we take the third alternative we are unlikely to make 
attributions of the former sort; here we will interpret the 
scene in light of our knowledge of dramatic conventions. 
These conventions may be nearly the same as the attri bu-
tional stereotypes we use in the first two instances (con-
sequently they might lead us to similar interpretations), 
and this is not surprising: naturalistic conventions in 
?rama aim precisely at evoking attributional knowledge 
1n order to convey "lifelikeness" to characters and situa-
tions. However, they need not be the same. We may 
" ~now" that the cowboy in the black hat is the bad guy 
Without also believing that anyone we see in real life 
wearing a black hat is a criminal. 
The point is that, although events encountered in "life" 
and in "art" may look the same, we make different as-
sumptions about the factors that determine their occur-
rence and configuration. Because the conclusions 
reached may be the same, in order to decide whether an 
interpretation is attributional (the observer is assessing 
the event as "life"-a natural event) or inferential (the 
observer is assessing the event as "art"-a symbolic 
event), we need to know the grounds on which it would be 
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justified. If asked how we know something we have con-
?luded about an event we have observed, we might say it 
IS because of what we know about the way such things 
happen (attributional interpretation); or we might say we 
know it because we are assuming the event was made to 
happen that way in order to tell us something (communi-
cational inference). 
We hoped that this model would clarify some issues 
Worth had addressed in earlier papers. Most im-
mediately, it allowed us to say that the tendency to see 
films as objective records of events rather than as a 
filmmaker's statement about events derived from a confu-
sion of interpretive strategies. The naivete Worth had at-
tacked in many anthropologists and others who were film-
ically unsophisticated took the form of assuming filmed 
events could uncritically be interpreted as natural. What 
such viewers failed to understand was that all mediated 
events are to some degree symbolic. There are always 
decisions made by the mediating agent-what to shoot 
(and consequently, what not to shoot) and how; and hav-
ing shot, how to edit the footage (one rarely sees raw 
footage); and finally when, where, and how to exhibit the 
finished film. 
A sophisticated viewer will recognize that the persons, 
objects, and events in a film are there at least in part 
because the filmmaker included them intentionally; that 
the sequence of events in the film has been ordered by 
the filmmaker's intention to say something by putting 
them in that order (which may not be the order in which 
they actually occurred) ; and that the overall structure of 
the film reflects the filmmaker's intention and ability to 
use implicational conventions in order to communicate to 
viewers who are competent to draw the appropriate 
inferences. 
From this perspective it should be clear why Arnheim's 
statement that "the world can present its inherent order to 
the eye and that seeing consists in understanding this 
order" so infuriated Worth. He saw this view as contribut-
ing to the kind of approach to film represented by 
Youngblood's advocacy of a cinema which was "entirely 
personal . .. rests on no identifiable plot and is not prob-
able. The viewer is forced to create along with the film" 
(Youngblood 1970:64). Worth's response to this was 
fierce : 
Tyros in the arts always forget that creation and originality 
cannot even be recognized (or perceived) except within a 
context of convention and rule-like behavior-especially in 
the arts. It is not within the context of an ordered universe that 
art exists, but rather within the context of man's conventions 
for ordering that universe.[1974:282] 
Cracking the Code 
In the period following the initial development of our 
theory of interpretation Worth devoted much of his atten-
tion to the elaboration and extension of this approach to 
understanding how people derive meanings from visual 
images. He was interested in exploring both the prop-
erties which were unique to visual communication and 
those which could be generalized to other symbolic 
modes. One of his first efforts in the latter direction came 
in response to a request that he prepare a commentary 
on a special issue of New Literary History devoted to 
metaphor. 
Worth began his paper with the observation that "every 
author [in the issue] 'assumes' that metaphor is a verbal 
event-a verbal 'thing' of some sort" (1974b:195). He then 
posed the question of whether-and how-the concept 
of metaphor could be applied to events in other modes. 
The answer he gave was that "metaphor is a structure 
composed of elements in any mode ... related in certain 
ways" (ibid.:196). The rest of the paper was largely di-
rected towards an analysis of the metaphoric possibilities 
of visual images and the argument that "visual structures 
can clarify a general and abstract notion of metaphor" 
(ibid. :197). 
Worth described several examples of filmic metaphors 
and said that the problems they raise are those of "syn-
tactic forms for nonverbal matters for which we have very 
little social agreement" (ibid.:199). How do we know what 
such metaphors mean? 
When Eisenstein used a sequence in his film Strike in 
which a close-up of a factory foreman (who has informed 
the cossacks about a coming strike) is followed by a 
close-up of a jackal, audiences interpret this as "akin to 
the verbal notion of 'the informer is a jackal"' (ibid.:198). 
Or, to repeat an earlier example, we "know" that the cow-
boy in the black hat is the bad guy. Worth's point here 
was that the understanding of metaphor depends upon 
our ability to apply the correct interpmtive strategy to 
infer the implied meaning: 
Metaphor is a communicational code depending upon the 
recognition of structure and the assumption of intention on the 
part of the "articulator" ... of the form we are to treat as 
metaphor. [ibid.:200] 
For example, it is our recognition of metaphoric inten-
tion that tells us Eisenstein has sequenced his shots in 
order to imply that foreman= jackal, and that we should 
not read these as merely contiguous events. In this case, 
the brief introduction of the jackal shot as a "break" in the 
plot signals us that it is a metaphoric comment rather 
than a narrative development. "The important point is that 
every culture provides its 'native speakers' in any mode 
with a code for interpretation" (ibid. :202). 
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Worth devoted the second half of the paper to an 
analysis of caricature as visual metaphor. Using Spar-
shott's conception (in the collection he was discussing) 
that metaphor is "talking about something as it is not," 
Worth suggests that 
metaphor might most fruitfully be understood in comparison 
with theories and concepts of caricature rather than with 
theories of representation. [ibid.:204] 
Noting that verbal metaphors are statements which are 
neither literally true nor false, Worth says that a caricature 
is 
a structure that reveals a set of meanings intended to com-
municate a certain set of relationships within some under-
stood or understandable context and bounds .... A carica-
ture is . . . a structure that relates several elements on one 
level (in shorthand-that of "reality") with elements on another 
level (the symbolic). It puts things together both as they are 
and as they are not, and the point of caricature, like that of 
metaphor, is that neither is only a "portrait." [ibid.] 
Metaphor, in Worth's analysis, thus becomes a central 
component of the structural code we learn "for the inten-
tional creation of meaning within specific contexts" 
(ibid. :209). It is a particularly rich syntactical device for 
implying and inferring meanings in each mode of sym-
bolic experience. 
Knowing about metaphor means knowing how to organize the 
universe within our minds, knowing systems of myth, of 
grammar, of behavior, value and art as they are defined by our 
group now, and have been in the past. [ ibid .:208] 
What Pictures Can Say 
The larger questions raised by Worth's analysis of 
metaphor were addressed in his next paper, in which he 
set out "to begin an exploration into how, and what kinds 
of things pictures mean" and also to explore "how the way 
that pictures mean differs from the way such things as 
'words' or 'languages' mean" (1975:85).8 
The title of the paper, "Pictures Can't Say Ain't," signals 
one of its main arguments, namely that among things 
pictures cannot imply are negative statements. But before 
getting to that point, Worth began by discussing the gen-
eral status of pictures as symbolic events. 
Using the model of symbolic vs. natural events first 
presented in our joint paper, Worth argued that a picture 
is never a natural event, but always a "created social 
artifact." He then recounts the notions of attribut ional in-
terpretation as contrasted with communication inference, 
making the point that an appropriate interpretation of any 
picture always assumes that it was structured intention-
ally for the purpose of implying meaning. Worth invokes 
Grice's classic analysis of intention and meaning, quot-
ing Grice's view that not merely must a symbolic event 
have been articulated "with the intention of inducing a 
certain belief but also the utterer must have intended an 
audience to recognize the intention behind the utterance" 
(Grice 1957:382). 
The next point Worth emphasizes is that we must learn 
to interpret pictures by learning the system of conven-
tions-the code-used by their makers to imply mean-
ings. Pictures cannot be taken as merely "corresponding" 
to reality, and therefore we do not merely "recognize" 
what they mean; we infer meanings on the basis of 
learned conventions. 
Worth here is arguing against two groups who have 
denied that pictures carry intentional meaning: certain 
logical positivists and linguists who believe that only "the 
linguistic mode is capable of meaning" (Worth 1975:93), 
and others, including some artists, who feel that pictures 
can mean anything anyone sees in them. "No artistic 
impl ication should .. . become a grab bag for everyone 
to reach into and pull out what he himself has put in" 
(ibid. :97). 
It we take art seriously as communication, we must 
acknowledge the separate roles and respons ibilities of 
the artist and the audience. Each performs a distinct and 
complementary task in the communicative process. The 
audience doesn't make the work, but interprets it: 
. . . the reader ... does not write any part of the poem, any 
more than the viewer paints the picture or makes the film. The 
reader (viewer), if he can participate in a communicat ions 
event, recognizes the work's structure, assumes an intention 
to mean on the part of the creator, and proceeds to his ex-
tremely complex job of making inferences from the implica-
t ions he can recognize. [ibid.] 
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Turning next to the question of what "pictures cannot do 
that words can do," Worth answers that "pictures cannot 
deal with what is not"; they can't say ain't. After disposing 
of several trivial examples of what might be seen as picto-
rial negation, calling these "linguistic uses of visual form 
which become sign events in a special language" (e.g., 
"no smoking" images), he discusses the general concept 
of what pictorial images affirm or deny. 
Although much of "what is pictured is often valued for 
what it negates by leaving out," pictures cannot specify, 
out of all the things that are not shown, which the painter 
means to say are not the case. "All that pictures can show 
is whatis-on the picture surface" (ibid .:98). 
On the other hand, pictures should also not be taken as 
necessarily affirming the existence of what they do show. 
Worth draws a connection between the fact that pictures 
seem to show us things-particularly photographs, which 
we tend to believe are the product of a machine that "tells 
it like it is"-and our tendency to see "false" pictures not 
as negations but as false affirmations. 
Pictures in and of themselves are not propositions that make 
true or false statements; that we can make truth tables about, 
or that we can paraphrase in the same medium. Pictures, it 
must be remembered, are not representations or corre-
spondences, with or of, reality. Rather, they const itute a "real-
ity" of their own. [ibid. :102] 
But, if this is the case, how do we make sense of pic-
tures? What do they tell us and how? Worth gives two 
answers: first, pictures imply-and we infer-an existen-
tial awareness of particular persons, objects, and events 
that are ordered and structured so as to imply meanings 
by the use of specific conventions; second, "what Larry 
Gross [1973] has termed the communication of compe-
tence." Pictures communicate the skill and control with 
which their structures have been manipulated according 
to a variety of rules, conventions, and contexts. 
Pushing the argument further, Worth reiterates the point 
that "matching to the real world is insufficient to explain 
how pictures mean," and goes on to say that 
correspondence, if it makes any sense as a concept, is not 
correspondence to "reality" but rather corresponde~ce to 
conventions, rules, forms and structures for structunng the 
world around us. What we use as a standard for corre-
spondence is our knowledge of how people make pictures-
pictorial structures-how they made them in the past, ho~ 
they make them now, and how they will make them for vanous 
purposes in various contexts. [ibid::104] 
Worth's answer, then, to the question he had posed at the 
beginning of the paper is that pi~tur~s commu.nicate "the 
way picture makers structure the1r d1alogue w1th the 
world." 
Toward an Ethnographic Semiotic 
Worth's theoretical investigations did not draw him away 
from his concern with the development of a discipline 
which studies visual communications in a fashion com-
patible with that theory. In 1976 he delivered a paper at a 
symposium honoring Margaret Mead on her 75th birth-
day (1980). That paper adressed the need for scholars to 
understand properly the uses and the limitations of visual 
communications. 
He distinguished between the use of visual images 
and media as research tools and as research material. In 
the case of the former he used Margaret Mead's work with 
Gregory Bateson as an example of how pictures can be 
used by a researcher to illustrate patterns of culture. The 
point he felt needed to be emphasized once again-it is 
a point we all forget too easily-is that "the photo is not 
the pattern" but something we use as evidence to illus-
trate pattern. 
Taking photographs, or looking or taking notes are tools for 
articulating and stating patterns we, as anthropologists, wish 
to show to others. [ibid .:17] 
And there is an important corollary: the value of the pho-
tograph lies in the analysis. The researcher-photographer 
who understands what patterns he or she wishes to pre-
sent will take photographs which will be capable of show-
ing these patterns to others. Success is not a matter of 
luck but of training, skill, and intention. Bateson's and 
Mead's photographs are valuable because of their 
knowledge of what they were photographing and why 
they were photographing. 
The reason their photographs and films are records is that 
they were taken in ways which allowed them to be analyzed 
so as to illustrate patterns observed by scientists who know 
what they were looking for. [ibid .] 
The second use of photographs and films is as objects 
and events which can be studied in the context of the 
culture within which they were used. Here the pattern is in 
the picture and the context(s) of its making. These im-
ages are analyzed as parts of culture in their own right, 
"just as conversations, novels, plays, and other symbolic 
behavior have been understood to be" (ibid.). 
This latter approach is one Worth was later to call 
ethnographic semiotics, the study of how actual people 
make and interpret a variety of visual images and events. 
These images and events range from the personal and 
private to the collective and public, from painting and 
sculpture through television, movies, and photographs 
(including home movies, snapshots, and photo-albums), 
store windows, and other forms of everyday presentation 
of self through visual means. 
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Here one looks for patterns dealing with, for example, what 
can be photographed and what cannot, what content can be 
displayed, was actually displayed, and how that display was 
organized and structured. Was it arranged according to how 
these people tell stories? To how they speak, or to the very 
language and grammar that they use? [ibid.] 
In the last two years of his life Worth gave considerable 
attention to the formulation of an empirical application of 
his concept of an ethnographic semiotics. He was deter-
mined to demonstrate rather than merely to advocate the 
feasibility and validity of l:lis aproach to the study of visual 
communications. At the time of his death he was prepar-
ing two grant applications. The first was for a fellowship 
that would give him a year in which to write a book, 
Fundamentals of Visual Communication, which would 
present a framework through which the process and 
structure people use to make interpretations of our visual 
universe might be understood. 
The second application was for a grant to support a 
project he proposed to conduct with Jay Ruby. That proj-
ect, to be carried out over a period of three years, was to 
be a study of the visual symbolic environment of a small 
American community in central Pennsylvania. This was 
an enormously ambitious and exciting project, proposing 
to use as the unit of analysis not specific symbolic prod-
ucts but the "context-the community and the community 
members' interaction with visual symbolic events." 
In his paper honoring Margaret Mead Worth noted, "I 
am aware that, even as we try to develop a history in this 
field, we also are in many ways that same history." Sol will 
remain an important part of the history of studying visual 
communications. 
Notes 
In the preparation of this introduction I benefited from comments and 
suggestions by George Custen, Paul Messaris, Jay Ruby, and Tobia L. 
Worth. I also drew upon Richard Chalfen's paper, "The Contributions of 
Sol Worth to the Anthropology of Visual Communication." 
2 The choice of the Navajo in this example was not accidental. Worth 
had already been discussing this idea with John Adair, a longtime 
student of the Navajo, who later collaborated with him on the project. 
3 I should mention here the fact that Worth's later repudiation of the 
mirror-image model was in large part the resu lt of many discussions 
between the two of us during the period 1968-1972. The arguments 
summarized in this paragraph represent the position I maintained in 
opposition to the implication on Worth's part of sender-receiver 
"isomorphism" in the communication process. 
4 I should alert the reader that later, in our joint paper, "Symbolic Strate-
gies" (1974), this terminology was significantly altered. Needing a 
general term for intentionally articulated arrangements of elements, 
Worth and I used "order" for this purpose, using "sequence" to desig-
nate temporal orderings and "pattern" to designate spatial orderings of 
sign elements. In contrast to "order" we used the term "contigu ity" to 
designate the "juxtaposition of units or events over time, space or 
position" (1974:32) where the perceiver does not assume that this ar-
rangement was intended to imply meaning(s). 
5 A major influence on Worth's thinking at this time was the emerging 
field of sociol inguistics. In particular, he was impressed with the work 
of Dell Hymes, who had come to the University of Pennsylvania in 
1965. 
6 As of the Spring 1980 issue (6:1), the name of the journal was changed 
to Studies in Visual Communication. 
7 Richard Chalfen, who had assisted on the Navajo project, was at that 
time conduct ing dissertation research which combined the ap-
proaches of Worth and Hymes. Chalfen used the term "sociovidistics" 
to designate an "ethnography of film communicat ion" (Chalfen 1974, 
1977). 
8 Many of these questions were also addressed in a later paper, "Man Is 
Not a Bird" (1978). 
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Mead and Metraux 1953 and Metraux 1980 for a descrip-
tion of the projects). Until now only excerpts of the work 
have appeared in print (Bateson 1943, 1953). The first 
three reels of Quex (approximately 45 minutes) with Bate-
son's analytic titles are available for rent from the 
Museum of Modern Art Film Library, 11 West 53rd Street, 
New York, N.Y 10019. All illustrations in this article are 
frames from the film that were added by the editors. 
Frame enlargements are by courtesy of the Museum of 
Modern Art. The editors wish to acknowledge the assist-
ance of Mary Corliss, Stills Archivist, Museum of 
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animal communication. Among his many achieve-
ments are the "double-bind" hypothesis about the ori-
gins of schizophrenia; his collaborative studies with 
Margaret Mead on Balinese nonverbal communica-
tion; and his work in cybernetics. 
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Introduction 
This essay is an experiment in film analysis, and it con-
sists in the detailed examination of a single Nazi film, 
Hitlerjunge Quex, which was released in Berlin on Sep-
tember 19, 1933. Other workers have applied other scien-
tific methods to the analysis of film material; in particular, 
Dorothy Jones (n.d.) has examined American films statis-
tically, noting especially the frequencies of various types 
of sociological events in film plots, and comparing these 
with the frequencies of the same events in real life, thus 
obtaining a picture of how life is distorted, exaggerated, 
or suppressed on the screen. Siegfried Kracauer (1942) 
has used another approach in the analysis of German 
newsreels and documentary films. He has examined a 
considerable bulk of these films from a technical point of 
view, using the contrapuntal relations between visuals, 
speech, and sound to give a general picture of Nazi 
propaganda methods and the special view of life which 
these methods express. 
The present analysis differs from both of these in that it 
is concerned with the weaving of themes within a single 
fictional film. The purpose, too, of the present analysis is 
different, in that where Dorothy Jones asked, "How does 
what is shown on the screen differ from real life?", and 
Kracauer asked, "What are the Nazis trying to say on the 
screen, and how do they say it?", the present research 
asks, "What sort of people are the Nazis?" 
The question has many sorts of importance. Wherever, 
either in war or after the war, we are concerned with 
Germany, our actions must be guided by an understand-
ing of what sort of people the Nazis are and how Nazism 
is related to the character and culture of pre-Nazi Ger-
many. Our whole intelligence service depends upon an 
abi I ity to guess at German motivation, and when, for 
example, we analyze German radio propaganda, treating 
it as an indication of the state of the German morale, our 
analysis rests in the end upon certain assumptions about 
what sort of people the propagandists are. Equally, if we 
want to estimate the effect of Nazi propaganda in the 
United States or in South America, or in some other non-
German region, we need to know what sort of people the 
Nazis are. 
In this latter case the Nazi character is, of course, only 
one element in a complex situation, and even to estimate 
the direction of the effect of Nazi propaganda we shall 
need a similar study of character and culture in the af-
fected country. With such a double knowledge of the na-
ture of Nazism and of the propagandized population we 
will, however, be able to tell exactly what' sort of suscep-
tibility the population may have to the Nazi creed and 
which parts of the creed are likely to appeal to them. 
At the present time the sciences of anthropology and 
psychology are engaged in devising the techniques for 
precisely this sort of description of the various sorts of 
character appropriate to and implicit in the cultures of 
different peoples (Bateson 1942; Erikson 1942; Gorer 
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1942; Mead 1943). The present study is therefore in-
tended to make two sorts of contribution: first, a contribu-
tion to the methods of analyzing human behavior and 
human culture, and second, a more specific contribution 
to our understanding of Nazism. 
The film which is here analyzed has three principal 
connections with Nazism: (1) Nazis are shown on the 
screen, (2) the film was made by Nazis, and (3) the film 
was used to make Nazis, that is, to induce a Nazi frame of 
mind in the audience. Since we are interested to know the 
psychology of this Nazi frame of mind, we are naturally 
concerned chiefly with the second and third of these 
connections. The picture of Nazis which the filmmakers 
put on the screen cannot be taken as an objective or 
ethnological record of Nazi behavior, being no doubt sub-
ject to all sorts of distortion, exaggeration of some as-
pects and suppression of others. The camera-and es-
pecially the motion picture camera-can lie freely about 
whatever passes in front of the lens, but inasmuch as the 
film was made by Nazis and used to make Nazis, we 
believe that at a certain level of abstraction the film must 
tell us the truth about Nazism. 
A painting, a poem, or a dream may give an exceed-
ingly false picture of the real world, but insofar as the 
painter or the dreamer is an artist, insofar as he has com-
plete control of his medium, the artistic product must of 
necessity tell us about the man himself. In the same way 
this film, insofar as it is an integrated work of art-and we 
shall see that it is very highly integrated-must tell us 
about the psychology of its makers, and tell us perhaps 
more than they intended to tell . 
We shall not in the course of this analysis ask whether 
the filmmakers were conscious or unconscious of what 
they put into the film, but since this question is commonly 
raised by those who approach the analysis of prop-
aganda for the first time, and since the notion of uncon-
scious mental processes is difficult to grasp, it is neces-
sary to make clear the assumptions about the uncon-
scious upon which this analysis is based. 
It is assumed that the filmmakers continually put to-
gether details which appeared to them to be artistically 
appropriate, and further, that in many cases what was 
implied by such montage or editorial arrangement was 
consciously meant. In other cases, no doubt, the 
filmmakers did not stop to ask what was implicit in the 
way in which they put the details together, but were only 
conscious of their appropriateness. In such cases we as-
sume that they liked the symbolic implications of what 
they had done, at least so long as t~ese implications did 
not come to their conscious attention. 
It is not possible, however, to tell in any given case 
whether the filmmakers were ful~y conscious, partially 
conscious, or unconscious of whaUhey were doing, and 
therefore this question is not asked in the analysis. There 
are several passages in the film where it appears that the 
script writers had at least a parlor acquaintance with 
Freudian psychology. In one case, for example, we are 
shown on the screen an incident in which a Communist 
thrusts a banana into a girl's mouth, and this incident fails 
to achieve spontaneity. It is as if the filmmakers departed 
from their own methods of artistic creation to introduce a 
piece of Freudian symbolism almost by recipe. If they 
have done this once, they may have done it many times in 
the course of the film, and there are no criteria which 
would enable us to tell whether a given detail or combina-
tion of details was spontaneous or calculated. It is not 
possible ever to determine whether the filmmakers were 
conscious of the implications of the various themes in the 
film, and we shall therefore refrain from asking this ques-
tion. Those who feel that the analysis leans toward overin-
terpretation are recommended to look for the sort of "ar-
tistic appropriateness" which probably appealed to the 
filmmakers and then to consider what the logical implica-
tions of such appropriateness are. 
Another feature of this analysis which may be confus-
ing to the nontechnical reader concerns the relationship 
between psychological and anthropological techniques. 
A film is not the idiosyncratic production of a single artist 
working by himself and for himself; it is created by a 
group of filmmakers working in close cooperation and 
with an eye on a popular audience. Therefore it has been 
assumed in the analysis that what seemed artistically 
appropriate to the filmmakers was also psychologically 
germane to Nazism-that the unconscious implications 
of the film were also themes implicit in Nazism as a 
whole, whether or not Nazis were or are generally con-
scious of them. In the analysis, the film has been treated 
not merely as an individual's dream or work of art, but 
also as a myth. We have applied to it the sort of analysis 
that the anthropologist applies to the mythology of a 
primitive or modern people. 
The anthropologist has an essential touchstone by 
which he tests his interpretations of any given myth or 
record of behavior. His analysis is not confined to that 
one item; he has in his notebooks many other myths, 
many descriptions of the ritual behavior and the daily life 
of the people whom he is studying, and he is able always 
to take eqch detail of his interpretation of the myth and to 
compare it with the wider background of other data upon 
that culture. If the interpretation is correct, he will be able 
to find numerous other instances in the culture which the 
same interpretation would fit; and if the interpretation is 
incorrect, he will be able to find instances in the culture to 
disprove it. Still more important, he will be able to say 
immediately of many possible interpretations: "No; this is 
wrong. This interpretation does not fit the people whom 
I knew." 
We have tried, in the present analysis, to create a 
touchstone of this kind. Before beginning the analysis of 
this film, and during the course of this analysis, the 
analyst has been cooperating in a more general study of 
German and Nazi culture (Erikson 1942). This work has 
been done under the auspices of the Council of Intercul-
tural Relations, and has consisted in a series of detailed 
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anthropological interviews with a number of social scien-
tists1 who have had intimate experience of German 
culture. 
These interviews have been of two sorts. The majority 
were directed toward discovering the major themes of 
German culture. The social scientists were asked in an 
anthropological interview to discuss their own experi-
ences in Germany-especially their experiences as chil-
dren in a German family setting. Simultaneously they 
were asked to comment as social scientists upon these 
experiences, their significance, and the degree to which 
they might be regarded as typical. These interviews were 
recorded verbatim. 
A further series of interviews was used to check the 
specific interpretations arrived at in this analysis. The 
social scientists were invited to a showing of the film and 
were invited to comment on the interpretation. As a result 
of these various comments, the analysis has been revised 
in many ways, but since not all the comments made have 
involved reinterpretation of the analysis, the writer 
alone is responsible for the interpretations which are 
here offered. 
Last, it is necessary to stress that this analysis makes 
rather unusual assumptions about the nature of prop-
aganda. In most content analyses the various statements 
in a piece of communication-for example, a film or a 
statistical picture of the propagandic content of the 
communication. 2 In such an analysis, in its extreme form, 
Communist sentiment uttered by the Communists in this 
film would have to be counted as items of Communistic 
propaganda, which would be absurd. In the present 
analysis, however, the emphasis will lie on the context of 
each event shown on the screen, the film as a whole will 
be regarded as a single psychological or artistic unit, 
and each event on the screen will be seen as set in the 
context of the film as a whole. 
This means that we shall attribute propagandic effect 
to the plot and its structure rather than to isolated details. 
We shall assume that what the audience learns from the 
film is not so much to ape the explicit sentiments of the 
hero nor to adopt his opinions, but rather that they ac-
quire the ways of thought of the propagandist. We are 
interested in knowing what sort of people the Nazis are, 
and in order to find this out we shall assume that the 
audience learns from the film to accept as artistically 
appropriate those things which the filmmaker has put 
together-in fact, that the audience consciously or un-
consciously will acquire Nazi habits of thought. 
Reasons for the Selection of This Film 
For this type of analysis it was essential that the film 
selected should have certain characteristics. 
1 It should show both the Nazis and their enemies on the 
screen. There are many propagandic films intended to 
promote a Nazi frame of mind which achieve this end by 
indirect means. Faehrmann Maria (1935), for example, 
contains an excellent symbolic expression of the Nazi 
attitudes toward death, but the whole film is set back in 
the realm of fantasy and the Nazis themselves do not 
appear on the screen. Friesennot similarly contains a 
great deal of material which expresses the Nazi attitudes 
toward sex and the Nazi notions of conflict between the 
generations, but this story is set in Russia and deals with 
an old German colony invaded by Bolsheviks; Nazism 
does not appear on the screen and, therefore, though the 
equation is obvious, it is not possible to say definitively 
that the younger generation of these colonial Germans 
stands as a symbol of Nazism. 
To make all these other films available for analysis it 
was first necessary to establish the basic symbolic equa-
tions, and this could best be done by analyzing a film 
which showed the Nazis and their enemies explicitly 
labeled on the screen. Such a film makes it possible to 
dissect out the relationship between these two fixed 
points and the whole range of phenomena-parenthood, 
adolescence, maturity, cleanliness, sex, aggression, 
passivity, and death-which are embraced by the Nazi 
view of life. 
Few German films meet this requirement. On Horst 
Wessel's birthday (October 9) in 1933, Dr. Goebbels ad-
dressed a gathering of German film producers and his 
speech contained the following passage: 
We National Socialists do not particularly care for the mere 
fact that our S.A. marches over the stage or the screen. Its 
realm is in the street. But when somebody approaches the 
solution of National Socialist problems artistically, he must 
realize (sich klar sein) that in this case, too, art does not come 
from wishing (wollen) but knowing how (kennen). Even an 
ostentatiously presented National Socialist conviction 
(Gesinnung) cannot make up for the lack of true art, by a long 
way. The National Socialist government never has demanded 
~hat S.A. films be produced. On the contrary: it sees a danger 
1n too many. ~ut when a company nevertheless approaches 
the pre~entat1on (Darstellung) of the values arising from life 
(Erlebmswerte) of our S.A. or the National Socialist idea then 
this film must be of first-class artistic quality. Therefore it,is not 
easy (bequem) but, on the contrary, extremely difficult be-
cause [the filmmakers are] responsible to the entire nation to 
make an S.A. film. The task one undertakes there demand~ 
staking (Einsa.tz) of all the best (aile besten) talent, and only 
truly great art1sts can accomplish it. National Socialism is 
under.n~ cir?umstances a guarantee of approval (Freibrief) 
for.art1st1c fa1lure. On the contrary: the greater the idea that is 
bemg presented, the greater the artistic demands that must 
be made of it. [Kalbus 1935]. 
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~hat the effects of this speech were we cannot judge, 
but many case very few films of this sort have been 
made .. There have been documentaries (e.g., Triumph 
des Wtllens, 1934; Fuer Uns, 1937; Sieg im Westen) deal-
ing with various sorts of Nazi ceremonial, newsreels, and 
the films of conquest which were made officially, but the 
only available fictional films containing the Nazi uniform 
were those produced in the early years of Nazism. These 
included S.A. Man Brandt (1933), Hans Westmar (1933), 
Blutendes Deutschland (1933), and lch fuer Oich (1934). 
2 For this type of analysis, the film should contain a large 
mass of material on the German family. This criterion was 
introduced for practical reasons. It so happens that in 
anthropology and psychology the most effective tech-
niques for the description of human character have been 
based on analysis of family life, especially of the parent-
child relationship. It would have been possible-indeed, 
in anthropology, we are often compelled to do this-to 
have performed similar analyses outside the family set-
ting. But such analyses are less vivid and are less useful 
in comparative studies of more than one culture. If it is 
possible to refer the peculiarities of, say, religious behav-
ior back to the family, then comparison between one cul-
ture and another becomes comparatively easy because, 
although the elements present in one religious system 
may be very different from those present in another, the 
basic elements of the family are almost universal and 
only differently arranged in different parts of the world. 
Actually, the Nazis have used the family setting as a 
springboard for their propaganda in several films and 
even in Mein Kampf. 3 
3 The film should be a good film in two senses: first, the 
acting should be good enough to give an accurate im-
pression of the emotions intended; and second, the film 
should be a close-knit artistic unit so that the themes and 
incidents of the plot can be readily seen in relation to the 
film as a whole. 
4 The film should carry the imprimatur of official Nazi ap-
proval and should have been successful with Nazi audi-
ences. It is true that every film is a product of cooperative 
work and therefore must show a cultural norm rather than 
individual idiosyncracies, but this criterion is introduced 
as a further guarantee of Nazi cultural normality. The fes-
tivities at the premiere of this film and the fact that the film 
is said to have been kept on the commercial screens for 
an unusually long time are a proof of official Nazi ap-
proval, but, unfortunately, we have no data on audience 
reactions. The film Hitlerjunge Quex amply satisfies these 
criteria. 
Basic Data on the Film 
The .film Hitlerjunge Quex was shown to Hitler at the 
Ufapalast in Munich on September 12, 1933, and had its 
premiere in Berlin, at the Ufapalast am Zoo, a week later. 
This premiere was made into a great occasion with a 
symphony by Bruckner and a speech by the Youth 
Leader, Baldur von Schirach. 4 
The print of the film which was used for this analysis 
was obtained from the Reichsfilmarchiv, in 1938, by the 
M~seum of Modern Art Film Library, and in the analysis a 
mimeographed transcript of the film, also obtained from 
the Reichsfilmarchiv, has been used. 
Length: The film is nine reels in length and lasts about 1 
hour and 40 minutes. 
Titles: The film carries credit titles in German, which are 
here reproduced in translation: 
a UFA presents (zeigt) 
b "Hitlerjunge Quex" 
c A film of the spirit of sacrifice (Opfergeist) of German 
youth. 
d Produced under the auspices (Protektorat) of the Youth 
Leader of the German Reich, Baldur von Schirach. 
e After the novel by-K. A Schenzinger 
Script-K. A Schenzinger 
B. E. Luethge 
Camera .... . . . ........ ...... Konstantin lrmen-Tschot 
Setting ......................... ... Benno von Arent 
Arthur Gunther 
Sound ............. . ............. . ... Walter Tjaden 
g Music ......................... Hans-Otto Bergmann 
Words of Hitler Youth Song ........ Baldur von Schirach 
h Cast: 
Father Voelker ...................... Heinrich George 
Mother Voelker ......................... Berta Drews 
Heini .................................. a Hitler boy 
Stoppel ...................... Hermann Speelmanns 
Gerda .............................. Rotraut Richter 
Wilde ................................. Karl Heixner 
District Leader Kass .................. Claus Clausen 
Fritz Doerries ........................... a Hitler boy 
Ulla Doerries ........................... a Hitler girl 
k Hospital sister ....................... Franziska Kinz 
Grundler ........................... Hans Ramspott 
Franz ................................ Hans Richter 
Boys and Girls of the Berlin Hitler Youth 
m Director: Hans Steinhoff 
n Producer: Karl Ritter 
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Figure 1 Heini's father begging his wife for beer money. 
o Prepared with Klangfilm apparatus 
Afifa-Sound-Track 
p Ufa 
q End 
Summary of the Plot 
The five analyses which follow will all be in part selective 
summaries of the film, differing from each other in the 
type of selection involved. To orient the reader in these 
analyses, it is necessary to provide at this stage a some-
what less selective summary. All summaries are neces-
sarily in some measure selective and therefore fall short 
of objectivity. The present summary is, however, objec-
tive in the sense that each statement is objectively true, 
but the summary as a whole was written after the study of 
the film had been completed and is specifically de-
signed to enable the reader to follow the steps of the 
various analyses. 
The hero of this film is Heini Voelker, a preadolescent 
boy, the son of a violent father and a drudge mother. His 
parents are of the lower middle class and have fallen in 
the world as a result of the inflation and the father's war 
wounds. 
Two hungry Communist boys steal apples from a 
vendor in the street, and Heini's father intervenes in their 
favor when the vendor talks about putting them in prison. 
In the crowd there is a sinister Communist agitator, Wilde, 
who makes a speech and provokes a riot in which Heini's 
father hurts himself, stumbling over the curbstone. He is 
helped home by Stoppel, an organizer of Communist 
youth. The Voelkers live in a poor Communist district of 
Berlin. Stoppel helps the mother to dress the father's 
wound. 
The father asks the mother for money to get some beer. 
She says that she has no money, and a violent scene 
follows, the father ransacking all the containers in the 
house in search of the mother's hiding place. At this mo-
ment Heini returns home from his work in a printing shop 
(arriving so that we see the climax of the scene between 
the parents through the eyes of the son). At the printing 
shop Heini had received a tip of 1 mark. He secretly gives 
this mark to his mother. She gives it to the father, who then 
goes off to get his beer. Stoppel is impressed by Heini's 
character and contacts him with a view to enlisting him in 
the Communist Youth International. (Figures 1, 2.) 
After Stoppel leaves, the mother opens the window and 
lets in the mechanical music of a merry-go-round at the 
neighboring fair. Heini is thus reminded of a wonderful 
knife which he has seen in a lottery in one of the 
sideshows. He asks his mother to enter this lottery, which 
he is sure that he will win. She gets money from the hiding 
place in the coffee grinder and gives it to him. Heini goes 
to the lottery and loses. (Figure 3.) 
Stoppel appears at Heini's elbow, comforts him, and 
invites him to join a hike of the Communist Youth on the 
following day. Heini accepts. 
On the hike, Heini sees the Hitler Youth, a company of 
whom are hiking on the same train to the same woods. He 
is disgusted by the gross behavior of the "Communists" 
and especially by a kiss which Gerda, one of the Com-
munist girls, forces upon him. Finally he wanders in the 
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Figure 2 Heini 's father demanding pennies for beer. 
dark, away from the Communist camp, ti ll he hears the 
"Hitler Youth Song" coming from the Nazi camp. He 
gazes through the buses at the Nazis who are celebrating 
the summer solstice. The Nazis find him and accuse him 
of spying ; Fritz, the boy leader of one of the Nazi troops, 
sends him away. The vo ice of Ulla, Fritz's sister, is heard 
saying that he might have become a convert, but by this 
time Heini has sadly gone away. He sleeps by himself on 
the bare ground, and next morning, after watch ing the 
Nazis with longing eyes, he goes home to his mother. 
(Figure 4.) 
He tells her he was with the Nazis and they were not so 
bad; they were wonderful. His mother is worried but not 
angry with him. She even lets him sing the "Hitler Youth 
Song" (without warning him that his father is in the next 
room). The father hears the song and comes in, furious. 
He compels Heini to sing the "lnternationale," boxing his 
ears while he sings. 
Next day at school Heini again meets Gerda and 
avoids her advances. He approaches Fritz and is invited 
by him to supper. Gerda meanwhile has been told by 
Stoppel to vamp Grundler, a weak Nazi boy, and while 
Fritz and Heini go off to supper, Gerda and Grundler go 
off to seek "Turkish Delight" at the fair. 
At supper in this middle-class home, Fritz and Ulla ask 
Heini to come to the opening of their new Nazi clubroom 
(Heim). Heini hesitates because he has no key with which 
to return home after the meeting. Finally he accepts when 
put on his mettle by Fritz. 
Figure 3 Heini and his mother listening to the merry-go-
round music while Heini begs for money for the lottery. 
The father, meanwhile, has been persuaded by Stoppel 
to sign Heini into the Communist Youth. When Heini 
comes home, his father at once informs him that he is to 
go that night to the Communist Local. Heini says, "Do I 
get a house key?", and the father says, "Of course-you 
are now a grown man, and a grown man has a house key." 
The father then makes a long, friendly speech to Heini 
about the difficulties of life and how "you young ones 
must help us older people." Heini is almost in tears and 
says later to his mother, "Father is not so bad-1 cannot lie 
to him-he gave me a house key." He is determined, 
however, not to go to the Communist meeting. 
He goes out that evening but meets Stoppel , who 
draws him aside into a doorway and tells him that the 
Communists are going to raid the Nazi clubroom and that 
he is to help in the raid . Heini manages to slip away 
without taking an active part, but when the police come 
he is picked up and taken to the police station. 
The police tell him to "go home to Mother." The Nazis 
think he has set the Communists onto them, and as he 
leaves the police station, they accusELhim of treachery. 
(We are given no further information about the events of 
that night, nor do we see Heini use the house key to return 
to the bosom of his family.) 
Next day Stoppel tells Heini that he was a hero be-
cause he did not tell anything to the police and that to-
night they will get dynamite from the Communists' cache 
in the Marschstrasse and blow up that nest of Nazis. 
Heini protests and finally says he will warn the Nazi boys. 
Stoppel is shocked and tells Heini that that is something 
which one does "only once in a life," but in the end Stop-
pel shrugs his shoulders and dismisses the matter. 
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Figure 4 The "disorderly" Communists march past the 
Hitler Youth at the train station. 
When Stoppel leaves, Heini rushes to the telephone. to 
warn Fritz and Ulla. Ulla answers the telephone but Fntz 
tells her not to listen to that traitor. Ulla is worried by 
Heini's mention of dynamite, but she obediently hangs up 
and Heini is left talking into a dead phone. In despair, he 
tries to persuade the police to interfere, but they again 
treat him as a child. He then tries to find Stoppel 
but cannot. 
Suddenly, while Heini is at the fair looking for Stoppel, 
there is a violent explosion-the Nazis have blown up the 
Communists' cache of dynamite-and Heini starts for 
home whistling the Youth Song. 
Stoppel knows that it is Heini who has betr~yed them, 
and he goes to the Voelkers' home where he f1nds only 
the mother. In the conversation which follows, the mother 
gets at first an impression that Stoppel has killed Heini 
and later a general fear that the Communists will kill him. 
Heini arrives after Stoppel has left and finds his mother 
in a state of despair. She tries to persuade him to make up 
with Stoppel but fails in this because Heini is now sure. 
that the Nazis will accept him. Heini goes to sleep on h1s 
bed while his mother sits weeping beside him. Finally, 
she turns on the gas to kill both herself and Heini, and the 
screen is filled with billowing fumes. 
Heini awakes in a hospital. A nurse says, "There is .. 
somebody to see you." Heini s~ys, ".MY mot~er?", but 1t IS 
the Nazi boys and Ulla. They g1ve h1m a un1form and a 
mirror in which to admire himself. After they have gone 
the nurse comes, and while she removes the Nazi cap 
from his head, she tells him that his mother will never 
come. . . 
While Heini is convalescent, his father and the d1stnct 
leader of the Nazis happen to visit him simultaneously 
and the question is discussed-"Where does the boy. 
belong?". The Nazi wins this discussion by a ve:bal tnck, 
and Heini goes to live in a Nazi clubhouse outs1de the 
Communist district. Here he meets Grundler, the weak 
Nazi and we are shown the contrast between the two 
boys'. Grundler gives Heini the nickname "Quex" (an .ab-
breviation of Quexsilber, "quicksilver"). He resents th1s 
and a small fight breaks out among the boys. The fight is 
quelled by a barked command fr?n: the district leader. 
The leader himself addresses Heinl as Ouex, and the 
name sticks. 
The Communists are waiting for vengeance, and, in 
spite of the district leader'~ oppositi?n, .Heini wants to 
return to the Communist d1stnct to d1stnbute leaflets for 
the 1933 election. Grundler has been falling lower and 
lower under Gerda's influence, and through Grundler's 
treachery Stoppel finds out where Heini is stayi~~· We ~re 
given to understand that Stoppel is fond o.f Heinl. a.nd IS 
wavering in his Communism. He goes to find He1n1 an~ 
makes a last attempt to persuade him to leave the Naz1s. 
Heini is adamant, even against the offer of the original 
many-bladed knife which Stoppel produces from his 
pocket. Stoppel goes back to the Communists and with a 
gesture places the knife on the table. It is picked 
up by Wilde. . 
The Nazis are working on leaflets for the 1933 elect1on, 
and Grundler and Gerda treacherously destroy all the 
available Nazi leaflets. Fritz has been wounded in an 
election riot, and Heini and Ulla meet at the door of the 
room in which Fritz is lying. They go off together to Heini's 
printing shop, where they work to prepare new leaflets, 
and when the work is completed Ulla gives Heini a single 
kiss. Heini then goes out to distribute the leaflets in the 
Communist district. He is hunted and encircled by the 
Communists in the darkened streets and takes refuge in 
one of the tents in the deserted fair. 
Accidentally, he touches a mechanical figure of a 
drummer and the figure starts to beat its drum, thus be-
traying him. The Communists enter the tent and Heini 
screams (presumably stabbed by Wilde). The Nazis 
come (it is now bright daylight) and find Heini dying. The 
knife lies on the ground beside him. Heini's last words 
are, "Our flag billows before . ... "The soundtrack takes 
up the "Youth Song" and the flag appears on the screen, 
giving place to marching columns of Hitler Youth. 
(Figure 5.) 
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Analysis 1: Time Perspectives 
In any analysis it is important to determine the sorts of 
questions which we ask of the material and to set up our 
analytical frames in such a way that the whole unit which 
we are examining will not be lost in our attention to details 
nor the details lost through too much attention to the 
whole. This dilemma of the wood and the trees can best 
be resolved by employing a series of different types of 
analysis. We shall therefore look at this film from three 
standpoints: first, from far off we shall examine its total 
climax structure; then, in a somewhat closer inspection, 
we shall study the characterization of the two political 
groups and the backgrounds in which they are set; and 
last, examining the film in detail, we shall study the in- · 
teractions between the various members of Heini 's family. 
The climax structure of any work of art is related to 
those characteristics of the artist which the psychologists 
call "time perspectives." All peoples must impose sense 
and coherence on the very complex stream of their expe-
rience. They must punctuate this stream so that the rela-
tions between events may be meaningful. But the type of 
sense which different types of peoples impose is known ' 
to vary greatly. Some people see themselves as living in 
a fatalist universe; others see their own behavior as de-
termining the future; and still others believe in a Golden 
Age, and of these some will put the Golden Age in the 
past while others imagine it in the near or distant future. 
Philosophers may try to choose between these various 
views of experience, attributing greater or less truth to 
one or the other, but with this question we are not con-
cerned. We are only asking what sort of view of the past 
and future, what type of time perspective, a certain politi-
cal cult had developed in 1933. Probably it is not given to 
man to determine which of these time perspectives is 
"true" because the stream of events to which the perspec-
tive is applied includes not only outside events but also 
his own behavior. His own behavior will be guided by his 
own time perspective, and thus whatever that time per-
spective may be, the total stream as he sees it will ac-
quire the appropriate structure. 
But because his behavior is shaped in terms of his time 
perspective, it becomes important to study this. A state-
ment of a man's time perspective is a way of describing 
his character. 5 
The time pe(spective of this film is summarized for us 
in the "Hitler Youth Song," whose words were composed 
by Baldur von Schirach: 
Figure 5 Heini dying in the arms of his Nazi comrades. 
"Through death to a millennium" 
Our flag billows [flattert] before us! 
We advance [ziehn] into the future man for man! 
We march for Hitler through night and pain [Not] 
With the flag of youth for freedom and bread! 
Our flag billows before us! 
Our flag is the new epoch [Zeit]! 
And the flag loads us into eternity [Ewigkeit]! 
Yes, the flag is more than death! 
Or, in one phrase, we may summarize the time per-
spective of the film as "through death to a millennium." 
This time perspective is interesting in several ways. It is, 
of course, the characteristic time perspective of the great 
fanatical revivals and nativistic cults, from early Chris-
tianity through Mohammedanism and Marxism to the 
Ghost Dance of the American Indians and the Vaihala 
Madness of New Guinea. The same basic view of life, 
"through the unpleasant to the pleasant," recurs again 
and again, but the specific pictures which are drawn of 
the unpleasantness and of the later reward vary from one 
culture to another. The unpleasantness may be death or 
political chaos or persecution or striving effort; and the 
final reward may be either in this world or in the next. It 
may be a sensuous reward, a military victory, or an ivory 
tower. The prognosis for any cult will depend on how the 
two successive phases of this time perspective are 
conceived and on the likelihood of events fulfilling 
expectations. 
In this film there are two such cycles, in which Heini 
goes through death: first, his incomplete death when his 
mother turns on the gas and second, his final death at the 
hands of the Communists. What sorts of death were these 
and to what sort of millennium did they lead? 
28 studies in Visual Communication 
The two deaths have a number of features in common: 
Each follows some conspicuous achievement on Heini's 
part. The gas death occurs after ~e has rescued the Nazi 
boys and enabled them to blow uts>. the Communists' 
dynamite; the final death follows his successful distribu-
tion of l-eaflets in the Communist district after the Com-
munists thought they were all destroyed. 
2 There is a woman involved in both deaths. The gas death 
is the final episode in Heini's relation to his mother; and 
the final death follows Ulla's kiss. 
3 Each death is represented on the screen by a sort of 
billowing or waving motion. In the case of the gas death, 
we see the fumes fill the screen and move like heaving 
waves. In the final death, it is the Nazi flag itself which fills 
the frame and bi I lows before us. 6 
4 Each death is accompanied by a change in illumination. 
The gas death occurs in a darkened room, and after it the 
fumes fade away to disclose Heini in a brightly lighted 
hospital ward. In the final death Heini distributed his leaf-
lets and was encircled by the Communists in darkened 
streets; he takes refuge in the dark tent of the deserted 
fair; he is stabbed in the dark. We then see his legs 
faltering as he comes out of the tent in a half light and 
finally, when the Nazis find him dying, we see full day-
light. 
Each death accompanies a change in Heini's status. By 
the gas death he shifts from his family home to a hospital, 
a sort of neutral ground halfway toward Nazism. By his 
final death he moves from the world of the living to the 
world of reincarnated heroes. 
In each death Heini's last words refer to the future. In the 
gas death, his mother says, "Heini, settle your quarrel 
with him [Stoppel] or else everything is lost [sonst ist 
alles aus]." And Heini replies, "But Mother, now it is just 
beginning [Jetzt faengt es doch erst an]." In the final 
death, Heini's last words are: 
Our flag billows before us 
It leads ... 
[See Figure 5.] 
Each death is rather amply predicted. The gas death is 
predicted by the mother at the beginning of the film when 
the father comes home hurt. She says, "You'll bring us all 
into misfortune [Unglueck] again." Later, while Heini is 
coming home from the hike, we are shown a shot of the 
mother lighting the gas, and finally, just before the event, 
she says, "Everything is lost" (quoted above). The final 
death is predicted by the district leader's anxiety, by 
Stoppel's and Gerda's warnings, and by the heavily 
weighted scene in which Wilde picks up the knife. Each 
death is tragic in the classical sense of being the final 
outcome of an inevitable sequence of events. 
These features which are common to the two deaths 
give us together a rounded picture of Nazi time perspec-
tive. To get this picture, it is important not to think of these 
features separately as they are enumerated above but to 
combine them into a hazy sense of the total Wel-
tanschauung. The achievement, the woman, the billow-
ing, the change of light, the change of status, and the 
destiny idea together make up a state of mind which can 
only very inadequately be expressed in words-an on-
going state through some sort of orgasmic upheaval to a 
final millennium. 
The final term in the Nazi time perspective is of special 
interest. The beginning of the cycle, through suffering 
and effort to individual death, is comparatively common 
in fanatical cults, but the final goal toward which the Nazi 
nominally strives is a rather unusual one. It appears to be 
a sort of multiple reincarnation in this world. Heini's 
corpse is replaced on the screen, first by the flag, then by 
columns of marching Nazis, and in this final shot some 
trick photography has been used so that while we see the 
innumerable marching figures moving obliquely away 
from us, we also see, faintly superimposed on them and 
much larger, the waists and thighs of uniformed Nazi fig-
ures striding toward us. Even after the passage through 
death, there is promise of future turmoil, sexual and 
aggressive. 
A similar promise of multiple reincarnation is still more 
explicit in another Nazi film, Fuer Uns (1937). This is a 
documentary account of a Nazi party ceremony in which 
we see the dedication of sixteen concrete blocks to the 
memory of the sixteen martyrs of early Nazism. Each 
block has on it the name of a hero (Hans Schlageter, 
Horst Wessel, etc.) and the words "On call" (Zum Appel). 
Each block supports a great urn in which flames billow. 
As a wreath is laid at the foot of each block, the name of 
the hero is called, and a thousand men somewhere in the 
stadium answer "HERE." The procession goes on to the 
next hero, and again the answer comes back from 
another section of the stadium. 
Before leaving the subject of Heini's deaths, it is nec-
essary to ask why there should be two of them. In this, the 
film transgresses the ordinary canons of tragedy, but the 
reasons for this transgression lie in the peculiar social 
structure which Nazism seeks to set up. In place of the 
more common type of social system based on the family, 
Nazism substitutes a system based on what an-
thropologists call "age grades."7 The youth of the nation is 
to be divided into blocks from small boys (Pfimpfen), from 
6 to 10 years old, up to the fighting units of S.A. The step 
from each grade to the next is accompanied by an ardu-
ous initiation ceremony. 8 
Initiation ceremonies, and other rites which symbolize 
the passage from one social status to another, usually 
include a symbolic statement of the candidate's death as 
a member of his former group followed by a symbolic 
statement of his aggregation into the new group. Thus, in 
giving Heini two deaths, the propagandist has epit-
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omized a whole social system and a time perspective 
which envisages repeated symbolic deaths. Heini's final 
death implies that the long series of symbolic deaths 
representing promotions from one age grade to another 
will reach its climax in a real death and multiple reincar-
nation. His first death by gas tells us that the entry into the 
age grade system is itself a passage rite, differing only 
from other passage rites and initiations in that Heini's 
mother, instead of mourning the loss of her boy when he 
leaves the family, is herself killed. 
In killing the mother in this way, the film does more 
violence to the conventional folk philosophies than is 
immediately apparent. It is not only that the film kills off a 
member of the group which Heini is leaving but, specifi-
cally, the mother is the predictor of tragedy, the repre-
sentative of fate. This theme is not very striking in this 
particular film. We hear the mother at the beginning say 
to the father, "You will bring misfortune on us again," and 
later she dies, but this combination is not shocking to the 
average spectator. That this combination may be signifi-
cant, however, is demonstrated by another Nazi prop-
aganda film, Faehrmann Maria (Ferryman Maria, 1936), 
an allegory specifically concerned with death. In this 
film, the old male ferryman (a figure who reminds one of 
Charon) dies in the arms of an austere male figure repre-
senting Death. The place of the old ferryman is taken by a 
beautiful ferrywoman, Maria. She cheats Death of a 
young male victim and deceives Death into following her 
across the swamps in search of this victim whom she 
loves. Death's foot slips, he sinks into the swamp, and the 
last we see of him is his hands pleading for rescue. Maria 
then tells her lover, "The way is open to the homeland 
[Heimat]," 9 and they go together hand in hand across the 
river and over the hill. 
This second film does very great violence to occidental 
notions about Death and shows us that the death of the 
mother in Hitlerjunge Quex-the killing of the personifica-
tion of fate-is possibly significant. German thought, both 
pre- and ~ost-~ litler, is very much preoccupied with ideas 
of destiny, interwoven with ideas of duty, racial superior-
ity, and providence, and it is natural to compare the des-
tiny notions in Hitlerjunge Quex with those in Faehrmann 
Maria. The second film leads us naturally to look in 
Hitlerjunge Quex for a second Destiny or Providence 
figure who should be a young female, replacing the 
dead mother. 
This role is filled by Ulla. Twice Ulla works like Fate or 
Providence behind the scenes, to reverse the course of 
the plot. First, when Heini is caught spying on the Nazi 
hike, Fritz is angry and sends him away, but after he is 
gone we hear Ulla's voice saying, "He might have been 
one of us." The audience is left with the impression that 
Nazism is inaccessible, and this impression is reinforced 
by the distant views of the Nazi camp at which Heini 
gazes the next morning. But on the following day Heini 
has no difficulty in approaching Fritz, who at once invites 
him to dinner. Later in the film we see another reversal of 
the same sort when Heini telephones to warn the Nazis 
about the dynamite and Ulla hangs up the phone under 
Fritz's orders. Heini is left unable to make contact with 
anybody, but the explosion occurs. Nothing is said to 
explain either of these reversals, and only one explana-
tion is possible: Ulla, on both occasions, worked like 
Providence behind the scenes. Thus into the whole notion 
of death and the time perspectives there has been in-
fused a sense that Death and Providence should be the 
object of the sorts of attitudes which the Nazis would 
direct toward the desirable female (see Analysis IV). 
Such a reading of the film will account at once for the use 
of orgasmic billowing symbols to represent death. 
In concluding this discussion of the time perspectives 
expressed in this film, it is appropriate to consider how 
this film differs from others. Insofar as a time perspective 
involves an expectation of change in the course of events, 
the perspective itself and its imp I ications for character 
may alter as time goes on. The expected climax may 
occur, in which case the former time perspective is satis-
fied and a new one must be constructed. Alternatively, 
the climax may not occur and some modification must 
then be introduced into the time perspective to accen-
tuate or rei ieve the frustration. 
Almost simultaneously with the production of Hitler-
junge Quex, other films were produced with the same 
basic time perspective, "through death or chaos to a mil-
lennium," but the chaotic phase is not always symbolized 
by personal death. In Bluten des Deutschland, this phase 
is directly equated with the political chaos of the twen-
ties, while in Hans Westmar, ·a film based on the story of 
Horst Wessel, individual death and the political chaos 
are simultaneously invoked. Thus in these films it was 
possible for the filmmaker to present the notion that the 
worst of the chaos was already over. The possibility of 
chaos still remains as a threat in case the nation should 
not dutifully follow its Nazi destiny, but the time perspec-
tive is not, as in Hitlerjunge Quex, that of a man faced with 
the whole uphill climb and only the distant promise of the 
summit. It is rather that of a man already more than half-
way up the hill and able to look back on what he has 
accomplished. 
When, however, we look at a much later film, Ohm 
Krueger (released in April1941), we find an entirely dif-
ferent time perspective. This film deals with the story of 
the Boer War, and the Boers, fighting England, are clearly 
the model that is held up before the German audience. 
The film starts after the Boer War is over. We see Krueger 
as an old man suffering from psychological blindness in 
a hospital in Switzerland. He is looked after by a young 
nurse to whom he narrates the story of the war. The film 
then cuts back to South Africa, and we see the Great Trek 
followed by disreputable intrigues attributed to Rhodes, 
Jameson, Chamberlain, Queen Victoria, and others. The 
war begins with prodigious victories for the Boers and 
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ends with utter defeat. We see the graves of the Boers, 
and then the film returns to Krueger, in Switzerland, who 
predicts that all this suffering will be avenged by some 
greater nation. 
The time perspective implicit in this film seems to be 
the precise opposite of that of the films of the early thir-
ties. Instead of "through death to a millennium" this later 
film offers us "through pre! iminary victories to ultimate 
defeat"-a time perspective which probably results from 
the resemblance between World Wars I and II. We may 
note, however, that Hitlerjunge Quex and Ohm Krueger 
are alike in assuming an enormous pendulum swing in 
the tide of human events. Ohm Krueger may bode better 
than Quex for a United Nations victory, but the problem 
which will confront us after the war is that of steadying the 
pendulum-of inducing in Germany an expectation not of 
climax but rather of steady progress. 
Analysis II: Political Groups and Backgrounds 
The first analysis of the film dealt with the climax structure 
of the film as a whole and related this to the time perspec-
tives of Nazism. In contrast to this, the present analysis is 
static. The element of time is here deliberately over-
looked, and instead this second analysis will consider 
how Nazism and Communism are characterized in 
the film. 
The film actually deals with three types of social 
grouping-Communism, Nazism, and the family-but of 
these the family is a sort of no man's land over which the 
battle for Heini's future is fought. In this battle Heini's 
relationship to his parents evolves and changes, the em-
phasis shifting according to the propagandist's technical 
needs. Analysis of the family, therefore, cannot be han-
dled in static terms, and is reserved for a later section. 
The present analysis is confined to Communism and 
Nazism, which are consistently characterized throughout 
the film. 
The very first shot of the film lays the base for the 
characterization of Communism. It is a close-up shot of a 
single apple which fills the screen-a double symbol of 
food and sexuality. From this the camera trucks back to 
include the whole heap of apples in the vendor's store, 
and we see two boys, whom we later discover to be 
Communists, debating whether to steal the apples. They 
are hungry and without money, and suddenly one of them 
snatches an apple and runs. The vendor grabs the boy 
and begins to box his ears. 
A second characterization of Communism follows in 
the same sequence. Wilde, the sinister Communist 
agitator, makes a speech beginning, "Workers [Proleten], 
hear me. It is not this boy alone who has been boxed on 
the ears. I tell you that all you who are here have had your 
ears boxed." 
Thus in a single sequence Communists are charac-
terized as unstoical in the face of temptations of the 
mouth and as making political capital out of purely 
human woes. 10 In doing this the propagandist has re-
sorted to two sorts of biblical reference; he has invoked 
the apple and has put Christlike paraphrasing into 
Wilde's mouth. 
Stoppel 's behavior when he accompanies Heini 's 
father to his home and helps the mother to dress the 
father's wound further illustrates this use of human woes. 
He takes advantage of the situation to contact Heini for 
the Communist Youth International , and later, at the fair, 
when Heini has lost his money in the lottery, he again 
exploits this woe, comforting Heini by inviting him on the 
Communist hike. 
On the hike, we see the contrast between the ragged , 
disorderly Communists and the neat, disciplined Nazis, 
and we are told almost in so many words that this contrast 
is a part of the emotional dynamics upon which Nazism 
rests. A platoon of Nazi girls in uniform is standing on the 
station when a disorderly mob of Communists comes by. 
At the head of the Nazi girls is Ulla (though the audience 
does not as yet know that this girl will play a special part 
in the story). Just before the arrival of the Communists, 
Ulla's head droops forward in a very unmilitary posture, 
but when she sees the Communists, she suddenly raises 
it and holds herself properly erect. Her gesture implies 
that the emotional value of Nazism is not simple and 
positive ; it is also negative: it is a pride in not being the 
sort of people that they accuse their enemies of being 
(see Figure 4). 
Immediately after this incident, the film begins to de-
velop the themes which were first suggested by the ap-
ple. We see the Communist boy who stole the apple take 
chewed food from his mouth and fling it in the face of one 
of the Nazi boys, 11 and in later stages of the film we 
repeatedly see the Communists indulging in grass eat-
ing, throwing their food, passing a half-eaten apple from 
one to another, smoking cigarettes (the Nazis apparently 
do not smoke), and drinking schnapps (the Nazis drink 
only beer). 
The response of the Nazis to the insult of the thrown 
food is interesting. For a fraction of a second we see them 
b~eak their ranks and prepare to indulge in a completely 
disorderly brawl. The district leader barks a command, 
and they return to attention. But in this fraction of a sec-
ond the psychological base for the whole propaganda 
system is exposed. The Nazi assumption is that, but for 
the barked command and their veneer of discipline, they 
themselves would be the same sort of disorderly rabble 
they represent the Communists as being.12 
T~is assumption reappears when Heini is living in the 
Naz1 clubhouse. Heini is referred to as "Quex" at a meal 
and when he shows resentment at this nickname, a disor~ 
derly brawl breaks out, involving all the Nazi boys. Some 
of them fight in one cluster and some in another in a 
completely disorganized manner, until a barked com-
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mand from the district leader freezes them into guilty 
immobility. (Figure 6.) 
Here the disorderly characteristics which the film attri-
butes to the Communists are another example of the 
Nazis' habit of attributing their own real or potential vices 
to their enemies, and we shall see that the whole charac-
terization of Communism in this film is, in a sense, a 
self-portrait of Nazism. It represents what the Nazis think 
that they themselves would be like without their disci-
pline or, psychologically speaking, what they are like 
under the veneer of that discipline. 
The sexual suggestion which was Implicit in the apple 
is also developed on the hike. When Heini enters the 
compartment on the train, Gerda, the Communist girl, 
seizes him around the neck and pulls him down onto her 
lap. His back is toward her, but she forces his face around 
until she is able to plant a kiss on his lips. Gerda is 
wearing a boy's cap, and as Heini stands horrified, she 
pulls the cap off her head. Heini, still more horrified, says, 
"You are a girl ," and she replies, "You notice everything." 
(Figure 7.) 
This kiss might appear sufficient to smear the Com-
munists with the combined reproach of sexuality and 
mouthiness, but the propagandist was apparently not 
satisfied and he borrows a Freudian recipe to drive the 
point home. We see Stoppel push a peeled banana into 
Gerda's mouth with the palm of his hand, and this mo-
ment is chosen for the others to start to sing the "lnter-
nationale." (Figure 8.) 
Later, in the camp, we see another characterization of 
the Communists, in which a Freudian recipe is once 
, again borrowed. They play a buttocks-slapping game 
(Schinkenkloppen). The boy who stole the apple is held 
Figure 7 Heini is pulled down by Gerda and exclaims, 
"You are a girl!" 
bent over so that he cannot see who slaps him. Gerda 
supplies the slap and then self-consciously looks the 
other way. The boy guesses correctly that she is the guilty 
one, and she in turn is grabbed by the crowd and held 
while the boy spits on his hands preparatory to taking his 
revenge. Heini at this point turns away in disgust. 13 
These characteristics are attributed to the Communists 
whenever they appear on the screen. Almost always they 
have food in their hands, and when the filmmaker wants 
to show us that Grundler's character is degenerating 
under Gerda's influence, he does so by having Grundler 
smoke a cigarette in a lackadaisical manner. While he 
smokes he sings a snatch of a cheap popular song, and 
when he sees Heini's photograph of Ulla, he assumes that 
she is a sexual object (Fiamme). 
In contrast to the Communists, the Nazis are almost 
colorless. We see their parade-ground smartness, we see 
them dashing into the sea to bathe, but these behaviors 
are the negative of the excesses which are attributed to 
Communism, and throughout one is left with the feeling 
that Nazi life is empty. On three occasions we see them 
eat-on the hike, in the Nazi clubroom, and at the home 
of Fritz and Ulla-but except on the hike, where the Nazi 
eating is contrasted with the throwing of food by the 
Communists, their eating habits are not specifically used 
to characterize them. In the Nazi clubroom the meal is 
merely the setting in which Heini's nickname is given 
him, and at the home of Fritz and Ulla, it is the whole 
upper-middle-class background which is significant, 
rather than the eating. 
On the sexual side, the film shows us something of the 
courtship behavior and attitudes which Nazism held up 
as an ideal in 1933. These, however, can be analyzed 
only in connection with their whole handling of the family, 
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Figure 8 Comrade Stoppel stuffs a banana in Gerda's 
mouth while the others sing the "lnternationale." 
and we shall therefore confine ourselves here to the ques-
tion of the psychological nature of the sexual contrast. We 
have noted that the contrast in terms of orderliness is 
based on the Nazi habit of referring their own disap-
proved weaknesses to their enemies, and two types of 
evidence are available to show that the same is true of 
the sexual conquest. 
The first evidence is of the same general type as that 
which we used in the case of orderliness-disorderliness. 
The Nazis used the premise that they themselves would 
be disorderly but for their discipline as an argument in 
favor of their whole system; and in the same way they 
employ the argument that they would be sexually de-
praved. The story of Grundler's fall is propagandic in 
this sense. 
The story begins on the morning after the hike when he 
and the other Nazis are distributing leaflets. Gerda, under 
Stoppel's orders, contacts Grundler, asking him for a leaf-
let and then for another and another ti II he gives her all he 
has. Then she throws all the leaflets into the river and 
starts a flirtation with Grundler by asking him for a 
cigarette. A few minutes later she says she wants "Turkish 
Delight." He asks where they can get this, and she says, 
"At the fair." We then see Grundler falling in step with 
Gerda on the way to the fair. Later we see them dizzily 
riding the merry-go-round, and the camera stoops to pay 
special attention to the swinging legs of the boy and girl. 
From this point on, Grundler's uniform becomes more and 
more slovenly, and finally, under Gerda's influence, he 
enters into a plot to destroy the entire supply of Nazi 
leaflets. He brings the leaflets on a barrow to a rendez-
vous with Gerda, and together they throw all the bundles 
of leaflets into the flowing river. 
The inclusion of Grundler in the film can partly be ex-
plained as a bid for "truthfulness," an attempt to make the 
audience say to themselves, "Yes, the film is not an 
idealized picture of Nazism because, after all, they do 
show a bad Nazi," and, of course, the propagandist can 
safely show this bad Nazi because the showing is ac-
companied by disapproval of Grundler's weakness. Ac-
tually, however, they have shown a Nazi who is not only 
bad but deteriorating, and thus, consciously or uncon-
sciously, they have again preached that Nazism has a 
double quality. On one side, Nazism may have the fine 
overpurity of comradeship (Kamaradschaft), but this pur-
ity carries with it, on the other, the tendency to deteriorate 
in a particular direction. 
This is by no means the double nature attributed to 
many by the more familiar Christian sects. Christianity 
has classified the forces which work to mold man's be-
havior in many ways, and no doubt the Nazi tendency 
toward dualism owes something to the dualistic thinking 
in other religions, but the actual content of the dualism is 
fundamentally different. Christianity sees man in various 
dualistic frames; it sees him as divided between mind 
and spirit, reason and emotion, soul and body, con-
science and temptation, and so on. But even the most 
pessimistic of Christian beliefs, those which assign 
maximum strength to the taint of Original Sin, have never 
omitted from man's nature some traces of spontaneous 
goodness. The Christian dual isms have always assumed 
good and bad elements within the individual man; they 
may have insisted that the good side needed external 
help from church or minister, but they have never seen 
man as a mechanical creature who should be passive 
vis-a-vis an external disciplinary authority. In the Nazi 
view-and the same is true of the handling of temptation 
and depravity in many pre-Nazi German films-man's na-
ture will respond almost mechanically to bright lights, the 
whirl of circuses, and city life. He will inevitably be 
sucked down into a swamp. 14 
The second type of evidence, which shows that, in 
attributing a certain sort of sexuality to the Communists, 
the Nazis are merely describing the worst side of their 
own nature, is indirect. If the Communists were repre-
sented as merely different from Nazis, the filmmaker 
could claim that he was simply giving an objective pic-
ture. But these "Communists" are not simply different 
from Nazis; they are a systematic opposite of the Nazi 
ideal. This relationship is, of course, what we should ex-
pect if the attributes of "Communism" are psychologi-
cally rooted in the Nazi character, and while it is conceiv-
able that this relatedness might be due to coincidence 
such a coincidence would be unlikely. ' 
The clearest indication that "Communism" as here de-
picted is only the obverse of Nazism comes from the 
makeup of the two girls, Gerda and Ulla. Gerda, the 
Communist, is more heavily female in her head and torso. 
Her hai~ strays loose; she continually expresses her sex-
ual des1res and frustrations with gestures of the lips; and 
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her breasts are evident through her sluttish blouse. But in 
contrast to this femaleness in her head and torso, her legs 
are usually clothed in slacks. Ulla, on the other hand, is 
the precise reverse of this. She wears a skirt, but from the 
waist up she is progressively more boyish. Instead of a 
blouse she wears a Nazi shirt open at the collar and 
loosely held with a tie. She has straight blond hair, 
bobbed and severely parted. She wears a beret. 
This contrast may be summarized by saying that if 
Gerda's head and torso were set on Ulla's legs, a com-
plete female figure would result; whereas Ulla's torso on 
Gerda's legs would give us a complete boy. They are not 
just two people, different one from the other; they are a 
pair of people, each systematically related to the other. 
Gerda is a postadolescent female with male legs, and 
Ulla is an adolescent or preadolescent boy with female 
legs. 15 The same type of systematic contrast occurs also 
between Heini's father and the district leader, and again 
between Heini and Grundler, and these two contrasts will 
be examined at a later stage of the analysis. It is evident, 
however, that the likelihood of these three systematic 
contrasts all being due to coincidence is very small , and 
we may take their systematic nature as evidence for the 
fact that the depiction of the Communists is a function of 
the Nazi character. 
Last, we cannot leave the consideration of the contrast 
between Nazism and Communism without examining the 
backgrounds in which these two political groups are set. 
The filmmakers went out of their way to blacken Com-
munism by photographing the Communist scenes in poor 
light. Even Heini's home is murky and sinister; the fair so 
much frequented by Communists is poorly lit; and the 
room in which the Communists meet is clouded with to-
bacco smoke. In contrast to this, the home of Fritz and 
Ulla and the Nazi clubroom are brightly lit, and on the 
hike we see Heini progress from the murky Communist 
camp through darkness to the scene in which the Nazis 
celebrate the solstice, where their beacon fire gives 
bright contrasts of illumination. When he is dismissed as 
a spy, Heini retires into the darkness, but next morning he 
is shown a brilliant scene of the Nazis on the beach in 
the morning sunlight. 
In general, these shifts between light and dark are 
satisfactorily woven into the plot, but at the very end of 
the film, one shift from darkness to light seems arbitrary. 
We see Heini encircled in the darkened street and he is 
killed in the dark, but when the Nazis come to pose 
beside his dying body, it is broad daylight. 
In addition to darkness, the background of Com-
munism is characterized by various kinds of spinning 
objects, the merry-go-round, the lottery wheel, and spin-
ning targets in the shooting booth. It appea~s that the 
Nazis conception of the sort of sexuality which they at-
tributed to Communists is closely linked with feelings 
of dizziness. Man, the mechanical puppet, is endlessly 
liable to be swept off his feet into some sort of whirlpoo l. 16 
The relationship between the dizzy background and 
sex is especially clear in the scene in which Stoppel 
invites Heini to the Communist hike. Behind them while 
they talk is the whirling merry-go-round, and their con-
versation is interrupted not only by the mechanical music 
but also by Gerda's voice. Gerda is riding one of the 
horses, and whenever she passes Stoppel she calls out 
to him. Finally, at the end of the conversation, Stoppel 
jumps on the moving merry-go-round, like a frog 
jumping into his pond. 
In addition to the use of these dizziness symbols, 
Communism is twice characterized by the river. This oc-
curs at the beginning and end of the story of Grundler's 
fall. First we see Gerda throw Grundler's leaflets over her 
shoulders into the river, and finally we see Grundler and 
Gerda together throwing the main supply of leaflets in 
bundles into the water. Probably the appropriateness of 
this symbol derives from some notion that Communism 
sweeps all good things away. 
German cameramen are exceedingly fond of photo-
graphing waves and ripples, and these symbols are usu-
ally used to denote some pleasant or desirable emotional 
state. In the first scene, when Gerda throws the leaflets 
over her shoulder, we see the river behind her, smooth 
and shining in the sunlight. Here the river probably rein-
forces the idea of Gerda's attraction. In the final scene, 
we see the river at night with the lights of the city reflected 
in it so that the river becomes a symbol of the seductive, 
bright lights. On neither occasion do we see waves, 
which are reserved instead for association with Nazism. 
We see the sea (or possibly a lake) when the Nazis run 
into it to bathe, and the Nazi flag, whenever it appears on 
the screen, bi I lows with a wave motion, and the gas 
fumes bi I low I ike a flag or I ike water. Thus Nazism is 
associated with the movement of waves. 
There is clearly a rather close relationship between the 
hypnotic fascination that comes from staring at waves 
and that which comes from looking at spinning objects, 
and this relationship is probably another facet of the rela-
tionship which we have already noted between Nazism 
and the Nazi characterization of Communism. There is, 
however, an important difference between waves and 
spinning objects. Waves contain an illusion of progress, 
of forward movement, but spinning objects evidently get 
nowhere. It is possible that the waves used to charac-
terize Nazism are related to the endless marching which 
has such great fascination for Nazis and which appears 
in almost every Nazi film. Only in its endlessness does 
this marching resemble the spinning of the symbols as-
sociated with Communism. 
These two introductory analyses, the first of Nazi time 
perspectives and the second of characterization of 
Nazism and Communism, enable us now to go on to 
examine how the filmmakers handled the mixed emotions 
present in the German family and how they have mar-
shalled these emotions to make them support Nazism. 
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Analysis Ill: The Family of Origin 
From a propagandist's point of view, and also, perhaps, 
from that of an artist, the contrast discussed above, be-
tween Nazism and Communism, is the weakest part of 
this film. The contrast is stated openly and didactically so 
that the audience is fully conscious that a contrast has 
been presented and, being fully conscious, is therefore 
free either to accept or to refuse it. Indeed, we may sup-
pose that if the only propagandic message in this film 
were its idealization of Nazism and its caricaturing of 
Communism, its effect on a mixed audience would be 
merely to reinforce Nazism in those who were already 
converted, while those who preferred Communism would 
be able to repudiate the caricature so that the film would 
only anger them and make them more Communistic tha~ 
before. The contrast by itself would not make converts; 1t 
would only increase antagonism. 
The great strength of the film lies elsewhere, however. 
Heini's preference for Nazism dates clearly from his see-
ing the contrast, but from then on his progress toward 
Nazism is tied up with his relations with his father and 
mother in a way that endows Nazism with a psychologi-
cal force much greater than it would otherwise have. The 
family scene as it is presented to us is one of extreme 
intensity, from the first moment that Heini appears in the 
doorway and sees his father in a temper tantrum, de-
manding money from his mother. And later, when we see 
a pleasant, warm relationship between Heini and his 
father-when the father gives him the house key-the 
emotions, though of a different kind, are no less intense. 
In general, the propagandist evokes all the intensity of 
emotion that lies latent in the German boy's relationship 
to his family, and as the film progresses, these emotions 
are rearranged and harnessed to give dynamic force and 
fanatical violence to Heini's Nazism. 
The present analysis from the kinship angle is an at-
tempt to show how this is done and to outline the implica-
tions for the Nazi character that follow if we suppose that 
the ·fanatical intensity of this cult is largely derived from 
certain themes of pre-Nazi German family life. 17 
In a strict, narrow sense (excluding possible spouses 
and parent substitutes), Heini's family consists of himself, 
his father, and his mother, and of these the first to appear 
on the screen is the father. We see him in the opening 
sequence of the film as an unknown man in the crowd at a 
food riot. He is a big, heavy man, poorly dressed, clumsy 
and violent, but with unexpected warmth and gentleness. 
The first characterization of him is as a kind person. We 
see him speak against the crowd that wants to imprison 
the two boys who stole apples when driven by hunger. 
The father pushes his way forward through the crowd, 
and he speaks simply, as a human being without party 
alignment. He sees the incident not as a political allegory 
but simply as a peccadillo. He points out that you don't 
put a boy in prison for one apple-"especially when the 
boy has not even bitten it." At this stage, the propagandist 
is careful not to associate the father with Communism 
and the father is sympathetically treated. A riot starts, 
however, fomented by Wilde, the Communist agitator: 
who treats the incident of the apple as politcal matenal: 
"Workers, listen to me. Here not only this boy has had his 
ears boxed, but also you who are here have been boxed 
on the ears." In the riot the shopkeeper upsets his own 
apples, and then there is a shout, "Police!" As the crowd 
scatters, the father stumbles over the edge of the 
sidewalk and strikes his head against the wall. He stands 
leaning against the wall and groaning on the porch of his 
own home. He is helped up the stairs by Stoppel, an 
organizer of the Communist Youth. 
The following sequence includes the father, the mother, 
and Stoppel, and it is important to watch how Stoppel 
becomes included in the set of relationships which con-
stitute the family. The relationship between father and 
mother is immediately and sharply defined. The mother is 
dominated by the father, and yet he is as dependent on 
her as a child. When he enters with his injury, she cries 
out in horror. This is the only evidence of love for him that 
she shows, and as the sequence develops we realize that 
his injury is not serious. The father groans when the 
wound is washed, but this is plainly due to his lack of 
stoicism. Stoppel joins the mother in ministering to 
the father. 
The mother, after washing the cut, solicitously offers 
the father a drink of water, but he with an oath demands 
beer. The mother says, "But that costs money!" He then 
asks where Heini is so that he can send him to get two 
bottles, but the mother replies that Heini is still at work. 
This sequence has set up the following definitions of 
the personalities and their relations to each other: the 
father is unstoical and dependent upon the mother; the 
mother is a drudge, solicitous for the father, and Stoppel 
is associated with the mother in caring for the father. 
At this point the sequence is cut to let us see Heini at 
work in a printing shop, where he receives a tip of one 
mark from a customer. He and the printer regard this as a 
great windfall, and the printer makes a tentative effort to 
take the mark from him (lest the mark should appear to 
the audience to have been too easily earned). Heini suc-
cessfully resists this and goes home. 
The camera now returns to the father, mother, and 
Stoppel. The father asks for money so that he can buy 
beer-" Mother, won't you give me a few pennies?"-thus 
underlining his dependence on her; and when she pro-
fesses to have no money, he becomes more and more 
violent and domineering. He starts searching in all the 
containers in the house, first looking in the coffee pot and 
then throwing it down, pulling out drawers and scattering 
the clothes, then scattering the photographs out of the 
family album, and so on. Both Stoppel and the mother try 
to quiet him. Stoppel says, "Man, don't make a circus 
(Zirkus )18 here." But the father continues to advance, 
angry and domineering, toward the mother, who slowly 
retreats backward, facing him (see Figures 2, 3). 
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At this point, Heini appears in the doorway. He arrives 
home at the precise moment of the height of the father's 
tantrum, and for a moment he hesitates in horror, so that, 
when the camera returns to the father and mother, we see 
their relationship through the eyes of their son. Almost 
immediately Heini goes over to the mother and secretly 
slips the mark into her hand. She raises her hand and 
opens it, and the father seizes the mark. His temper tan-
trum suddenly subsides; he spits on the mark and says, 
"There, you see, one has to show one's teeth in dealing 
with women." 
This very dramatic sequence burns into the audience 
the whole stereotyped family picture from which Nazism 
draws its emotional power. Heini is for a moment 
paralyzed with horror at the conflict in which his parents 
are engaged, but this hesitation is resolved when he goes 
and gives his mother the mark. In contrast to the father, 
he, Heini, is the mother's slave, and she, at least in this 
instance, is dependent on him. He is the rescuing hero in 
his own eyes and in the eyes of the audience. 
The emotions and attitudes of the rescuing hero are 
precisely those which the propagandist would like his 
audience to apply to Nazism or to Germany. But this inci-
dent has a double significance. At a superficial level we 
can see Heini as the hero, but while he is being heroic, he 
is also at a slightly deeper level joining his mother in 
passive appeasement of the father.19 And this passivity 
also can be orchestrated into the emotions which Heini 
will give to the Party. In the end, the propagandist wants 
the audience to feel that utter passivity to the demands of 
the Party is a form of rescuing heroism, and this incident 
presents the ideal model for such a combination of emo-
tions. Heini's passivity toward his father is glorified by 
being at the same time a rescuing of the mother, and this 
glorified passivity has now only to be shifted to the Party 
and/or the nation. 
The film does not go into the question of the relation-
ship between Party and nation, and it seems thatto have 
attempted this would have landed the propagandist in 
difficulties. Starting from three symbolic units, the son, 
the father, and the mother, he would have had to end up 
with two, the party and the nation, and the basic instabil-
ity between these two would eventually be disclosed. If 
the nation were equated with the mother, then the Party 
would have to combine the father's authority with Heini's 
heroism, and would therefore become a recipient of am-
bivalent emotions. We should see all too clearly that Party 
and nation could only exist side by side if perpetually fed 
on scapegoats and enemies, which would provide an 
object for the negative parts of this ambivalence. 
Passivity can be glorified only by emergency, and there 
must be imagined danger from which somebody can 
rescue somebody else. 
We have now seen son and mother united in mutual 
love against the father, and Stoppel has received a sym-
pathetic characterization through his association with the 
mother in aiding and placating the father. Now Stoppel 
takes advantage of the occasion to contact Heini for the 
Communist Youth International. He first praises Heini to 
the father and then asks if Heini is "organized." The father 
tells him to ask the boy himself. In a later scene the father 
signs Heini into the Communist Youth willy-nilly and 
brushes aside the mother's suggestion that Heini ought to 
be asked, but at this stage of the film Communism is still 
being given a favorable build-up. We are not allowed to 
identify the father as an active Communist but only, 
perhaps, as a mild Social Democrat. 
Stoppel has a few words with Heini. He asks him if he is 
"organized," but Heini apparently does not even know 
what the word means. Stoppel says that of course Heini 
belongs naturally in the Communist Youth lnternational-
"or do you want to be a Nazi?" The father scoffs at this 
idea, saying, "What!-my boy a Nazi-l'd sooner kill him." 
The father then goes off to get his beer, and after taking 
leave of Heini and saying that they will talk it over later, 
Stoppel, too, goes away. 
This leaves Heini still the rescuing hero with his loving, 
drudging, and weeping mother. She sighs, "That is no 
life--1 cannot bear it (das halt ich nicht mehr aus)." Heini 
continues in a comforting role for a moment, telling her 
not to be always so sad. But she goes and opens the 
window. This act lets in the mechanical music of the fair, 
which, as we have seen, is associated throughout the film 
with the orgies and degeneracy of Communism. It is the 
mother who lets in this music, and Stoppel the Com-
munist has so far been associated with her rather than 
with the father. And now it is the music of the fair which 
leads Heini to desert his heroic role. He gazes for a mo-
ment out of the open window, and then he remembers a 
wonderful knife he saw at the fair in a lottery in one of the 
sideshows. He turns back to his mother and starts to 
describe the knife, listing its many blades- "and it has a 
saw, too." She says, as she said before about the father's 
beer, that it must cost money, but Heini tells her it is in a 
lottery and can be had for a penny. He begs her for the 
penny just as his father begged her for money (see 
Figure 3). 
In spite of the fact that Heini has now shifted from a 
rescuing to a dependent role he is still a hero in her eyes, 
and very slowly she smiles on him-a slow, almost 
seductive, Mona Lisa smile. Thoughtfully she rises to her 
feet and moves across the room. As she moves, the 
music of the fair, which hitherto has been almost form-
less, becomes rhythmical, and she moves in step with it. 
She goes and gets money from a hiding place inside the 
coffee grinder. 
Thus she confers on her son the favor she had refused 
the angry father, but we are shown very clearly that Heini 
is no longer really a hero. As she crosses the room, he 
watches her appraisingly-judging the success of his 
plea for money. He smiles secretly when she starts to 
shake the coffee grinder and rapidly removes the smile 
from his face the moment she turns to give him the 
money. Then he dashes out to get the coveted knife. 
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In thus going out to get the knife with his mother's 
money, he is performing an act closely comparable with 
the father's going out to get beer, and indeed both the 
knife and the beer are natural symbols for a certain sort of 
virility. Through this crack in the knight's armor Com-
munism enters. The pennies are, of course, immediately 
lost in the lottery, and the "of course" element in this loss 
is underlined by the casual impersonal quality of the lot-
tery scene. The lottery is a swindle, in which a large 
number of prizes are exhibited but the competitors do not 
know which prize is being put up at any given turn of the 
wheel. When the wheel is spun and the winning number 
announced, the prize is not the knife but a cheap vase20 
of artificial flowers, and it is won by a silly woman. Heini 
shyly asks how much the knife would cost to buy, and 
the man says, "8 marks"-the knife is inaccessible. 
But Stoppel, the Communist, is there in the 
background. For a moment Stoppel and Heini pause to 
listen to a ballad singer (Moritaet). Each stanza of the 
ballad ends with the words "Often the thing succeeds. 
But for our George it failed." Stoppel tells "Heini to note this 
text, then offers him a sort of substitute gratification in-
stead of the knife. He invites him to a Communist hike in 
the country. Heini says, "But won't that cost money?" but 
Stoppel says, "I will take you, you are my guest." Then, 
further underlining the fact that the hike is a substitute for 
the knife, Stoppel goes on to list its charms just as Heini 
in the previous sequence listed the charms of the knife. 
They will have tents, they will play, they will bathe. Heini 
agrees to meet the Communists at the railway station the 
next day. 21 
The preliminary build-up of the family structure is now 
complete, and a I ink between the two parents and the 
political background has been constructed. The position 
which the film has so far achieved may be summed up in 
Diagram 1. 22 
The first fifteen minutes of the film have been devoted 
to building up Communism into a straw man. The audi-
ence has been led to accept unconsciously the premise 
that the symbolism of the family is applicable to the polit-
ical scene by being shown how this symbolism could be 
used to create a sympathetic basis for Communism. 
Heini's world is shown as split into two great halves by 
the scene of violence between the two parents. Heini 
himself is repulsed by his father's violence and depend-
ence. He has just been shown a side of his father's 
character with which he cannot identify, but he is at-
tracted by his mother, who smiles upon her hero. Com-
munism has been quite definitely linked with the world of 
the emotions in two ways, first through Stoppel, the 
Communist, who is associated with the mother, vis-a-vis 
the father, and second, through the knife and the fair. The 
mother opened the window and let in the music of the fair, 
which reminded Heini of the knife, and then she gave 
Heini the money to get the knife in the fair. The link be-
tween the fair and Communism has already been dis-
cussed in the analysis of backgrounds, and it is accen-
tuated by the clear symbolism of the incident in which 
Stoppel jumps onto the merry-go-round from which 
Gerda, the seductive Communist girl , has called to him. 
This diagram is, of course, fundamentally false. The 
propagandist has deceived the audience into accepting 
links which are psychologically unsound. In particular, 
the knife as a symbol of virility cannot really be linked 
with the mother, and the film will go on to destroy this 
preliminary picture. The basic premise, however, will re-
main, and remain unconscious-that the symbolism of 
the family is relevant to political ideology-but the sym-
bols will be rearranqed . 
At this point the story jumps to the railway station where 
Heini joins the Communist hike. The scenes at the station 
and in the woods, in which the contrast between Com-
munism and Nazism is built up, have already been dis-
cussed. But there are a few points relevant to the family in 
these sequences. The first of these concerns not Heini 's 
family of origin, but his courtship and the sort of family in 
which he might be a father. Gerda, the Communist girl , 
grabs Heini around the neck as he enters the compart-
ment on the train, pulls him down onto the seat, and 
kisses him on the mouth. While she does this Gerda is 
wearing a boy's cap, which she takes off after the kiss. 
Heini is shocked and disgusted by the kiss and appar-
ently sti II more shocked to discover that she is female. He 
says, "You-you are a girl?" She replies, "Yes, you seem 
to notice everything ." (See Figure 7.) 
Later, after Heini is disgusted by the Communists, he 
wanders away from their camp and sees the Nazis cele-
brating the summer solstice. They find him and think he is 
a spy. Fritz, the boy leader of the group, recognizes him 
as one of the Communists who were on the railway station 
and abuses him and sends him away. Ulla, Fritz's sister, 
is heard expostulating with Fritz. She is not shown on the 
screen but we hear her voice telling Fritz that he ought not 
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Diagram 1 
Communism 
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{the Fair 
{Knife 
Mother 
~
(Father's anti-Nazism) 
(attraction) / Fat::~ulsion) 
Heini 
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Figure 9 Heini 's father forces Heini to sing the " lnter-
nationale." 
to have been so hasty. Perhaps Heini might have become 
a Nazi. These two incidents, Gerda's kiss and Ulla's ex-
postulation, provide the beginning of Nazism's answer to 
the adolescent's problem of sex. 
Next morning there is a symbolic reference to Heini's 
family of origin. While Heini is looking longingly at the 
Nazis, who are now inaccessible, Stoppel comes through 
the woods looking for him and calling his name. Heini 
hides in a hole in the ground and then runs. down the 
hillside to a road where he gets a lift from a truck and 
goes home to his mother. The hole in the ground is prob-
ably a piece of conscious symbolism introduced by a 
propagandist who had read a little folklore and who 
wanted a maternal symbol for blood and earth (8/ut und 
Boden). That Heini should hide in this way from Stoppel is 
the first indication we are given of the complete reshuf-
fling of the symbolic roles whi~h is now about_to ,oc?ur. 
Formerly Stoppel was I inked w1th the mother v1s-a-v1s the 
father. Now we see Heini hiding in the hole vis-a-vis 
Stoppel. Similarly, the return to the mother now that 
Nazism has become inaccessible is another indication of 
the same reshuffling. 
When he arrives home his mother is surprised to see 
him so early and asks him about the hike. Heini is en-
thusiastic, and she asks, "What then did Stoppel do (to 
make the trip so successful)?" Heini says, "Mother-but I 
was with the others-with the boys with the--the hooked 
cross." His mother says, "But not with the Nazis!" And 
when he says "Yes," she heaves an anxious sigh; she is 
not angry but rather regretful. Heini says, "But mother, 
they are not so bad. They cooked and they wheeled and 
they swam and they sang a song"-and Heini then sings 
the "Hitler Youth Song" to his mother. 
The father, meanwhile, is reading a newspaper in the 
next room. The mother must certainly have been aware of 
this, but she does not warn Heini. At first the father smiles 
when he hears his son's voice, but suddenly he hears 
Hitler's name and rushes in, furious. The mother tells him 
to leave the boy alone and even tries to pull Heini away 
from his father. The father holds Heini fast and compels 
him to sing the "lnternationale," slapping at his face with 
each beat of the song. The mother, almost crying, stands 
there helpless, and a special close-up shot is inserted 
into the sequence to show us the mother rubbing her own 
cheek with her hand-thus underlining her link with 
Heini. This slapping of Heini's face clearly echoes the 
earlier slapping which was administered to the boy who 
stole the apple, and we may suppose that this second 
slapping is likewise administered to "all you who are 
here"-i.e., the audience. The final shot of the sequence 
is a close-up of Heini's weeping face (Figure 9). 
This violent scene completely destroys the alignment 
shown in Diagram 1. At that stage of the film Communism 
was in the mother's half of the diagram, but now with 
every slap of Heini's cheek we are told that Communism 
is the father and especially that it is all that is violent and 
shocking in that parent. The mother is as yet only very . 
slightly associated with Nazism, though already we are 1n 
a position to feel that such pro-Communist sentiments as 
she professes are due entirely to tht:: father's influence. 
This indeed is the great difficulty with this German 
mother. Heini cannot get her to himself unalloyed by her 
allegiance to the father, and while she is not angry with 
him because he goes with the Nazis, she is regretful and 
does not trouble to save him from detection. 
The new alignment can again be stated in diagramma-
tic form. The situation is, however, somewhat more com-
plicated than it was in Diagram 1. An~ it is now ~ecess_ary 
to draw two diagrams, one representing the po1nt of v1ew 
of the mother (Diagram 2) and the other representing 
Heini's point of view (Diagram 3): 
Diagram 2 
Nazism · [Communism\ 
"'-Heini) ()Father ~Stoppel 
\Mother 
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Diagram 3 
~ c. 
Nazism ~Mother\ ommumsm ~ ~Helni Father ~Stoppel 
~
Diagram 2 shows that the mother has no cle~r al-
legiance or attraction uncomplic_ated ~Y repulsion_. In 
psychological terms, all her relat1onsh1ps are ambivalent. 
Even her love for Heini is complicated by the fact that 
Heini is linked with Nazism. She herself is not actively 
anti-Nazi but, duty bound to her husband, must oppose it, 
so that the arrow representing the repulsion she feels for 
Nazism is really an echo of the attraction which binds h~r 
to her husband. However, her relationship to the father 1s 
also ambivalent, and the repulsion she feels for him, 
while partly her response to his violence, is also partly an 
echo of the attraction she feels for Heini. 
From Heini's point of view (Diagram 3), the position 
appears at first glance to he much simpler. He is at-
tracted by Nazism and by his mother, an~ he feels re~ul­
sion for his father, Stoppel, and Commun1sm. If only h1s 
mother felt as he does, life would be simple for him, but 
unfortunately the "Mother" (in Diagram 3) is a complex 
being whose attitudes are shown here in more detail. 
Heini cannot be fully united with his mother because of 
political sentiments induced in her by the father. The 
propagandist has built his le~son into t~e ~tructure of ~he 
family where the audience w1ll absorb 1t w1thout knowmg 
what they are absorbing. Earlier in the film, ~hen the 
mother slowly smiled on her hero and gave h1m money 
which she had refused to the father, we were given a taste 
of how sweet the world might be if only mother love were 
unmixed, and now, by contrast, the propagandist is able 
to slip in his message that Communism is those flaws in 
mother which result from her undivided (?) love. 
The next scene is laid in the yard of the school which is 
attended by both the Communist and Nazi youth of the 
neighborhood. We see Gerda try to make a date with 
Heini who turns her down because he wants to approach 
Fritz 'the Nazi boy. Gerda goes off disappointed and 
Stop,pel tells her that Grundler, the weak Nazi, is due 
(faellig) to fall for her. She says with a pun that Grundler 
does not attract her (gefaellt mir aber gar nicht). Stoppel 
says that that is not important. She must go ahead and 
vamp him (einzuseifen, "Soap him in"). This she pro-
ceeds to do and we are thus given to understand that the 
sexual seductions of Communism are not only dangerous 
but actively treacherous. 
Heini meanwhile has been waiting for Fritz, and when 
he tells Fritz that he wants to join the Nazi troop, Fritz 
says, "Famous!" (fabelhaft), and takes him to his home. 
We then see Gerda falling into step with Grundler on 
their way to the fair, and Heini falling into step with Fritz 
on the way to the latter's upper-middle-class h?m~. At the 
door, Fritz invites Heini to eat with them, ment1onmg that 
his father is away at a doctor's conference. (None of the 
committed Nazis have visible parents, and we shall see 
that the propagandist's use of the emoti~nal_ fo~ces of the 
family to give intensity to Heini's conversion IS, 1n the end, 
totally destructive of that family.) . 
At this meal Heini meets Ulla, who shakes hands w1th 
him with a conspicuous show of frankness and t_hen . 
cooks eggs for the two boys. While they are eatmg, Fntz 
invites Heini to the opening that night of the troop's new 
"home" (Heim), or clubhouse. Heini exclaims, "A real 
home!" in a tone of longing which recalls the whole tor-
ture of Heini's real home and suggests the possibility, 
which is to be worked out at a later stage of the film, of 
completely substituting Nazism for family life. ~t this 
stage, however, Heini sees a difficulty-how w1ll he b~ 
able to get back into his parents' house after the meetmg 
when he has no house key? Fritz replies, in the slogan of 
Nazism, "If you will, you can do much" (wenn Man will 
kan Man vieles), and Heini replies, "Yes, I shaiJ come." 
In the following sequence we see Stoppel getting the 
father's signature to a paper entering Heini in the Com-
munist Youth International. The mother suggests weakly 
that they ask the boy whether he "will," but the fathe~ 
violently exclaims, "What do you mean, 'will'? There_1s no 
more to be said. He can be glad that they accept h1m. 
Call it rather luck" (Glueck). And he signs the paper. At 
the beginning of the film, when Stoppel first approached 
the father to get Heini for the Communist Youth, the_ father 
rather pointedly told Stoppel to approach the boy h1mself. 
Now, the propagandist deliberately draws the reverse 
picture, either to correct an impression of the f~ther's 
kindness, which he did not intend should remam, or else 
to give us a total picture of the father's p~rsonali~y, in 
which we see him as mild only when he 1s certain of 
getting his own way, but violent and overbearing 
when opposed. 
Heini now comes home from his meal with Fritz and 
Ulla. He sees Stoppel just leaving the house and anx-
iously asks his mother what Stoppel has been doing. The 
mother weakly says, "Yes, he was with your father-
Father will tell you. Go on in." Heini, a little afraid, goes in 
to his father, who tells him he is to go to the Party Local 
that night at 9:00 o'clock. Heini says, "And do I get a 
house key then?" And the father rep I ies, "Of course you 
get a house key. You are entering the Party and now you 
are grown up-a grown man. And a grown man has a 
house key." 
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Fumbling to free the key from his ring, the father then 
makes a long speech, awkwardly groping for words but 
fully expressing an extraordinary warmth of feeling for his 
boy. "Sit down a minute--1 have wanted to have a word 
with you-you see, there is much happening in these 
days that you don't understand-but we, Workers 
[Proleten], we must look after our own skins. That's it. 
Look how we I ive here-your mother, you, and l-it was 
not always so. We had better days formerly. But now we 
are thrown out of our tracks [Geleise]. I'd have I iked to do 
more for you. Many a night I have racked my brains how I 
could make things better for you. But now work for years 
on end-no wages-that's what breaks one. And now 
even you young people must help us-must stand by us 
old ones. Else we'll never get on, do you see? Else we'll 
be stamping [on a relief line] forever. You understand?" 
"Yes, father." "Now-you have the house key. Your father is 
your friend [meint es gut mit dir]. Now, go along and see 
to it that you enter your Party." 
This scene is in a sense a recapitulation of the whole 
story. The film has carried its audience through all the 
combinations of the family alignment and has built up by 
implicit reasoning the notion that all the psychological 
forces in the family are linked with Nazism, while the 
unpleasant are due to Communism personified in the vio-
lent and childish elements of the father. Now the film goes 
on from its depiction of the internal structure of the family 
to invoke on the side of Nazism all the emotions which 
can be aroused in the boy when he achieves adult inde-
pendence of the family. We are told almost in so many 
words that the house key represents responsible maturity, 
and this symbol is sufficiently well known in Germany to 
stand alone even without the father's words, "A grown 
man has a house key." 
In this new beginning, the film again gives Com-
munism a favorable opening, and the trap is baited 
exactly as it was in the first scenes, except that instead of 
posing as a hero in saving his mother, Heini is now in-
vited to save his father ("us old ones") and the symbol of 
virility is changed. Instead of a knife, he is offered a key. 
Heini comes away from this talk with his father almost 
weeping. He sits down beside his mother and lays his 
head on his hands. "Father is not so bad, mother-father 
is r;uite different, quite different [ganz anders]. What am I 
to do now? He gave me a house key and now I cannot lie 
to him any more. What am I to do, mother? Tell me." 
In this speech, Heini echoes his earlier speech about 
the Nazis-with exactly the same emphasis he told his 
mother that he had been with the "others" (andern) and 
that those others were "not so bad." Thus, the moment the 
father begins to show a pleasanter side of his character, 
the propagandism takes steps to link this pleasanter side 
with Nazism. 
The mother weakly replies, "It would be good if you 
would obey [folgen] your father." Heini says, "But I can-
not." The mother says, "One can do everything, even if it 
is painful [Man kann alles. Muss dir eben Muehe geben]. 
One cannot always do as one would like [gem moechte]." 
This last speech apparently recalls to Heini the full 
strength of Fritz's challenge ("If you will, you can do 
much") and he says definitely, "I will not go to the Com-
munists. I will go to the others ." 
The father's change of tone and Heini's decision to use 
the key to go not to the Communists but to the Nazis have 
introduced important changes into the alignment, and a 
new diagram (Diagram 4) must now be substituted for 
Diagrams 2 and 3. 
Heini has placed himself in a false position, and in-
stead of the cmparatively simple alignment shown in 
Diagram 3, we now have one in which almost all of his 
relationships have become somewhat ambivalent. His re-
lationship with his father, which was one of simple repul-
sion, is now mixed, and we can represent it only by show-
ing the father in two separate parts of the diagram-the 
remembered violent event in one place and the gentle, 
warm father in another. Even with this division of the 
father into two personalities, Heini is still left in an ambiv-
alent relationship to the friendly father. "I cannot lie to 
him"-but Heini is going to lie to him and this lie must 
necessarily introduce a negative element into his attitude 
toward this new, kind father. And this negative element is 
not the simple hate we feel toward those whom we dislike 
and fear, but the subtler guilt we feel when we take a 
course contrary to those who love us and whom we love. 
His attitudes toward the mother are similarly compli-
cated. Insofar as he now loves the kind but Communist 
side of his father's personality, he must also love those 
elements in his mother which weakly echo the father's 
policies. But these elements he has decided to trample, 
so that his decision to lie to his father must also, and for 
the same reasons, introduce an ambivalence into his 
attitudes toward the mother. 
Similarly, his attitudes toward the house key are con-
fused in that the key is very clearly linked with Com-
munism, but he proposes to use it in cooperation with 
Nazism. The key, therefore, also appears twice in the 
diagram. 
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Of all his relationships, only that toward Nazism re-
mains almost uncomplicated. The attraction here is even 
stronger than before, since Ulla has now been added to 
the picture, but even here his attitude is simple only in-
sofar as his "I will" is absolute. 
We now have a long series of sequences dealing with 
Heini's adventures outside the family home, but these 
sequences must be followed in this family analysis since 
their structure is evidently determined by the fact of 
Heini's lie. Heini is stopped on his way to the Nazi "home" 
by Stoppel. The Communists are about to raid the Nazis 
and Stoppel says, "It is good that you have come-now' 
you can join us." He draws Heini onto the porch of a 
house and they stand there waiting for the raid. We see 
Gerda try to seduce Grundler away from his post as sen-
try, and we see the Communists creeping up in the dark 
from different directions. 23 Just as the raid begins, Heini 
dodges away from Stoppel, but he runs straight into 
the arms of the police who have come to quell the 
disturbance. 
The police have already been characterized in a beau-
tiful shot near the beginning of the film. In the food riot the 
apples are scattered, and we see a little girl eating one of 
them in the middle of the street. Two policemen dash up 
on horseback, as though about to ride over her. She 
qui~tly continues to eat her apple, and the police halt 
the1r horses harmlessly on each side of her: This shot has 
told ~s that the police are supposedly infinitely reliable 
and Impersonal , and since it is their relationship to a 
~hild ~hich is used to. characterize them, we are justified 
1n sa~~~~ that they are 1n some sense parental. (Figure 10.) 
He1n1 1s taken to. the pol ice station and questioned by 
these parental pol1ce. He refuses to give his name be-
cause he is afraid it will get into the newspapers, but he 
says that he had nothing to do with the affair-that he was 
o~ his way hom~ (nach Hause) when the pol ice picked 
h1m up. The pol1ce agree that he does not look like a 
gangster (Revolverheld) and tell him to "go home to the 
mother." The first payoff of his lie is that the police label 
him child. 
As he leaves the police station, he encounters the 
Nazis an~ especially Fritz. They accuse him of setting the 
Communists on to them. Fritz's facial expression in this 
scene is a study in what Nazism stands for. His lips are 
drawn back to show both canines in complete and sav-
age repudiation of all human contact with Heini. It is 
however, interesting that the Nazis should have been 'will-
ing to show us this expression on a Nazi face and di-
~ected against.the hero.24 The second payoff of Heini's lie 
IS that the Naz1s label him traitor, putting him back to that 
~arlier state.w~ich he fell into when he was caught watch-
~ng th~ ~az1 h1ke and accused of being a spy. Nazism 
1s agam maccessible, as it was then. 
We .see n.o ~or~ of.the. ~vents of that particular night, 
but th1s om1ss1on 1.s s1gn1f1cant. Heini must have gone 
home and someth1ng must have been said at home about 
Figure 10 Mounted police arrive to quell the food riot. 
the raid , but the filmmakers do not take Heini home. To 
take him home would have involved them in working out 
and recognizing the unacceptable impl ications of the 
particular symbol chosen to represent maturity and the 
achievement of independence of the family. That key, the 
symbol .which stands for all this, is a tool for return ing to 
the fami!Y· Its symbolic meaning is: "If you will accept 
res~ons1ble sexual maturity, you need not break with your 
fam1ly background." Thus in letting the father give Heini a 
key, the filmmakers have unconsciously left open anal-
~ernative t~ Nazism. This alternative they avoid by pass-
Ing over Without a word the other events of that night. 
What did Heini and his parents say to each other when he 
got home? The film does not tell us and assumes that we 
will not notice the omission. 
The film now jumps to the following afternoon, and we 
see Heini at work in the printing shop. Stoppel enters and 
compliments him on the way he conducted himself last 
ni~ht in refusing to give information to the police. The 
th1rd payoff of Heini's lie is that Stoppel hails him as a 
hero. ?t~~p~l 9oes on. to say that tonight Heini must join 
them 1n f1n1sh1ng the JOb." They will get their "bonbons" 
--dynamite and hand grenades-from the secret cache 
in. the old factory in the Marschstrasse. Heini protests, "I 
w111 not that you do this-You must not laugh-1 am fully 
determined (es ist mein vollen Ernst)-1 shall warn them." 
At this threat, Stoppel suddenly becomes serious and 
tells Hei~i ~hat th~~ is .something which one does only 
once. He1n1 says, Th1s then is that once." Stoppel stares 
at ~im for a moment and then relaxes suddenly with a 
sm1le, saying, "Lad, you're on the level [Junge du bist 
richtig]-1'11 see you at 6:30."2s ' 
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Heini has now, like Hitler, told his enemies what he will 
do, and he has succeeded in not being believed. Stoppel 
has dismissed the possibility that a mere boy would 
commit a mortal sin. The assumption implicit in this 
scene seems to be that the older generation (i.e., the 
enemy) will always let you get away with murder if you tell 
them that you are going to commit it and especially if you 
underline the generation difference between yourself and 
them. The same theme was implicit in Heini's interview 
with the police, when the inspector ignored the evidence 
in favor of Heini's guilt in favor of his impression of Heini's 
childishness. (The same theme is also to some extent 
implicit in Hitler's war against the "senile" democracies.) 
Heini 's lie has now been expiated by telling Stoppel 
that he will warn the Nazis, but the daydream that Nazism 
is inaccessible persists. As soon as Stoppel leaves, Heini 
rushes to the telephone and rings up the home of Fritz 
and Ulla. Ulla answers and Heini passionately tells her 
about the plot and the cache of dynamite. But Fritz is in 
the room with her and asks who is telephoning. She tells 
him it is Heini and Fritz says, "That spy! It is a trick. Hang 
up!" Ulla hangs up the telephone thoughtfully, saying to 
Fritz, "but he said 'dynamite.'" Heini is left talking to a 
dead phone. 
He dashes to the police, but the inspector says, "My 
constables are not nurses for your Hitler boys." Next, he 
runs to the house of Fritz and Ulla, but they are out, and 
finally he goes to the fair to try to find Stoppel. At the fair, 
the action of the film is delayed while we listen to fifteen 
and a half lines of the ballad singer's performance, one of 
the longest consecutive speeches in the whole film. At 
the end of the second stanza, as the ballad singer is 
saying, "Often the thing succeeds. But for our George it 
... ,"the explosion occurs, in the Marschstrasse. All the 
explosives have been destroyed. The Nazis have done it. 
The Communists know that someone has betrayed 
them-and Heini goes home smiling and whistling the 
"Youth Song." 
In fact the inaccessibility of Nazism was only a day-
dream: Heini's warning was effective and Ulla must have 
prevailed on Fritz. Ulla's role as a personification of Prov-
idence has already been discussed in the analysis of 
German time perspectives, but here we have to note spe-
cifically that this role is given to Heini's future mate. 
After the explosion, there follows a curious scene be-
tween Stoppel and Heini's mother. In all the remainder of 
the film the dialogue is perfectly straightforward, but in 
this one scene we have a series of misunderstandings 
and things half said. It is night, and Stoppel comes beat-
ing atthe door. The mother tries to keep him out, saying 
"My husband is out! What do you want? I tell you my 
husband is out." Stoppel forces his way in and tells her to 
put out the light. She does this hesitatingly and asks 
Stoppel, "Why are you looking [glotzen] at me like that-
are you being followed?" Stoppel says, "Yes, by the 
Homicide Squad." The mother then gets the idea that 
Stoppel has commited a murder, and he goes on to say 
Diagram 5 
Nazism Stoppel~ 
\____, ( ~ Father 
\_Heini Communism~ 
~Mother/ 
that he will always kill when he is betrayed-that he has 
been betrayed by the Nazis-"And where is your Heini?" 
The mother then jumps to the conclusion that Stoppel has 
killed Heini. She grabs a knife from the table and attacks 
Stoppel, who easily disarms her, saying, "You ought to be 
glad that you are not Heini." The mother then asks who 
betrayed them. Stoppel answers, ''Just a stupid boy," and 
goes out. The mother is thus left afraid of Stoppel and 
Communism but still uncertain of what has happened. 
The effect, and perhaps the purpose, of this scene is to 
shift the alignment shown in Diagram 2. We saw there 
that the mother's allegiance to the father made it impos-
sible for Heini to get her complete love. Now this difficulty 
has in some sense been removed. The mother's alle-
giance to the father is now replaced by hatred and fear 
of Stoppel and Communism. In terms of the diagram, the 
triangle Father-Stoppei-Communism has been turned 
around so that, instead of the corner representing the 
father being directed toward the mother, Stoppel and 
Communism have come into the foreground of her atten-
tion. (Diagram 5) 
The scene, however, is an awkward one. Stoppel's act-
ing, never very good, leaves more ambiguity in it than the 
filmmakers perhaps intended, and it is possible to see in 
the sequences a hint of potential sexual attraction be-
tween Stoppel and the mother. 26 What exactly the 
filmmakers intended in this scene is not clear, but we 
have to remember that Stoppel is later to appear capable 
of conversion to Nazism. The filmmakers therefore had to 
work within narrow limits. Stoppel could not be frankly 
vilified; he could not come in seeking to kill Heini-and 
yet a scene was necessary to make the mother afraid of 
Communism. The scene consequently built up on misun-
derstandinqs and half-understood threats. 
Immediately after Stoppel's exit, Heini comes in and 
the mother says, "Did you do it, Heini?" Heini answers, 
"Yes, I rescued the boys! ... Why are you crying, 
Mother?" Earlier in the film, Heini rescued his mother 
from his father and tried to prevent her from being so sad 
Now he has rescued the Nazis from the Communists, and 
she weeps. 
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The mother pleads with Heini to go and be reconciled 
with (versoehn dich mit) Stoppel, "else all is finished 
[sonst ist alles aus]." He says, "But mother, it is just be-
ginning." He is sure that the Nazis will not accept him, 
and as he lies down on his bed he says in a tired but 
happy voice, "Yes, everything will now be all right"-and 
goes to sleep. 
His mother is left weeping. She hesitantly looks at the 
gas stove, turns on the gas for a moment, turns it off, 
pauses, and finally gets up, turns off the light, and turns 
the gas fully on. The music, based on the first bars of the 
"Youth Song," modified and slowed down to express ter-
ror or threat, mounts slowly, and the gas fumes begin to 
appear on the screen as wisps of haze. Finally, the screen 
is completely blotted out with these billowing fumes, and 
the music evolves from terror to a triumphant and almost 
martial climax. Heini is finally united with his mother and 
-with Nazism-and the propagandic use of the family has 
now finally broken that little group. 
In place of the sharply defined diagrams which we 
have so far been able to draw of the attractions and re-
pulsions within the family, we have now the billowing 
haze in which the mother, Nazism, triumph, and death are 
indistinguishably blended together. 
Heini, however, does not die. The gas fumes clear from 
the screen and reveal Heini awakening in a bed in a 
hospital where he is being looked after by a middle-aged 
nurse. When he realizes where he is, he asks about his 
mother, but the nurse only tells him to drink his milk. 
The sequence is then cut to show the father, who is now 
being looked after by a neighbor who brings him food 
and opens the window to let in some fresh air, as the 
mother did at the beginning of the film after the violent 
scene with the father over the money. The double role of 
the mother has in fact been divided between two women 
-one to look after Heini and make him drink the milk, 
and the other to look after the father. 
Returning to Heini, the nurse enters and says, "There is 
someone to see you." Heini says, "My mother?" The door 
opens and Fritz enters, accompanied by Ulla and four 
Nazi boys. The Nazis are thus brought in as the word 
"mother" leaves Heini's lips. 
Fritz makes a speech to Heini asking forgiveness for 
the way they behaved to him at the police station and 
inviting him to join the troop. Ulla comes forward and 
presents Heini with a parcel. He opens it and finds in it a 
beautiful new Nazi uniform with, in one pocket, some 
money which has been contributed by the group, and in 
the other, a photograph of Ulla with her brother Fritz. 
Heini puts on the cap of the uniform, and Fritz produces a 
mirror from his pocket so that Heini can admire himself 
-a knight in shining armor with the symbol of Aphrodite 
in his hand. -
The nurse returns to tell the Nazis that visiting time is 
over, and when they have gone, she removes the Nazi 
cap from his head while telling him that his mother will 
never come. Thus, in this scene Nazism is twice substi-
tuted for the mother-first when the Nazis enter in the 
mother's place, and second, when the Nazi cap and the 
mother are simultaneously removed. 
In the next scene we see the father selling part of the 
furniture in the home. He receives 30 marks for this, and 
then agrees to sell the rest of the furniture for another 30. 
The second sum is counted out into his hand, and then he 
sees the men removing Heini 's bed-the last possibility 
of Heini's returning to his home. The father tries to stop 
them, but the bed is already sold. In helpless anger, he 
flings the 30 marks on the floor-probably evoking in the 
audience an almost unconscious echo of Judas and the 
30 pieces of silver. 27 
Some days later, Heini is still in the hospital and we see 
him walking forlornly in the garden. The doctor remarks 
that his recovery is slow, and the nurse replies, "He can-
not forget his mother"; and we see him refuse to play with 
another boy in the hospital garden. 
Meanwhile, Heini's father is in the waiting room of the 
hospital, and while he sits there slumped heavily in his 
chair reading a fashion magazine, the district leader of 
the Hitler Youth comes in and sits down in the next chair. 
The father eyes the swastika on the leader's sleeve and 
moves away. The leader and the father meet, however, 
when the nurse comes in and announces that Heini is in 
the garden. Both of them rise. There is an awkwardness 
as they both go toward the doorway, and the father says, 
"Where are you going then?" and the leader replies, "To 
Heini Voelker." "What? To my son?" "Oh, are you the 
father?" 
When they reach the garden, the leader waves to Heini 
with enthusiasm while the father greets his son a little 
gruffly. The father says that the doctor has given Heini 
permission to leave the hospital whenever he wishes, but 
Hein i says, "But where should I go?" The father says, 
"What a question! To your father, of course-where you 
belong [hingehoerst]." At this point, the leader cuts into 
the conversation with "That is the question-where does 
the boy belong today [heute ]?"28 
We have seen Nazism equated with the mother. Now 
we have a triangular scene, whose structure is revealed 
by Heini's sitting between the two older men so that they 
are in analogous positions relative to Heini, though argu-
ing in opposite directions. Thus Nazism comes to be 
equated not only with the mother but also with the father, 
as it was when Heini said of both the Nazis and his father, 
"They are not so bad." Nazism is ready to be substituted 
for those aspects of the father's personality which 
are congenial. 
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The scene consists of a long ideological conversation, 
the function of which, in the plot, is to formalize the shift-
ing of Heini from the family setting into the Hitler Youth 
organization. This conversation must be given in detail: 
Leader: That is just the question-where does the boy be-
long today? I had very good parents. But when I 
was fifteen I got out of the rut (bin ich ausgerueckt). 
I wanted to go to sea- to become a sailor-to 
wherever there were islands, where there were 
palms-to Africa. In there thousands of boys have 
left the rut. 
Father: And there were bad boys (Lausejungens ). 
Leader: Boys are something that is wonderful! Boys are a 
great mystery (Geheimnis)! In all times it has been 
so. They have run away to the gypsies. Always a 
day has come and they have joined the great cara-
van (Zug). They, they begin to wander. Where does 
a boy belong? You-ask your own boy. 
Father (to Heini) : Well-you-you say a word now. (Heini 
smiles to himself, imagining the palms, the islands, 
and the wandering.) 
Leader: I don't know whether you were in the war (im Felde). 
Father (resentfully): Yes-indeed. 
Leader: Two million boys then freely offered (gemeldt) 
themselves for service. Every one of them was the 
son of a father-and, more important, of a mother. 
And where did they belong? 
Father: I am a simple man. I am a worker (Prolet). 
Leader: But you must have heard of the Movement (Be-
wegung). No? 
Father: Movement! Attention! March! March! That was my 
"Movement" till I stopped a bullet. And then I was 
laid in plaster of Paris, and then there was more 
"Movement" stretching the bones. Bend! Stretch! 
Bend! Stretch! And then I hobbled on the stamping 
ground (Stempel; where men stamp in line, waiting 
for relief). Week after week, year after year, that was 
my "Movement." Nothing else "moved" me. I was 
unstuck (Aus dem Leim bin ich gegangen). Do you 
think it was eating (fressen) that made me so · 
heavy? And where I belong, that is where the boy 
belongs. To his class comrades (Kiassengenes-
sen). 
Leader: You mean-to the International? 
Father: Yes, indeed. To the International. 
Leader: And where were you born? ' 
Father: In Berlin. 
Leader: And where is that? 
Father: On the Spree. 
Leader: On the Spree. Yes. But where? In what country? 
Father: In Germany-yes-in OUR Germany. Think that 
over. 
This dialogue has a rather complicated propagandic 
structure. The first two speeches are clearly addressed to 
Heini and to those youthful members of the audience who 
can be charmed with a daydream of wandering among 
tropical islands, escaping from parents, and shelving the 
difficult issues of maturity. Heini himself is clearly caught 
in this daydream. He smiles to himself with a glowing 
face and is so wrapped in his dream that he is hardly 
aware of his father's question. We think of adventure as 
inducing a greater awareness of other people and of the 
outer world, but wandering, the escape of the German 
Youth movements, was different. It was rather a with-
drawal into a dream, an introversion of the personality. 
It was hardly necessary, perhaps, to provide Heini with 
this dream because we know that his heart is already set 
upon becoming a Nazi. But this particular scene is cru-
cial. It is the final scene between Heini and his father, the 
scene of the final disruption of the family. The propagan-
dist cannot say bluntly that Nazi ideology is logically the 
bane of the family, that its propaganda is parasitic upon 
the emotions which dwell within the family, and that, in 
the end, the ideology is totally destructive of the family 
unit. Therefore, this final scene must be sweetened, and 
we are offered the theory that youth has "always" es-
caped "from the rut" and the lyrical illusion that they es-
cape to palm trees and tropical islands. 
The second half of the scene is addressed to the father 
and to the men of the war generation. Heini and the prob-
lem of where Heini belongs fade away almost completely. 
The leader brings up the question of the war, again and 
again, "Where did they [the soldiers who fought] be-
long?" This is tantamount to asking the father not "where 
does Haini belong" but "where do you belong." In reply to 
this latent question, the father is then allowed to express 
all his own bitterness about the war, his own wound, and 
his own unemployment, and must at the end argue rather 
lamely, "Where I belong, that is where the boy belongs." 
The leader ignores this last reference to Heini and pushes 
the father into equating class consciousness with inter-
nationalism (by means of a pun on the word "lnter-
nationale"). Then he builds up the trap by dialogue until 
he can spring it with the words "Our Germany." 
In truth, the family drama is finished off with the 
leader's speech about hunger and gypsies, and in the 
second part of the sequence, the filmmaker has pro-
ceeded to an entirely new task-that of showing that all 
the principal characters of the film, with the exception of 
the sinister Wilde, can be converted to Nazism. It is diffi-
cult to ensure that every member of the audience will see 
the story of any film through the eyes of the right charac-
ter, and whenever, as in this film, two opposing sides are 
presented on the screen, there is always a danger that 
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some members of the audience may see the story 
through the eyes of some character in the wrong camp. If, 
however, all the characters make progress toward the 
side favored by the propagandist, then there is hope that 
all members of the audience will be encouraged in the 
same direction. 
The father is told to "think over" the fact that he was 
born in our Germany, and later we see the result of his 
cogitations. He is drinking with Stoppel and asks Stoppel 
which he would prefer-English beer or the local Molle 
Helles beer. Stoppel says, "Molle Helles," and then the 
father asks, "Where was it brewed?" which leads suc-
cessfully to "In our Germany-think that over." 
Later we see Stoppel trying to save Heini from the 
vengeance of the Communists; and we see Gerda scorn-
ing the traitor Grundler and expressing a preference for 
Heini. She has taken a first step toward becoming a Nazi 
in admiring Heini's loyalty to Nazism, and even Grundler 
himself seems sobered by her scorn. 
In sum, by closing off Heini's relationship to his family 
of origin with this scene, the filmmakers have been able 
to lay the foundations for the conversion of almost every-
body in the film to Nazism. (The family of origin has 
served its function as a source of emotional intensity, and 
the propagandist has been able to collect from it all the 
favorable attitudes directed toward the parents to redirect 
them toward Nazism while the unfavorable attitudes have 
been collected and redirected toward Communism.) 
Analysis IV: The Future Family 
The family of origin has been destroyed, the mother is 
dead, and after the scene in the hospital garden, we 
never again see Heini with his father-but this analysis of 
the film's use of family symbols must follow Heini to the 
end, because the beginnings of another family structure 
are appearing. Every individual whose life is complete 
has membership in two families, the family into which he 
is born and that other family which he himself sets up 
when he marries. 
It is clear already that no future family could be set up 
by Heini on the old pattern. The film has indicated great 
disapproval of Gerda's lusty sexuality and has frustrated 
all Heini's symbolic moves toward normal masculine 
virility-his desire for the knife and his acceptance of the 
house key presented to him by the father. The old virility 
has been condemned, and if we want to know about 
Nazism, we must ask what sort of pattern the film will 
suggest as a model for the future Germany. In answer to 
this question the film contains two types of materiai-
Heini's courtship relations with Ulla and the district 
leader's relationship to the boys. The leader, in the last 
scene, has been set up as an alternative to the father, and 
to this extent he can be regarded as a father substitute, so 
that from his behavior we can get one segment of the 
future German family pattern while from Heini's courtship 
we get another. 
The scene between the leader and the father is cut off 
after the leader says, "Think that over," and the next shot 
shows us the leader and Heini entering another Nazi 
"home" in the district of Bannheim. Heini is to be pro-
tected from the vengeance of the Communists by being 
removed from the Beusselkietz district. On entering the 
home, the leader introduces Heini to his new roommate 
-Grundler.29 The leader says, "So, Heini, you will live 
here. And that is your roommate (Stubenkamarad), 
Grundler. And this is Heini Voelker-he is alone in the 
world like you." Thus the leader underlines the notion that 
Nazism is a substitute for the real home and at the same 
time marks the parallel between Heini and Grundler. This 
parallel is at once used, as it was earlier in the film, to 
point up the contrast between them. Grundler starts to 
sing a snatch from some popular song : 
That is the life of any sailor-
Never think my love will last, 
Anchors cannot there hold fast . ... 
(Das ist die Liebe der Matrosen-
auf die Dauer, Iieber Schatz, 
ist mein Herz kein Ankerplatz ... . ) 
His association with Gerda is evidently causing his 
character to degenerate, ·and while he sings he walks 
around the room with a curiously footloose air, expressing 
complete casual detachment. He pauses in his song to 
offer a cigarette to Heini, who refuses disapprovingly. 
Grundler shrugs his shoulders, lights one for himself, and 
resumes his song. Heini meanwhile pins up over his bed 
the photograph of Ulla and Fritz which they gave him in 
the hospital. Grundler strolls over and looks at this, say-
ing, "So, you have let yourself be photographed with your 
wench [F/amme].'' The insulting implications of this re-
mark are much stronger than we would guess. In most of 
the German Youth movements-Communists, Social 
Democratic, and Nazi alike-there was a·very strong 
taboo on any suggestion that ordinary sexual attraction 
might play a part in "comradeship." It is probable that not 
only the Nazis but also other groups were on their way 
toward evolving sexual patterns of the type indicated by 
the relationship between Heini and Ulla. 
Heini replies, "That is no 'wench,' that is the Group 
Leader [Kamaradschaftsfuehrer] with his sister!" But 
Gru.ndler says, "To me it only looks like a fine girl [stram-
mes Maedchen]-a very fine girl." We have already had 
hints that Ulla approves of Heini, and we have seen Ger-
da's desire for Heini and her seduction of Grundler. Now 
the fourth possibility of sexual attraction is hinted at-
Grundler thinks that Ulla is a "fine wench." We are being 
told that the sort of love which Grundler and Gerda and 
the Communists affect is different in kind from anything 
in Nazism. 
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The sequence is cut off at this point to show us the 
scene in which the father tries the trick dialogue on Stop-
pel with the two pots of beer: "And where was it brewed-
in our Germany." 
When we next see Heini, he is sitting with the other 
Nazi boys at a meal in the clubroom. Grundler refers to 
Heini as "our 'Quex."' Heini protests against this 
nickname, but the other boys all say that he is a real 
Quex-a real Quicksilver [Quexsilber]." 30 They all start to 
point at Heini and call him "Quex! Quex!" A disorderly 
fight breaks out between Heini and the others. Heini 
throws water in Grundler's face, 31 and in a few seconds 
one or two subsidiary fights start among the other boys, 
as though they were all really fighting each other just for 
the sake of fighting. At this moment the district leader 
enters and restores order with a single barked command, 
and the whole scene thus forms a further illustration of the 
premise that disorderly depravity underlies Nazi disci-
pline. This incident of the nickname requires, however, 
further interpretation. The name itself- "Quex," or 
"Quicksilver"-fits well enough with Heini's quick, re-
sponsive character, his "mercurial" temperament. But it is 
interesting that the name should first be applied by 
Grundler, that Heini should resent the name, and that the 
name should be allowed to stick-it is later used by Ulla 
at the highest point of her relationship with Heini, and of 
course. it is used in the title of the film (see Fiqure 6). 
We may guess that Grundler's use· of the word follows 
naturally from the contrast which has been drawn be-
tween himself and Heini. Grundler is weak and wavering, 
his heart is no place for an anchor [sic]; but Heini has 
really changed-he has been converted to Nazism and 
stands firm in that faith. It is natural, therefore, for Grund-
ler to quiet his own conscience by accusing Heini of 
changeability. Such a reading, however, will hardly ac-
count for the adoption of the nickname in the title of the 
film. We have to recognize that, in addition to the mean-
ing of mere changeability, the word "Quex" implies a 
certain sexlessness, or, more strictly, a certain sexuality 
distilled from the normal lustiness arising from the differ-
ences between the sexes-purified until either sex may 
have the shining, untouchable charms of Mercury or 
Hermaphroditus.32 Such an epithet, bearing these impli-
cations, could certainly be applied to the preadolescent 
Heini, and its overtones-verging on the homosexual-
would certainly explain Heini's resentment. 
The nickname comes close to being a reproach, and 
its adoption into the title of the film is best understood as 
an instance of the rather common-phenomenon by which 
a term of reproach is picked up and worn as a badge of 
pride-like the Garter and the motto Honi soit qui mal y 
pense. · 
If we put together the intersexual implications of the 
word "Quex" and the narcissistic implications of the inci-
dent in which the Nazis give Heini a mirror in which to 
admire himself, we get a rather clear picture of one side 
of Nazi character. The badge of reproach is proudly worn, 
and the uniform is self-admired. This type of narcissism 
has led to the development in Germany of an entirely new 
kind of film, which we may call the "pseudodocumentary." 
These films, of which The Triumph of the Will is the out-
standing example, depict historical spectacles such as 
the Nurenberg Parteitag of 1934, but they differ from ordi-
nary newsreel material in that the spectacle is expressly 
created and staged for the motion picture camera. Reality 
becomes a carefully dressed shop window in which 
Nazism exhibits itself. 33 
The ordinary technical terms of psychology and 
psychoanalysis are not applicable to the particular type 
of personality implied by this combination of intersexual-
ity and self-admiration in Nazism. The word "narcissism" 
suggests not only self-admiration but also effeminacy-
which Nazism does not exhibit; and the word "homosexu-
ality" implies dominance-submission relationships, usu-
ally with a strong emphasis on the erogenous zones. 
Nazism has gone to the opposite, and equally pathologi-
cal, extreme of repudiating all such emphasis. We are of 
course talking only about the ideal Nazism as it is pre-
sented in this film and not about the reality. The film indi-
cates to us that the ideal in 1933 was not merely without 
emphasis on the erogenous zones, but emphatically 
anti-zonal, and the psychiatric expectation would be that 
a cult with such ideals would produce frequent cases of 
underground homosexuality with pronounced zonal em-
phasis and dominance-submission patterns following the 
lines of the overt authoritarian system. 
It is, however, the ideal which we are here investigat-
ing, and in order to get a clearer picture of the sort of 
human relationships which would be based on combin-
ing narcissism and intersexuality, it is necessary to look 
carefully at the relationships between Ulla and Heini and 
between the district leader and his boys. In the last two 
reels of the film, there are two scenes between Heini and 
Ulla, and it is interesting to note the ruse which the 
filmmaker deemed artistically appropriate as a means of 
bringing this boy and girl together. The script writer has 
shown considerable resourcefulness throughout the film, 
and he is here faced with a comparatively easy task, so 
that we may legitimately assume that the device which 
here seems to be artistically appropriate is also psycho-
logically significant. 
It is the time of the 1933 election, and after a series of 
shots of election crowds and processions, one very quick 
shot shows us a crowd scene in which Fritz's head is 
slightly wounded. Fritz reports back to the Nazi head-
quarters where everyone is busy working on leaflets. The 
leader seizes Fritz by the head and gazes into his eyes, 
then gives orders that he is to lie down. Heini and Ulla 
meet at the door of the room where Fritz lies in bed. Heini 
tells Ulla that Grundler has treacherously destroyed all 
their leaflets and that he is leaving immediately to print a 
new supply. Heini and Ulla then go off together to print 
more leaflets in Heini's workshop. 
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Figure 11 Ulla gives Heini a "Nazi" kiss of friendship. 
Thus Heini and Ulla come together by temporary 
elimination of Fritz, so that Heini is substituted for Ulla's 
brother. The relationship between them, which is clearly 
meant to have sexual overtones and to romanticize the 
mating of pure types under the Nazi aegis, is structurally 
equated with a relationship between brother and sister. 
The second scene between Heini and Ulla is a very 
short sequence in the printing shop. They have worked 
all night on the leaflets and finally Heini says, "So-that's 
done [sodas haetten wir geschafft]," and Ulla exclaims, 
"Quex, you are colossal [du bist ein kolossaller Kerl]," 
and bends forward, giving him a quick, sisterly kiss-a 
kiss which contrasts sharply with that earlier kiss Gerda 
had forced upon his lips. Heini is delighted, and says, 
"UIIa!-and now for Beusselkeitz!" He then goes out to 
his death. (Figure 11.) 
The preliminary base for the future German family is 
thus envisaged as a courtship between two mercurial 
beings stripped of the outward manifestations of sex dif-
ferences and symbolically equated as brother and sister. 
Nazism offers us a recipe for life based on regression to 
those themes against which most of the civilizations of 
the world have striven since human communities first had 
culture-psychological homosexuality, narcissism, and 
incest. This probably is the logical outcome of building a 
cult on the preadolescent daydream of perpetual youth. 
Corresponding to the metamorphosis which courtship 
has undergone at Nazi hands, we find corresponding 
changes in the father and son relationship. The film unfor-
tunately does not show us a Nazi father, but we have seen 
that the district leader is cast as an alternative to the real 
father, and therefore by comparing him with the father, we 
may arrive at some indication of what the father-son rela-
tionship would look like in the ideal, future Nazi family. 
When we compare the leader with Heini's father, we find . 
the same sort of systematic contrast that we found earlier 
in the comparison of Ulla and Gerda, As Ulla is con-
structed to be the physical opposite of Gerda, so the 
leader is the physical opposite of Heini's father. He is a 
curious but not unfamiliar type. The father is a very heavy, 
broad-faced man, clumsy and fumbling in his move-
ments, his voice a deep bass and his speech broken and 
halting. He roars when he is angry but he is warm and 
awkwardly charming when he wishes to be kind. In con-
trast to this, the district leader is tall and thin, hatchet-
faced, fluent and even eloquent in his speech and in his 
movements. When he is angry, instead of roaring he emits 
a single, sharp bark. The two men are about the same 
age, perhaps in their early forties with at most five years 
difference between them, and yet the district leader is 
boyish where the father is manly. The leader's youthful-
ness is enhanced by the uniform he wears which confers 
upon him the air-slightly embarrassing to non-Nazi 
eyes-of an overgrown Boy Scout, a Boy Scout who has 
grown old insofar as the lines of his face are concerned 
but whose physique has never filled out. He clings longer 
than he should to a certain boyishness of manner, a cer-
tain romanticism of youth maintained almost by recipe 
after youth should have given place to maturity. In fact, 
the district leader bears just about the same relationship 
to the old stereotype of the lower-middle-class father that 
the ideal sexuality of Nazism bears to the caricatured 
sexuality of Communism. He is an emasculated father but 
not an effeminate one. When he talks of the mystery of 
boys, we are reminded of those nineteenth-century 
romantic notions about the "long, long thoughts" of 
adolescence, and yet there is a difference. The 
nineteenth-century labels were applied to underline a 
contrast--even a barrier-between male and female, and 
between the mature and the adolescent, but the district 
leader's speech and tone indicate rather that he himself 
is one of the boys whom he romanticizes: He recognizes 
no suc1iJ barrier. He shares their dreams and romanticizes 
himself by some twist of narcissism. 
All of this is repellent to non-Nazi eyes, but this is the 
enemy's idealized picture of himself, and if we are ever to 
help that enemy pu"ll himself out of the swamp into which 
he has sunk-and thereby endangered us all-we need 
to understand him and the dreams on which he has fed. 
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Analysis V: The Knife and Death 
Two ingredients of the plot remain to be examined in 
order to complete the analysis of the propagandist's han-
dling of the symbols which derive their force from the 
loves and hates of the German family. These are the knife 
and Death. 
The knife is referred to, either openly or implicitly, no 
less than seven times, and while it only appears on the 
screen at three of these points, the whole series must be 
brought together to get a full impression of its significance: 
The first reference to the knife is in the dialogue between 
Heini and his mother, after the father has gone off to get 
his beer. Heini is reminded of the knife by the music of the 
fair, and turns to his mother. He I ists the charms of the 
knife and begs for money to go and get it. We have al-
ready noted earlier that, in doing this, Heini is deviating 
from the role of the self-sacrificing hero and is doing 
something which more nearly parallels his father's irre-
sponsible virility. (See Figure 3.) 
2 We then see the knife in the fair, and we see Heini lose his 
money in the lottery. He asks the price of the knife and is 
told "eight marks." Stoppel appears at Heini's elbow and 
says, "Now-don't let your head hang scr--1 promise 
you'll have the knife sooner than you think-have you 
thought about it? About the Communist Youth Organiza-
tion?" and then Stoppel invites Heini to the hike, listing 
the charms of the hike just as Heini had I isted the charms 
of the knife to his mother. 
3 When the Nazis come to Heini's bedside in the hospital, 
they give him a uniform and tell him to look in the pock-
ets. In one pocket he finds the photograph of Fritz and 
Ulla, and in the other some money. They tell him that they 
have all contributed to make up this sum. (There is no 
overt reference to the knife on this occasion.) 
4 When Heini is hiding in the Nazi clubhouse in another 
part of Berlin, the leader sends him to get some beer. He 
goes and gets the beer from a bar, and on the way back, 
carrying two full mugs of beer, he encounters Stoppel. 
Stoppel makes a last effort to persuade Heini to come 
back to the Communists and even produces a knife from 
his pocket, offering it to Heini if he will come with him. 
Heini's two mugs of beer are in imminent danger of being 
upset by Stoppel's sudden movements (a little actually 
spills), but he stands firm against temptation and Stoppel 
finally leaves him, with the emphatic warning not to show 
himself in Beusselkietz or he, Stoppel, will not be respon-
sible for the consequences. 
5 Stoppel then goes back to the Communists, who are plot-
ting Heini's death. He says, "Whether you want it or not-
there it is! [Wer nicht will, der hat schon ]," and lays the 
knife on the table with a gesture dimly reminiscent of 
Pilate or Judas. The camera then closes in and we see 
the hands of all the other Communists crowd over the 
knife. The sinister Wilde lifts the heaped-up but unresist-
ing hands, takes the knife, and puts it in his pocket. 
6 When Heini and Ulla are working in the printing shop on 
the new supply of leaflets, the following dialogue occurs: 
Ulla: What will your master say? 
Heini: Oh, I will pay him tomorrow for his current 
[electricity] and paper. 
Ulla: Have you money then? 
Heini: You all brought money for me to the hospital. 
Ulla: Yes, but with that you wanted to buy the knife 
for yourself. 
Heini: Never mind [Ach!]. Leaflets are more important 
[wichtiger]. 
7 Hunted and surrounded by the Communists, Heini takes 
refuge in a tent in the deserted fair grounds. He acciden-
tally touches a grotesque mechanical figure of a drum-
mer, and his touch sets the machine working. It gives a 
few beats-thus betraying Heini to the Communists. 
Heini's scream is heard, but no shot, and we are left to 
presume that Heini was stabbed by Wilde. The knife is 
seen a moment later on the ground beside the dying 
Heini. 
These seven incidents build up into a definite picture of 
the psychological significance of the knife. Throughout it 
is a symbol of the old sort of virility which is imputed to 
"Communism." Heini's going to get the knife is analagous 
to the father's going to get his beer. Before Heini ap-
peared on the scene, the father had said, "My boy can 
just go and get a couple of bottles of beer-Where is the 
lad?" Thus the two glasses of beer which Heini goes to 
get for the leader are an echo of the two bottles which he 
never went to get for his father. The equating of leader 
and father is again indicated by this echo, but the differ-
ence between them is underlined. The beer that Heini 
fetched for the leader stands for his passivity, which is 
happ.ily given expression within the framework of Nazism, 
and this beer, the symbol of passivity, is pitted against 
the knife-the old symbol of active virility and temptation. 
We need hardly be surprised that the audience is made 
to feel anxious lest the beer be spilled, nor need we be 
surprised that the beer wins against the knife in this sym-
bolic conflict. 
Stoppel's handing over of the knife to the other Com-
munists then becomes a statement that he, for his part, is 
sick of them and has progressed at least from active 
participation in Communism to neutrality. 
The dialogue with Ulla about the money and the knife is 
of great interest, since there are two obvious reasons 
which should have prevented the inclusion of this 
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dialogue: first, Heini is obviously being a little 
hypocrite-he has seen the knife in Stoppel's hands and 
knows very well that it is no longer on sale at the fair; 
second, the dialogue has an unsatisfactory result-the 
audience, who have not hitherto been told to associate 
the money with the knife, now must do so and may well 
ask. what has prevented Heini from acquiring the knife in 
the interval. We are not told how long Heini spent in 
Bannheim, but Grundler remarks to Gerda that Heini has 
been with them there "ever so long [schon ewig lange]." 
He could easily have asked one of his Nazi friends to go 
to the fair and buy it for him. 
Thus, by including this little piece of dialogue, the 
propagandist has let Heini appear to be a hypocrite and 
has created an unexplained blank in the plot, where pre-
viously no explanation was called for. We are entitled, 
therefore, to conclude that this dialogue was psychologi-
cally important to the propagandist. 
This importance seems to be of two kinds. First, there is 
a marked parallel between this weakness in the handling 
of the knife and the weakness which we have already 
noted in the handling of that other symbol of maturity and 
virility, the house key. The propagandist was compelled 
to pass over the night of the raid on the Nazi clubroom in 
order not to let it appear that by using the key Heini could 
combine maturity with a return to his family. And now, 
again, the propagandist has been constrained to pass 
over a stretch of time. He seems psychologically im-
pelled to leave open the way to a satisfactory mature 
sexuality in spite of his ideological trend in the opposite 
direction. 
Second, the dialogue is important at a more superficial 
level, since it is Heini's formal repudiation of normal sex-
uality in favor of Nazism and Kamaradschaft. He had, of 
course, already repudiated the knife once before, in the 
dialogue with Stoppel, but now he does it again. The 
propagandist makes him protest perhaps once too often 
than was quite necessary, but still this second repudia-
tion is artistically appropriate here since it immediately 
precedes Ulla's kiss.35 The abnegation of normal sexual-
ity is rewarded by achievement of Nazi sexuality, and 
from this reward Heini goes out to meet the knife for the 
last time. 
As to Heini 's death, the filmmaker goes to great pains 
to show us that the Nazis are in no way to blame for it. The 
district leader has done all he can to save Heini from the 
vengeance of the Communists by keeping him away from 
Beusselkietz, hidden in the Bannheim Nazi home, and 
the filmmaker even goes to the quite unnecessary length 
of setting up two trains of events, either of which could in 
the end lead to Heini's death. 
The first depends upon Grundler's treachery. Gerda 
has made Grundler completely subservient to her, 36 and 
she and Stoppel find out from him that Heini is in Bann-
heim. Stoppel does not pass this information on to the 
other Communists, but himself goes to try to tempt Heini 
back with the knife, just as we have seen Gerda similarly 
not passing on the information (perhaps because she is 
in love with Heini). The train of events, therefore, which 
the filmmaker could have used to kill Heini if he had 
wanted to, leads nowhere. 
The second train of events springs from Heini's suicidal 
ambition to return to Beusselkietz. Ever since he has 
been in Bannheim, Heini has been wanting to get back to 
his old comrades, and the screen shows two arguments 
between Heini and his leader on this subject. The leader 
insists on caution and backs up this insistence with ap-
peals to discipline. He points out that those twelve in 
Beusselkietz are not the only comrades that Heini has-
that he has "hundreds of thousands" of comrades all over 
Germany who wear the same brown shirt-and this ap-
peal to the bandwagon and to narcissism prevails in the 
first argument. In the second argument Heini says, "You 
said that a Hitler boy is a soldier-and you yourself were 
an officer in the war ... and did you forbid your soldiers 
to advance after the battle was on?" The leader is much 
moved by this argument. He takes Hein i's head in his 
hands and gazes into his eyes saying, "In God's name, go 
then to your Beusselkietz." 
Thus it is Heini 's fault-overzealousness-that leads to 
his death, so that this, his real death, like the former 
symbolic death which he shared with his mother, con-
tains elements of suicide: the one was inflicted on him by 
his mother, the other results from his own Nazi zeal. 
Objectively speaking, the final death was inflicted on 
him by Wilde with the knife, so that the suicidal elements 
discussed above provide only a partial explanation of the 
events and must be supplemented by a further explana-
tion. Actually the death is the meeting point of two sepa-
rate trains of circumstance, the development of Heini's 
character, on the one hand, and the history of the knife on 
the other. At the beginning of the film, Heini wanted to 
possess the knife, the symbol of old-fashioned virility, but 
on this occasion the knife was denied him, and later, in 
the interests of ideological purity, he abjures the knife in 
favor of two glasses of beer-his passivity. This passivity 
mounts to suicidal ;z:eal and finally, in the end, again 
meets the old virility symbol , the knife. 
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Conclusions 
The Nature of Nazism 
The first purpose of this analysis has been to draw from 
the filn: as muc~ insight as possible into the psychology 
of Naz1sm, and 1n conclusion, those characteristics of 
Nazism which have appeared at various stages of the 
analysis are presented in the form of a list. Such a listing 
~f psychological characteristics is necessarily a distor-
tion: ~very charact~ristic of a human being is dependent 
on, 1s mdeed a sect1on of, a whole character. Each item in 
the list is only a special view of the central Nazi character 
brought to light by some special form of analysis. For ' 
ex~mple , it ~~ probable that the Nazi tendency to project 
the1r ~w.n fa1l1ngs upon the enemy is only another way of 
descnb1ng the double nature of their attitudes toward 
sex, and this again is probably only another way of de-
scribing their climactic time perspective-insisting, 
however, that any separation of the characteristics one 
from another necessarily does violence to our view of the 
whole. Such a list may still be useful. The whole character 
cannot be expressed in words, but the list may help the 
~eader t? synthesize in his mind some vague feeling or 
1mpress1on of what the whole is like. 
The principal characteristics of Nazism are here listed 
in the order in which they appeared in the analyses. 
Characteristics which appeared in the study of 
time perspectives: · 
In 1933, the Nazis had a climactic view of the future which 
we summarize as "through death to a millennium." Evi-
dence was produced also for believing that, in 1941, this 
time perspective was already giving place to its obverse, 
"though preliminary victories to a final defeat." From these 
two conclusions, the central hypothesis emerges that 
Nazi time perspective is reversible and subject to a 
swing between two extreme positions. It is likely that 
either of these extreme positions is more stable, more 
psychologically attractive than the more common-sense 
middle positions, and also it is possible that indulgence 
in either of the extremes strengthens in the Nazi soul the 
potentiality for the other; therefore, while a swing toward 
the more pessimistic time perspective may bode well for 
a United Nations victory, the psychiatric problem which 
Nazism presents is of how the more realistic middle posi-
tion may be made more stable and the extreme positions 
less stable, so that the pendulum may come to rest. 
2 Nazism is an age grade system. Important educative 
functions of the family, especially the function of giving to 
the growing boy some sense of self-sufficiency, are taken 
over by another set of institutions, the youth organizations 
and the army. These institutions are divided into a 
number of age grades, and the psychology implicit in this 
age grade system is basic to Nazism, so that such a film 
as this, which does not specially deal with the grading of 
Nazi youth, is nevertheless patterned like an initiation 
ceremony. Thus, at least in 1933, the Nazi attitude toward 
death included the notion that death is a sort of 
promotion. 
Some sort of age grade system will inevitably persist in 
Germany after the war, because the large number of bro-
ken homes and the general social dislocation will in-
cr~a~e rath~r than decrease the importance of any in-
stitution wh1ch takes over the educative functions of the 
f~mily. But it will be important for any such institution to 
fmd some new phrasing of its philosophy of death and 
promotion. T~e linkage between death and the passage 
from ~ne soc1al status to another will probably persist-
even 1n commencement exercises in American schools 
the students often sing Tennyson's "Crossing the Bar"-
b_ut Germans will have to find some phrasing different 
from the .notion of death itself as an achievement. Perhaps 
death m1ght be seen more definitely as the sloughing off 
of the old personality and less as a step toward the new. 
3 In N~zi ritual it is assumed that death is followed by 
multiple reincarnation. This notion has a number of unde-
si.ra~l~ implications. It necessarily diminishes any sort of 
d1gn1f1ed and responsible individualism. The individual 
sees himself as a mass-produced object, identical with a 
thousand others. He may like this view of himself, and he 
may reverse the tradition of dead Nazi heros, but his 
chances of discovering his own worth and dignity, his 
own power of responsibility, are necessarily reduced. 
Characteristics which appeared in the study 
of political groups: 
Nazi propaganda continually resorts to projection. The 
propagandist smears his enemy by attributing to him 
characteristics which are latent in Nazism itself. Analysis 
of the various sorts of projection recognizable in this film 
indicates three fundamental splits in the Nazi character. 
In each of these splits it is probable that each side of the 
personality promotes the other, the more extreme posi-
tions of the personality being more stable than the inter-
mediate positions. The stability, however, of the extreme 
positions, especially of the overpurified extremes, is in 
part dependent upon being able to recognize or imagine 
~ome enemy on whom the other extreme may be pro-
Jected. All three splits are recognizable in the pre-Nazi 
movies of the 1920s. 
.a. B~tween dis.c!pline and disorder. Discipline as imag-
Ined 1n the Naz1 1deal depends upon extreme passivity 
-almost an impassivity-in the face of sudden, barked 
commands, and these commands appear to be the 
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stimulus which prevents lapse into disorder. In the Nazi 
ideal at least, discipline is not so much a toadying to 
authority as a controlled steadying in the face of sudden 
shock, whether this shock be a sudden command or an 
enemy attack. (There is here an interesting psychoanalyt-
ic possibility of identification between authority and the 
enemy, and some identification of this sort would be ex-
pected since many of the unpleasant characteristics of 
the old father stereotype are projected onto enemies. The 
film, however, does not provide material for examining 
this identification.) 
Psychologically the passivity is wrapped in an aura 
of romantic heroism, typified in this film by the incident of 
the mark, in which Heini in one and the same act joins his 
mother in passive submission to the father and does this 
act of submission as a piece of rescuing heroism. And 
the passivity is further romanticized by substituting it for 
an identification with the father. The lusty and aggressive 
behavior of the father-his going to get beer, etc.-is 
replaced in the son by the two glasses of beer which 
express the son's passivity toward his leader. 
The disorderly underside of the coin is typified in the 
film partly by the momentary outbreaks of disorder 
among the Nazis, and more fully by their representation 
of "Communist" behavior. It is a system of behavior 
characterized by lusty virility and aggression. When the 
Nazis themselves lapse into this state, they become dis-
organized, but when they are projecting this state upon· 
the Communists, they attribute to them a considerable 
degree of malevolent organization. 
The split between disorder and discipline is an old 
theme of German dreams and nightmares-recognizable 
in, for example, The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (1919)-and it 
has its roots undoubtedly in the stereotype relationship 
between father, mother, and son. 'vVe do not know what 
the parental relationship looks like in families where the 
parents grew up as Nazis, but it is here that we must look 
to determine whether this particular nightmare is likely to 
persist in Germany and to find the means by which the 
Germans may remedy it. 
b. Between sexual "comradeship" and sexual gross-
ness. We have noted that the overpurified Nazi ideal of 
sex leans toward the homosexual side even though, in the 
ideal, the sexual object (UIIa) may be of the opposite sex. 
On the other side of the picture, we have the sexually 
gross and heterosexual relationship to a sexual object 
(Gerda), whom Heini, in the curious incident of the kiss in 
the railway carriage, mistakes for a boy. In the characteri-
zation of sexual grossness, there is an extreme emphasis 
on the mouth and buttocks, and this emphasis on the 
mouth spreads from the purely sexual to include gross 
eating, the throwing of food, and even the use of chewed 
food as a weapon. On the side of the Nazi ideal, the 
eating and sexual functions of the mouth are minimized, 
but the mouth still appears as an organ of aggression in 
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the facial expression of the district leader when he gives 
his barked commands and on the face of Fritz when he 
repudiates Heini as a traitor. 
The middle position between these two extremes is not 
represented in any way in this film, but it does appear in 
some other films (e.g., The Street), where we see a hus-
band tempted away from domesticity by the bright lights 
and whirl of the city. Significantly, in The Street,_ the mid-
dle position, domesticity, is characterized as dull and 
almost regressive, in the sense that the husband's rela-
tionship to his wife is almost that of a son to his mother. 
Essentially this split between an ideal homosexuality 
and a gross heterosexuality seems to be an expression of 
preadolescent psychology. It is significant that Heini is a 
preadolescent and that the audience is encouraged to 
see life through preadolescent eyes. It is to eyes of this 
age in German culture that Nazism appeals, and we may 
suppose that where it appeals to adults, the attraction is a 
nostalgic longing for a preadolescent purity. It would 
seem, in fact, that German culture has in some way over-
valued that preadolescent period of life and has inflated 
the romance of this period until it has become a model for 
the culture as a whole. To correct this, some change will 
have to be introduced, either into the family pattern or into 
the pattern of whatever institutions and youth organiza-
tions perform the function of giving a boy self-sufficiency 
and introducing him into adult life. 
c. Between light and darkness. This split is, of course, 
common to most occidental cultures, which associate 
fear, dishonesty, and vice with the dark, but it is interest-
ing that in this film the split between light and darkness 
takes two forms: light is used to characterize the Nazi 
ideal while darkness characterizes the Communists; but 
also within the Nazi ideal, light and darkness are used to 
characterize different stages of the step from one status to 
another. In this way, over and over again the projected 
and repudiated themes find their expression within the 
ideal system. 
2 Nazism assumes that the individual is in a sense a me-
chanical object. He is not endowed with free will, or with 
any internal tendencies toward good or evil, but rather is 
seen as responding mechanically and inevitably to an 
external dualism between authority and temptation. This 
theme occurs in pre-Nazi Germany film material in two 
forms: we see the mechanization of man in numerous 
robot fantasies (e.g., Metropolis) and, inversely, we see 
machines endowed with malevolent semihuman person-
ality (e.g., in Metropolis and Berin). This notion is closely 
linked with the Nazi idea of discipline, multiple reincarna-
tion, and the whole psychology of the Nazi parade 
grounds. It is interesting to note, however, that in the twen-
ties these ideas of mechanization were especially spread 
by filmmakers and writers, who were not themselves en-
gineers. In its origin, the idea was probably in part a 
reaction to the enormous industrialization of Germany by 
people who were not actively concerned with mechanics. 
It would be very important to know how much the en-
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gineers themselves have consciously or unconsciously 
adopted this fantasy, and perhaps among them there 
might be people who could correct it. It is also possible 
that the fantasy has undergone changes in the course of 
the war, and it will be important to know, for example, 
what attitudes have developed in regard to the tanks and 
airplanes against which the Germans are fighting. We 
(especially the English) tend to think of our own tanks, 
etc., as tools or vehicles or horses--creatures whom we 
endow with free wi II. What attitudes the Germans, who 
personify their own machinery, have built up in regard to 
ours is not known. 
Characteristics which appear in the study of the family: 
One of the major appeals which Nazism had for German 
youth was the solution it offered of the complex and in-
tense emotions implanted in the boy by his pre-Nazi 
German family background. The Nazis have used the old 
family background as a springboard for their prop-
aganda, not only in this film but also, for example, in 
Hitler's account of his own boyhood in Mein Kampf (Erik-
son 1942). Specifically, in this film we have seen how both 
father and mother are characterized as mixtures of good 
and evil, so that the attitudes of the boy are ambivalent 
toward each parent. The propagandist has rearranged 
these attitudes so that by the end of the film all the posi-
tive attitudes toward both parents become directed to-
ward Nazism while the negative attitudes are focused on 
the enemy. Thus, the Nazi clubhouse becomes a substi-
tute "home," the district leader is played off against the 
father, and passivity becomes heroism when it is seen as 
a means of rescuing the mother. 
This complete reorientation of the attitudes and 
stereotypes which were available in pre-Nazi Germany 
leads logically and necessarily to the destruction of the 
old family unit. Thus the obvious and necessary proce-
dure for correcting the German tendency toward Nazism 
and other such cults would seem to be the resuscitation 
of the family. The mere resuscitation of the old German 
family pattern, however, will not be sufficient, since this 
pattern has been used again and again as a springboard 
for cultist youth movements. If the pattern were merely 
resuscitated, it would act only as a stimulus for such 
movements. The old German family pattern with all its 
ambivalences may have provided a stable base forGer-
man society in the nineteenth century, but it would not 
provide such a base today. Habits die hard, and today the 
habit of regarding this old-style family as something to be 
rebelled against, as an inspiration for revolutionary 
ideology, is too strong. 
The family must be resuscitated, but the roles of father 
and mother must be modified in some way. The youth 
organizations, as we have noted above, are likely to per-
sist in the postwar world simply because any organiza-
tion will be valuable in that period of dislocation. It will be 
essential , however, that entry into these organizations 
and membership in them not be conceived as a rebellion 
against the parental background, and for this to be so the 
parental background itself must alter. 
As to the direction of this alteration, no prescription is 
possible until we know what the new parental patterns in 
Germany are, how Nazi-trained young men and women 
behave toward their sons, what character is today being 
implanted in small children by mothers whose husbands 
are away from home, and how the people of Germany wi II 
feel about Nazism after the war. It is out of these attitudes 
and patterns that the solution must be developed, and 
these patterns should be the subject of intensive inquiry 
today. 
2 In the analysis of the episode of the house key, we noted 
that the propagandist in 1933 was psychologically unable 
or consciously unwilling to exclude the possibility of a 
persistent and satisfactory relationship to the family 
background. The house key, the symbol which he chose 
to represent Heini's independence of the family, is itself a 
symbol for Heini's return to the family, and the film, there-
fore, must pass over Heini's use of the keys that night. 
This would seem to indicate that there is available in 
Germany, even among the Nazi propagandists, a psycho-
logical opening for the revival of family life. There is a 
crack which could admit an entering wedge. If such an 
opening exists among the propagandists-and the men 
who devised the script of this film were undoubtedly en-
thusiastic Nazis-then it is likely that a very large portion 
of the population of Germany is ready for a return to a 
world in which the family would again be an important 
educative institution. 
3 The old German interest in ideas of destiny has been 
picked up by Nazism and become one of the cor-
nerstones of Nazi ideology, but in the process the con-
cept of destiny has changed. In this film the mother, the 
tragic predictor, dies, and her place is taken by Ulla, who 
twice works like Providence behind the scenes; and we 
noted that in another film, Faehrmann Maria, the old mas-
culine personification of Death is killed, and his place is 
taken by a sexually desirable young woman. We do not 
know the psychological dynamics which lay down a base 
in the child for this curious interest in destiny; we only 
know that this interest is characteristic for German culture 
and that it has changed. The destiny idea is certainly 
related to the climactic time perspective we noted 
above--destiny is the climax to which man must look 
forward, and it is his duty to follow that destiny. We noted 
above that the German time perspeotive shifts between 
two extremes--one optimistic, the other pessimistic-
and that it would be important to substitute for both of 
these some more stable middle position. Such a substitu-
tion would probably exclude the notion of destiny or 
would, at any rate, rob this notion of much of its psycho-
logical attraction. This attraction is probably the result of 
those unidentified parental patterns which lay the base 
for the whole destiny idea, and therefore it becomes ex-
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ceedingly important that these patterns be identified and 
that they be altered or eliminated in the future German 
family. 
4 In the course of the film, Heini graduates from coveting 
symbols of virility-a knife and a house key-to wearing a 
Nazi uniform and admiring himself in a mirror, and this 
narcissistic theme has been exploited over and over 
again by the Nazis so that it has become one of the 
dominant themes in the cult. We may like or dislike nar-
cissism according to our own cultural standards and 
tastes, but at any international level , we are concerned 
only to make sure that no nation shall induce in its popu-
lation a character structure which is inevitably committed 
to an internationally aggressive role. Some of the most 
peaceful people in the world are the most narcissistic ; 
the Balinese, for example, are among the most peaceful 
and the most narcissistic. Warfare and personal aggres-
sion are virtually unknown among them, and internation-
ally speaking, they would be ideal neighbors. Thus, nar-
cissism itself is no blemish and may lead to all sorts of 
cultural achievements. The important factor is what is 
admired in the self. If the self is admired for beauty or for 
virtuosity in the arts of peace, then narcissism will pro-
mote these characteristics; if, however, the self is ad-
mired as a mechanism of aggression, then narcissism 
must promote aggression. There is, therefore, no reason 
why narcissism should not even be encouraged in Ger-
many, provided the Germans shift its content and admire 
themselves for qualities and virtues which will make 
good neighbors of them. 
Learning, Culture, and the Propagandic Process 
Besides the psychology of Nazism, the detailed study of 
this one film has bearing on a number of other types of 
problems, which vary from the most general questions 
about human nature, the ways in which we learn, and the 
propagandic process to the forms of propaganda which 
can be carried in fictional films. Our analysis has shown 
that in this film there are a large number of themes-
especially those connected with the family-which are 
more or less easily overlooked by the casual audience 
but which nevertheless may have very high emotional 
force. That those themes are actually present in the film 
and were put there by the filmmakers, consciously or 
unconsciously, there can be no doubt. The film itself pro-
vides continual verification of this fact. We have seen, for 
example, that Ulla not once, but twice , acts like Provi-
dence behind the scenes so that the significance of this 
theme is verified by its repetition. Similarly, we have 
noted that the contrast between Ulla and Gerda parallels 
that between the father and the district leader, so that all 
our descriptive analysis of the difference between the 
Nazis' picture of themselves and their picture of Com-
munism rests not upon one instance, nor yet upon one 
contrast, but upon two contrasts which mutually verify 
each other. The material which we have analyzed shows 
an extraordinarily high degree of internal consistency, 
which enables us to detect the same state of mind at work 
in all the various contexts of the film , and so to obtain a 
real picture of what sort of mind participated in and ap-
proved the total creation. 
On the whole, this is what we should expect of any 
daydream or artistic creation-that the way in which the 
work of art is structured is psychologically characteristic 
for the creators-and ranged beh ind this generalization 
and supporting it, there is the whole mass of our an-
thropological and psychiatric knowledge of human na-
ture. We know that human beings are generalizing crea-
tures in the sense that they will bring to any new context 
emotional and intellectual habits acquired in other con-
texts, and especially those habits that they acquired in 
early childhood. The behavior of any individual in a new 
context reechoes all his earlier experiences and forms of 
behavior. The individual is a single organized entity, not a 
collection of bits and pieces, and when we watch h'is 
behavior and look at his creations, we find running 
through all the same principles of organization. 
The next step from this generalization is to say that a 
similar character and similar principles of organization 
will be typical for the various individuals in a given tribe, 
a given community, or a given unit, and this is vouched 
for by anthropolog ical findings among primit ive peoples 
and more recently by the findings of anthropo logists in 
the study of the higher oriental and occidental cultures. It 
is true that, when we are dealing with cultures, the levels 
of similarity between ind ividuals are necessarily some-
what more abstract, but still we are beginning to be able 
to define (Bateson 1942) these levels and arrive at a sys-
tematic understanding of any given culture in terms of the 
thematic handl ing of the various contexts of life. 
But this is a propaganda film, and therefore there is a 
further question we must ask. Granted that the film is 
structured and built in terms of specifically Nazi themes; 
granted that the handling of the family, of courtship, and 
of death are consistently Nazi-these themes are sti II not 
articulately stated by the propagandist, and it may be 
doubted whether the film would serve to propagate these 
themes. The obvious methods of testing such a question 
are barely available. Audience research techniques have 
specialized in examining the reactions of an audience to 
what was explicit in a film, but themes of the type with 
which we are here concerned are usually not expl icitly 
recognized-therefore, their effect upon an audience 
cannot be obtained by direct questioning. There is, how-
e~er, very strong evidence, especially on the psychiatric 
s1de, for supposing that, in many cases, themes which 
can be accepted so long as they are not explicitly stated 
may be violently repudiated the moment attention is con-
sciously called to them-indeed, one of the purposes of 
?ur whole analysis has been to bring the Nazi themes out 
mto the open where the reader can recognize them and 
so be fortified against them. 
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In place of audience research we must rely on our 
general knowledge of man as an educable creature and 
our knowledge of the circumstances under which learn-
ing occurs. Simple learning, we know, occurs principally 
in those contexts which contain elements of either reward 
or punishment, and it is probably safe to generalize from 
this experimental finding to the very much more complex 
type of learning with which we are here concerned-the 
modification of the individual's character and view of the 
universe in which he lives, and his reading of the events 
in which he participates. 
We should then have to ask whether the individual 
member of the audience is rewarded in any way for ac-
cepting the themes which are implicit in the film, and 
whether he is punished in some way for refusing to ac-
cept them. Here the answers must be affirmative. It is 
exceedingly difficult to enjoy a good film without accept-
ing the thematic premises upon which it is based. Either 
we accept the premises and enjoy the film or we resist 
the premises and suffer a psychological or physical 
headache. It is in general exceedingly difficult to main-
tain any sort of intellectual detachment, to carry along as 
a part of one's mental state some reservation , while enjoy-
ing any form of entertainment. The aud ience may say to 
themselves: "This is a very good film"; and they may say 
to themselves: "But I disagree with the contrast which the 
film draws between Nazis and Communists." But combin-
ing these two statements is exceedingly difficult and 
tends to result in : "If this contrast between Nazis and 
Communists were true, this would be a good film." Thus 
the premise which an audience tries to repudiate easily 
ends up as a supposition which it temporarily accepts. 
The propagandic effect of a film is perhaps stronger 
when, like Hitlerjunge Quex , the film contains both ex-
plicit and implicit suggestions. The audience member 
who repudiates the explicit contrast between Com-
munists and Nazis may find it exceedingly difficult to 
repudiate the less explicit propagandic themes which the 
film contains. His critical sense is focused on one feature 
of the film, and if he is to go on enjoying the film, he 
cannot become critical of such assumptions as the way 
in which Heini 's progress toward Nazism is made easy for 
him by Ulla's intervention. 
There is thus an a priori case to be made out for the 
propagandic effectiveness of themes which are not ex-
plicit. The audience is rewarded by enjoyment of the film 
for accepting these as implicit premises and is, in a 
sense, punished for refusing to accept them. This case is 
based, however, upon the structure of simple learning 
experiments, and it is a very long step from these 
experiments-from the rat which learns that the sound of 
a buzzer is the precursor of an electric shock that can 
only be avoided by lifting the right foreleg-to the more 
complex learning phenomena with which we are here 
concerned. The Nazi convert learns to remodel his Wel-
tanschauung, his interpretation of the universe in which 
he iives, and his interpretation of his own behavior. To 
compare him with the experimental rat, we should have to 
suppose that the rat learned not merely to lift his leg 
whenever he hears the buzzer, but also to expect future 
sequences of experience to be patterned like the experi-
mental setting; that pain would always be preceded by 
some warning; and that, for him, the problem of life con-
sisted in trying to guess what magical behavior would 
avert these pains. Such a rat might be said to have 
learned not only the connection between a buzzer, lifting 
the leg, and pain, but also to have learned a Wel-
tanschauung or ideology. Unfortunately, we have almost 
no data on this order of learning. 37 That much learning 
occurs, there can be no reasonable doubt, and it is prob-
able that the generalizations about reward and punish-
ment take less tangible forms, such as the enjoyment of 
the film or the psychological headache to which we re-
ferred above. 
The verification of the central hypothesis-that themes 
implicit in an artistic structure may be propagandically 
effective-must depend upon the development either of 
methods of audience testing which will tap unconscious 
or semiconscious levels, or of learning experiments 
which will demonstrate this more complex type of learn-
ing at an animal or human level. 
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Notes 
1 This study was completed in the spring of 1943 while I was film analyst 
attached to the Film Library of the Museum of Modern Art. As it is now 
presented primarily for its methodological. implications, no attempt has 
been made to bring the comments about Nazi Germany up to date. 
These should be read within the research context of the state of the war 
in 1945. 
2 Lasswell and others have publ ished formal methodolog ical statements 
and even experimental data on contrasting methods of content 
analysis. They show the differences in the final findings which result 
from differences in the size of the unit chosen for diagnosis. In terms of 
Lasswell 's system, the present analysis might be described as an 
extreme case in which the unit of analysis is the whole film , and in 
which , therefore, only qualitative, nonstatistical conclusions can be 
reached. 
3 The present study supports a number of the conclusions which Erikson 
(1942) arrived at by analysis of other types of German material. 
4 These data are taken from "Vom Werden Deutscher Filmkunst" by 
Oskar Kalbus (1935) , where a part of von Schirach's speech is quoted. 
5 For more detailed and systematic discussion of time perspectives, see 
Frank (1939) and Lewin (1942). 
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6 In translating the "Nazi Youth Song," the word flattern has b'een ren-
dered as "bi llow." The dictionary meaning of this word is "flutter," and 
the German word is certainly sometimes used in this sense (e.g. , in 
referring to birds). A small experiment shows, however, that Ameri-
cans, when asked to visualize a flag fluttering, usually see a small flag 
moving rapidly or a large flag rather far away, whereas the image 
called up in Germans by the words Fahne and flattern is of a large flag 
close up. In Nazi films, the flags are usually photographed to fill the 
frame, so that the emphasis falls not on the changing outline of the 
flag, but rather on the wave motion in the middle of the fabric. Th is 
billowing motion is clearly intended to have a fascination sim il ar to that 
of waves in water. 
7 For the Nazi Age Grade system, see Gregor Ziemer, "Education for 
Death." 
8 Unfortunately, we have no data on the symbolism of these ceremonies, 
but it is almost safe to predict that they contain a mortuary element-
certainly referent to the heroic deed and probably actual symbolic 
representations of the death of the candidates. 
9 The Heimat is an important symbol in Nazi ideology. It differs from the 
Vaterland in several respects. In particular, the Heimat seems to be a 
pleasant place to which one returns or dreams of returning , so that the 
emotion evoked by this word is a nostalgic, rather than a disciplined, 
patriotism. The word Heimat is feminine. 
10 The whole film is, of course, an attempt to make political capital for 
Nazism out of human woes, and the suggestion that Communists do 
this is a typical example of the technique and mental state of Nazi 
propagandists, who project their own characteristics onto their enemy. 
11 The boy who receives this insult is Grundler, the weak Nazi . I do not 
know of any psychological reason why he should have been selected 
for this, unless it be because he is the only named professional actor 
among the Nazi boys. Heini , Fritz, and Ulla are all anonymous "Hitler 
Youth ," but Grundler is a named actor, Hans Ramspott. 
12 The general opinion of informants who were in Germany at this time 
and in touch with the Youth Movements is that the Leftist group.s were 
slightly more disciplined than the Hitler Youth. 
13 An official propaganda photograph of the "Strength through Joy" 
movement shows that this identical game of Schinkenkloppen is 
commonly played at Nazi picnics. 
14 Actual death in swamps occurs rather frequently in German films. The 
case of Faehrmann Maria has already been mentioned. And in 
Friesenet, a girl is punished for sexual relations with a Communist by 
being led to the edge of a swamp where she must commit suicide. The 
film suggests that this punishment is traditional among the peasants of 
this old German colony in Russia. 
15 In Nazi youth films, the camera rather frequently provides shots of the 
backs of the legs of boys, showing the bare inside of the knees. 
16 This type of symbolic treatment of temptation is also common in pre-
Nazi German films, e.g., Variety, The Street, Sunrise. 
17 For several of the suggestions here put forward, I am indebted to 
conversations with E. Erikson (1942). On the whole, the findings in the 
analysis of this film coincide very closely with those of Dr. Erikson in 
his analysis of Mein Kaempf and other Nazi literature. 
18 This metaphor is probably put in Stoppel's mouth to prepare us for the 
association between the fair and Communism. 
19 I have to thank Dr. Marian Kris for pointing out the underlying passivity 
in this episode. 
20 The fact that a vase is contrasted with the knife provides additional 
verification for regarding the knife as a virility symbol, and it also 
verifies our assumption that the filmmakers had at least a prior ac-
quaintance with theory. 
21 Stoppel does not at this stage offer the knife as a reward if Heini will 
become a Communist, but the possibility is clearly in the air; later in 
the film this bribe is actually offered. 
22 The diagrams used in this analysis are necessarily on a rather crude 
associational level and fail to indicate the finer points of the various 
attitudes and relationships. Psychoanalysis is still a verbal rather than 
a diagrammatic science. 
23 It is interesting to note the frequency of encirclement themes in Ger-
man films. Even in much earlier films (e.g., M, Emil und die Detektive) 
this theme is recognizable and seems almost to replace the chase 
themes so popular among American filmmakers. · 
24 The same expression appears on the face of the district leader when 
he gives his barked commands to the Nazi troop. 
25 This scene is somewhat awkward. Stoppel 's acting is not convincing, 
and we are left without any clear idea of why he did not worry about 
Heini's threat. 
26 In the novel on which the film is based, this scene takes place in two 
parts. First, there is a conversation between Stoppel and the mother, in 
which the mother is described as hypnotized with fear in Stoppel's 
presence; later there is a conversation between Stoppel and the father 
which is overhead by the mother. In this conversation, Stoppel tells the 
father that he will give Heini one more chance to come back to the 
Communists, but if he does not take it, he will be killed . 
27 Echoes of Christian mythology occur rather frequently in German films, 
usually in a much disoriented form. In the present film, it is perhaps 
significant that, at the beginning of the film, Wilde, the Communist 
villain, is allowed to echo Christ, whereas at the end of the film the 
Communists echo Judas and Pilate. 
28 Heute may mean either "today" or " in this period of history." 
29 The film gives us no rationalization for Grundler's removal from Beus-
selkietz to the new district. He was certainly a member of the Beussel-
kietz troop, under Fritz, in the earlier scenes. 
30 So spelled in the Reichfilmarchiv transcript. The usual spelling of the 
metal is Quecksilber. 
31 This is probably an echo of the earlier episode in which chewed food 
was thrown in Grundler's face at the beginning of the hike. The psycho-
logical reasons for this repeat are not clear. 
32 This interpretation would not necessarily imply that either the filmmak-
ers or the audience were familiar with the classical myth of Hermes 
and Aphrodite . It would be equally possible for the name "Quex" to get 
these overtones from the properties of the metal : its curious "quick-
ness" and its "touch-me-not" behavior, the way in which it shatters into 
shining pieces when shaken, combined with its power of recovery into 
a single mass when the disturbance is over. 
33 See Kracauer (1942) for a careful discussion of this fake realism in 
Triumph of the Will and in German newsreels. 
34 In an earlier footnote it was pointed out that the relationship between 
the Nazi party and the nation would not be handled in the symbolic 
terms set up by this film. It is possible, however, that this in-turned 
narcissism-whereby the leader is romantic about himself as though 
he were one of the boys, in spite of the fact that he is also in part a 
father figure-may provide a partial solution of the problem of reduc-
ing three symbolic entities (father, mother, and son) to two (party 
and nation). 
35 One shot of the Communists, in which they gleefully boast that no Nazi 
literature is reaching Beusselkietz, intervenes between the two scenes 
and covers the night during which Heini and Ulla went to the printing 
shop and completed the printing of the leaflets. 
36 In Nazi ideology, it seems that, while Nazism itself stands for a disci-
plined obedience and the repudiation of full heterosexuality, normal 
sexuality Is prescribed as an equally passive form of moral enslave-
ment. 
37 There is a great deal of experimental evidence to show that animals 
can be taught to learn more rapidly. A new experimental animal will 
learn only slowly to associate buzzer, lifting the leg, and pain, but the 
animal with much past experience in experimental settings of this 
general type will learn to adjust to any particular setting quickly. For a 
more general discussion of these problems, see Bateson (1942). 
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The Perceived and the Named* 
Christian Metz 
The viewer of an image feels the need to "recognize" 
(identify) the objects which are represented therein. 
When the image is figurative, as is the case in photo-
graphy, paintiog, and film, it meets this need itself by 
offering objects to recognize. However, it can happen, 
even with strongly representative images, that the de-
mand of the consumer remains more or less unsatisfied. 
For instance, the westerner who watches an ethnographic 
film often remains perplexed by the objects that he sees 
in it but cannot name or classify (e.g., cooking utensils, 
hunting or fishing equipment). To name, to classify: our 
problem starts here, with the problem of cultural 
taxonomies, encompassing both the taxonomy of cultural 
objects and the cultural taxonomy of natural objects, 
such as zoological or biological classification, which var-
ies from one society to another. Phenomenology has 
clearly shown us that we live in a world of objects, that our 
immediate perception is a perception of objects, and that 
this arrangement is neither superficial nor transitory (so 
much so, I will add, that it is deeply reassuring, and that 
is doubtless one of the roots of its existence). So why not 
link this striking character of our lived world conscious-
ness with the even more deeply embedded force of cul-
tural classification and sociolinguistics? 
The case of nonfigurative images (modern painting, 
avant-garde films), only confirms the initial impressions 
that emerge from this study. Notably, the spectator very 
often has the tendency to forceably reintroduce to the 
image, by the way he looks at it, objects which the au.thor 
wanted to leave out. The vague forms, curves, blurs, or 
shadings become clouds or dancing waters; the rec-
tilinear drawings become railroad tracks. There are many 
fewer nonfigurative images received than are sent. And 
even at the sending end, the tendency toward representa-
tion is sometimes stronger than is believed by those who 
consciously would like to escape it. The free contours 
that we have in mind are often involuntary variations on 
objects of recognizable form. There are fewer nonfigura-
tive images than there are images that would like 
to be so. 
Christian Metz is author of Film Language, Language and 
Cinema, and many other wo~ks in film theory and general 
s,emiology. He teaches at L'Ecole Pratique des Hautes 
Etudes in Paris. 
Steven Feld teaches visual and sound communication at 
The Annenberg School of Communications, University of 
Pennsylvania. Shari Robertson is an independent 
filmmaker. 
Translated by 
Steven Feld and Shari Robertson 
Codes of Iconic Nomination 
Work in philosophy, and the psychology of perception 
and observation, taught us long ago that the identifica-
tion of tangible objects was closely mixed with their lin-
guistic nomination. The semantic organization of natural 
languages, within certain sectors of the lexicon, overlaps 
with the variable margins of shifting configurations and 
demarcations of perception. The visible world and lan-
guage are thus not without multiple and deep structural 
interactions, and these have not yet been studied in the 
detailed technical terms of intercodal relations. It is 
exactly to such a study that I would I ike to address myself. 
But one thing already seems certain to me: even if the 
connection between language and the viewed can hardly 
be conceived of as a complete "copy"-either one 
served by the other-certainly one function of language 
is to name the units that vision demarcates, and to help 
demarcate them. And one function of vision is to inspire 
the semantic configurations of language, and also to be 
inspired by them. 
Recently, from the semiological perspective, these 
problems, which are exceedingly old in themselves, have 
been approached from two sides-on the linguistic front 
by A. J. Greimas (1968) and on the iconic front by Um-
berto Eco (1968, 1970). I have myself devoted some brief 
analytical sketches to them, where the main interest was 
the articulation of the two sides (Metz 1971, 1973). That is 
really the heart of the matter. I have proposed the term 
"codes of iconic nomination" for the systems of corre-
spondence which explain that within figurative imagery, 
even schematics, one can instantly recognize and name 
objects. These codes are thus the constituent mecha-
nisms of "analogy" and "iconicity," or the impression of 
resemblance and reality that give us representative im-
ages. They contribute to the creation of fiction, diegesis,t 
and the pseudo-real. It is now time-and the general 
state of previous research does not deprive the undertak-
ing of all risk-to try one's skill at a more detailed and 
systematic description of these bridging devices. Be-
tween image and language, they facilitate the objective 
production of a whole network so interiorized by the cul-
ture that, on the one hand, the phenomenologists were 
able to describe them as spontaneous (which they are in 
effect) and, on the other, as deeply tied in the West to the 
Aristotelian tradition (quantitatively dominant even today) 
of diegetic or mimetic art, in short, representative art. 
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Which Part Image, Which Part Language? 
It is first necessary to delimit the object of this research 
and establ ish boundaries on both its sides. The codes of 
iconic nomination do not relate the whole of language to 
the whole of imagery. Their study should not aspire to 
exhaust the vast question of the links between the per-
ceptual and the linguistic but on the contrary should 
concentrate on one of its levels in order to attempt to 
better il luminate it. 
Lexicon 
On the side of language we will limit ourselves to the 
lexicon. It hardly seems possible, for the moment, to seri-
ously establish even slightly precise correlations be-
tween the perception of objects in a society and the 
phonological and grammatical structures of the corre-
spond ing language. This difficulty, which perhaps will not 
be eternal , is connected to another one which is more 
general and well known to linguists: in. spite of some 
interesting attempts1 no one has succeeded thus far in 
linking, in a convincing fashion, phonological or syntactic 
systems with social structures. It is across these two sys-
tems that language preserves for the moment its great 
relative autonomy in comparison with other institutions 
where the very existence of linguistics is founded , inas-
much as the discipline is distinct from sociology (but 
belongs to the social sciences since language is an in-
stitution). Of all the internal sectors of language it is, on 
the contrary, the lexicon which brings the most important 
and most immediately exploitable materials to those who 
wish to found a sociolinguistics. 2 It is clear that words are 
linked to culture (and, among other things, to the faculty 
of sight), following a shorter and more direct circuit than 
do phonemes or rules of grammar. Moreover, the lexicon 
is the only part of language wh ich immediately exercises 
the function of nomination, that is to say, which enumer-
ates the objects of the world and gives them a name. The 
referential dimension, which characterizes all of lan-
guage, appears in a direct fashion only within the lexicon. 
The dissymmetry of the situation is certainly reflected 
in the concepts of a semanticist like A. J. Greimas (1966). 
Semes, as such, constitute the "semiological level," that 
is, that level at which language articulates about the 
"natural world ." These are distinguished from classemes, 
whose entirety forms the "semantic level ," that is, the level 
of autonomy of the linguistic orgaoization. Thus we see 
the differences between semanticisms like "in an oblong 
shape," "made of leather," or "belonging to the feline 
species," which are semes or "nuclear" to the degree 
they are as diverse and specific .as the perceive~ ob-
jects of a culture which they desrgnate and constrtute at 
the same time. Units of meaning like human/nonhuman, 
material object/abstract notion, or animate/inanimate 
are classemes, or "contextual semes ," which have a 
more general significance within the lexicon and which 
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intervene in the naming of numerous tangible objects. 
Furthermore, at a different level, they submit also to a 
second classification (whose links are in fact larger than 
the first operated by the nominations themselves), which 
extends beyond the lexicon to grammar, where they 
often correspond to some formal markers. Thus we have 
the case of human/nonhuman, the difference between 
qui/quai in French, and who/which in English. Just as 
the classemes within a language are common to the 
grammar and the lexicon, the nuclear semes (which I 
will henceforth simply call semes, since this study is 
limited to them) are suited only to the lexicon. I will not 
discuss all the lexical semes but only those which inter-
vene in the lexicon of visual objects. 
To Recognize the Object 
In the domain of the image, the codes of iconic nomina-
tion no longer involve the whole ensemble of semiologi-
cal material. We no longer need to review every sense 
and all senses of the representative image. To recognize 
the object is not to understand the image, even if that is 
the beginning of it. It is only a question of a level of 
meaning, that which is called the literal ( = denotation or 
representation) , and not the entirety. The apprehension of 
relationsh ips between objects, or at least of their more 
factual relations, still participates in the literal sense, but 
is taken over by other codes. Notably this involves mon-
tage in the most general sense of the word, encompass-
ing the internal composition of the still unique image. To 
understand that one object, in a narrative, appeared only 
a few minutes after another, or that they are constantly 
copresent, or that one is to the left of the other, or farther 
back, is already something more than visually identifying 
each of these objects. The "recognition" should therefore 
be understood as an operation which articulates certain 
sectors of linguistic activity and not directly the whole of 
language over the whole of perception. 
From the Word to the Sememe 
If one poses the problem in this way, it becomes essential 
to know to what sort of linguistic unit the optically identifi-
able object exactly corresponds, since language in-
cludes units that are very diverse in figure and status. 
Common-sense response leaves no doubt-it is the 
word. The act of nomination, considered in its concrete 
and directly observable form, corresponds most often to 
a word, that which comes to mind when our eye recog-
nizes an object: "It's a dog," "it's a lamp." 
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Yet the pertinence of a word does not resist analysis. 
The word is a two-sided unit, with its signified and its 
phonic signifier. Accordingly, that which can "corre-
spond" to an iconic element will necessarily be a unit of 
the linguistic signified and therefore only a one-sided 
unit. The naming of visible objects is a case, among 
others, of transcoding. In all transcoding (translation, for 
example) the only direct transit is that which passes be-
tween the two respective signifieds. (I will return to this 
point, which is in fact more complex). Nomination is more 
than transcoding, though it is that also. It is clear that no 
direct correspondence between the signifier of an image 
representing a house and the signifier of the word house 
(or maison or casa) is conceivable. This is a conse-
quence of the "arbitrariness" of linguistic signs. The two 
materials are absolutely heterogeneous; one is outlines, 
colors, shades, and so on, the other an emission of the 
human voice. The optical aspects of a house bear no 
relation to the fact that the French word maison has four 
phonemes rather than three or five, and exactly those 
four. These are the signifieds which articulate one 
another, the recognized object and the meaning of 
the word. 
The lexeme (lexical morpheme) is another sort of lin-
guistic unit, smaller than a word, that for the same rea-
sons no longer suits our purposes. It is still a two-sided 
unit which includes phonetic elements. So, how shall we 
distinguish the signified of the word from the signified of 
the lexeme? At the level of the word or even the lexeme 
the signified can include several units which are quite 
distinct on the optical plane. For example, the French 
word chevre means both the animal called "goat" and the 
tool called "sawhorse." That is the problem of multiple 
meanings. 
In sum, the visual correspondence should have be-
come established with a linguistic unit that is a pure 
signified, which is smaller than the signified of the 
lexeme--or the signified of one sense of a lexeme, or of 
the unique sense of a lexeme with one meaning. But the 
linguistic unit we are studying can in certain cases coin-
cide with a longer segment than a lexeme or even a word 
on the condition that one always pictures a single mean~ 
ing for the signified of .the segment. The object which one 
names betterave ("beetroot" in English) is recognizable 
in an image, and corresponds in French to two lexemes 
(bette and rave) grouped here in a single word. The ob-
ject which one names pomme de terre ("potato" in Eng-
lish) corresponds to three French lexemes, which also 
happen to be three words. Nevertheless, as perceptual 
elements they are obviously at the same level as the 
French carotte (English "carrot"), where the nomination 
uses a single lexeme that coincides with a word. This is 
not an accident since within the linguistic order itself it is 
a question in this case of a sequence of several lexemes 
(eventually of several words) being lexically congealed 
and turned into a single lexeme. In the terms of Andre 
Martinet (1967) these are not syntagmes (free syntactic 
combinations) but synthemes, combinations which have 
been formed by the language once and forever and 
which enter the lexicon with the same status as unde-
composable segments. If a potato (pomme de terre) is 
red in color (rouge) , one speaks of a pomme de terre 
rouge and not of a pomme rouge de terre. As Martinet 
proposes the term "theme" for jointly designating syn-
themes and proper lexemes, we can ask that the visually 
identifiable object correspond at the level of nomination 
to one meaning of theme, which is to say exactly what 
Greimas3 calls a sememe. 
Cultural Taxonomy of Objects 
Each sememe (a specific unit at the level of the signified) 
denotes a class of occurrences, not a single occurrence. 
There exist thousands of "trains" even within the single 
sense of "railroad cars," and these differ greatly from each 
other in color, height, number of cars, and so on. But the 
cultural taxonomy which is contained in the language has 
determined to hold these variations to be irrelevant and to 
consider them the same object (of a single class of ob-
jects). It has also determined that other variations are 
pertinent and sufficient "to change" the object, as, for 
example, those which separate train and micheline.+ It is 
the same apportionment, so variable among different 
societies, of pertinent and irrelevant traits-in sum the 
same "arbitrary" principle of the enumeration of 
objects-which presides over spontaneous classifica-
tions that operate the perception of corresponding ob-
jects within the same culture. The sight itself is slightly 
obscured to the extent that the image does not determine 
whether it is a train or a micheline. Once it is demarcated 
the viewer of the image has the feeling of "recognizing ' 
the object." It is notable, then, that one false perception of 
the color of this micheline (if it is one) or of its exact 
length or of the metal of which it is made does not consti-
tute a comparable obstacle. 
~he traits that do not partic ipate in this decoupage of 
obJe?!s are culturally experienced as types of secondary 
qual1t1es, determinations superimposed as something 
extra and not indispensable to the immediate intellection 
-adjectival qualities rather than substantive ones. It is 
most often true that linguistic expression of these visual 
p~rticu.larities is conveyed by adjectives (a long 
m_tcheltne) or by certain determinants which are larger in 
s1ze but syntactically interchangeable with adjectives, 
a~, for ~xample , the subordinate relative phrase "a 
mtche~tne that goes very quickly." To the contrary, perti-
~ent v1su~l qualiti.es, those which, by their grouping in 
packets, determme the list of objects to recognize, ex-
press themselves in language through nouns. As we have 
known for a long time, the nomination of objects-
because there are also those of actions, to which I will 
return-proceeds by nouns. Traditional grammar says 
that nouns correspond to objects, adjectives to qualities 
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and verbs to actions. Simply, "objects" are only sets of 
qualities considered as definers, and what we call qual-
ities covers only those qualities whose proper meaning 
does not enter into the definition of the objects. 
Optically identifiable objects are, then, classes of oc-
currences, like the sememes which they name. That is 
why Greimas proposes naming them "visual figures" (the 
pertinent units) and then further distinguishes "visual 
signs," which will be singular occurrences, such as one 
drawing of a house or one photograph of a tree.4 But 
within linguistic tradition the term "sign" is too strongly 
evocative of the pertinent unit for it to have any chance of 
being made to designate the contrary. It seems prefera-
ble to me not to adopt a special term and to speak simply 
of "recognizable visual objects" as opposed to "visual 
occurrences." 
About "Nomination" 
One sees that the fundamental phenomenon of nomina-
tion is itself quite poorly named. In the word "nomination" 
the sememe nom corresponds to the English "name" and 
not to the English "noun." But it nevertheless designates a 
linguistic unit which is on the order of a word. Now it is 
only at the surface level that nomination proceeds by 
words. The real correspondences between the visible 
world and language are established at the level of perti-
nent traits, which are deeper and more invisible units. 
The word (nom) which designates the optical object only 
constitutes the emergent part of the system, a conse-
quence that is manifest by the play of the pertinent traits 
and their internal organization. When an iconic item car-
ries all the definitive traits required for us to recognize, for 
example, a bulb (electric light bulb), and when one has 
access to the corresponding sememe (ampoule =electri-
cal accessory), this last access is carried to the lexeme 
where it contributes to an articulation of the signified 
(here "electric light bulb" in all its sen~es, but ~lsewhere 
"bulb" forms a word by itself). And th1s word, 1n turn , 
functions as a two-sided entity, which also has its own 
signifier and can therefore express itself. The viewer of 
the image explains to himself, "That's a light bulb." In the 
complete process of nomination, then, the word does 
play a role, but only at the endpoint. 
The term "nomination" is not peculiar to linguistics or to 
modern semiology. It has come a long way, historically in 
languages (nominative case) .. an? ~lso fr~m a whole 
philosophical tradition. It cames 1n .Itself .. m. a condensed 
state, a certain concept of the relat1onsh1p oetwe~~ lan-
guage and the world, a c~ncept that has b~en_ cnt1qued 
since Saussure as what G1lbert Ryle terms na1ve 
realism." For him there was a sort of list of objects, 
preexisting their 'naming, and the words came to "name" 
(nominate) these objects after the fact, one by one. As 
long as we limit ourselves to the surface level (that of the 
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word or even the lexeme) we are inevitably drawn toward 
faith in this view. The word, the lexeme (and on the other 
side of the problem, the visual object, once recognized) 
is not the end product, because the decoupage of the 
world into objects (and of language into sememes) is a 
complex process of cultural production. At the heart of 
this process the central role has been broken down into 
pertinent traits: traits of visual identification on one side 
(Eco) and linguistic semes on the other (Greimas). 
Determination by Social Practice 
This double decoupage did not exist before social activ-
ity and the features of each culture. It is determined by 
them, and at the same time it implements them. We know 
that the Eskimo employ some ten different lexemes (and 
thus different sememes) for designating snow, according 
to whether it is crumbly, hardened, slippery, piled up and 
so forth (Schaff 1965). Each of these units consists of an 
undecomposable lexeme, while the languages of West-
ern Europe are obligated, in order to designate the corre-
sponding "objects," to form a nominal syntagme, which 
each time combines the appropriate adjective (e.g., 
powdery), with a noun that is invariably "snow" (neige, 
Schnee, nieve ). Thus our culture sees a single object with 
variable types, where the Eskimo see ten different ob-
jects. A perceptible trait like "crumbly" or "hardened" 
(with its corresponding seme), while pertinent to the Es-
kimo, is considered irrelevant in our languages, at least 
when the question is the "nomination" of snow. 
This variation in lexical organization is obvious in rela-
tion to a difference in the perception of snow, which is 
more subtle and more finely distinguished among the 
Eskimo. Each society lexicalizes the distinctions which it 
perceives the most clearly, and in return, perceives with 
particular clarity the distinctions which it lexicalizes. It 
would be a fruitless quarrel that would initially seek to 
know whether it is language that informs perception or 
perception which informs language. In fact, the one and 
the other have been shaped by society. 5 In our cultures, 
the modes of work and production are such that snow 
plays a minor role, and careful attention to its different 
states would be without immediate utility. The Eskimo, 
who hunt and fish in largely snow-covered landscapes, 
and whose very survival depends on that, are obliged to 
know the diversities of the snow well: those which permit 
the hunt, those which represent a danger of sinking, those 
which announce a blizzard, and so on. A society 
lexicalizes and perceives the distinctions for which it has 
the greatest need. 
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The Pertinent Traits of Perceptual Identification 
Vision does not identify an object as a result of the totality 
of its perceptible appearance, or as a result of the surface 
of the paper, in the case of the same object being in the 
state of " representation" in a drawing or photograph, 
which is to say, the object relayed by codes of analogy. 
Thus it can be explained that schematic representations 
of objects in which the majority of the perceptible fea-
tures have been deliberately suppressed are also recog-
nizable (and sometimes more so) than many more faithful 
representations which are far more complete at the level 
of material expression (more exhaustive in respect to de-
tails of form, color, etc.): representations in which the 
degree of schematization is smaller and the degree of 
iconicity greater (Moles 1968). It is noteworthy that highly 
schematized images are very identifiable (the whole of 
the art of caricature lies therein). Visual recognition is 
based on certain perceptible traits of the object and its 
image (to the exclusion of others), only those which 
keep-and for the moment, materially isolate-the 
schema and the caricature. If they are sometimes more 
implied than detailed figurations, it is because they avoid 
the risk of drowning these traits in the midst of others, 
thus slowing the marking of guidelines. On the contrary, 
the image which shows great detail sometimes becomes 
the image-jumble (!'image fouillee devient parfois !'im-
age fouillis). 
The Schematic Diagram 
The traits which retain the schema-Drat least the figura-
tive schema, because there are also some others (e.g., 
diagrams)-correspond exactly to pertinent traits of the 
code of recognition so well described by Umberto Eco, 
who has cited diverse examples of them.6 Others could 
be borrowed from caricature: arms raised above the 
head, a tall figure, and it is enough for us to recognize de 
Gaulle; bushy eyebrows, a round face, and it's President 
Pompidou. In certain comic drawings two protuberances 
on one side and two on the other are sufficient to repre-
sent the breasts and buttocks, so that we interpret it as 
"woman." (Needless to say, such a choice of pertinent 
traits owes itself to an ideology at the same time mis-
ogynous and maternalistic, so characteristic of the world 
in which we live.) The codes are the formal machines, but 
it is precisely as such that they have historical and social 
content; in this example, as in others, the opposition of 
form and content leads to an impasse. 
So, schematisme largely overlaps schematisation . The 
latter is a socially specific activity which consists of pro-
ducing materialized diagrams (schemas, in the precise 
sense). The former, on the contrary, is a mental , percep-
tual , and sociolinguistic principle of wide general bear-
ing, which makes possible the comprehension of 
schemas as well as of detailed images with a high de-
gree of iconicity and of spectacles from real life. Even 
outside all schematization, this is because only certain 
sensible traits matter in identification; visual occurrences 
which differ in other traits can be perceived as multiple 
examples of the same object, and not as distinct objects. 
If several drawings have in common definite traits of the 
visual object "key" (e.g. , a head and a shank, a certain 
type of serration), they can otherwise, and without disad-
vantage to the sociotaxonomic permanence of the item 
"key," differ very widely in size, color, diameter of the 
head, depth of indentations, and so on. 
In ordinary perception, or in that of strongly figurative 
images, it is the social subject, the spectator, who fabri-
cates the schema by mental subtraction of nonpertinent 
traits. In the case of schematisation, it is a specialist (de-
signer or draftsman), a "transmitter," who performs the 
same subtraction in advance and materializes it. The dif-
ference is that the process of abstraction and 
classification-the "subtraction"-intervenes, in one 
case at the level of recept ion and in the other at the level 
of construction. In the former it is absent in the stimulus 
but reintroduced in the perceptual act; in the latter it is 
integrated into the artificially constructed stimulus. 7 
Perceptual Exclusions and Inclusions 
It is again the schematisme, and in a more general way 
the very existence of pertinent traits and occurrences, 
wh ich is responsible for a rather striking structural par-
ticularity, common to both perceptual decoupage and 
lexical decoupage. Two "objects" can be contained in 
one another while otherwise continuing to stand for an 
autonomous and distinct item, so much so that one no 
longer knows whether or not they are of the same rank. In 
terms of set theory one could say that it is a matter of two 
classes which simultaneously maintain relations of ex-
clusion and inclusion. Thus, for example, the sememes 
and the visual objects automobile and wheel: the wheel 
is a part of the automobile and can be mentioned in the 
entry "automobile" in a dictionary of iconic nomination, 
but the wheel is also an entirely separate unit of the same 
"rank" as the automobile: our dictionary would contajn 
both entries, apart from each other and on an equal level. 
This apparent peculiarity, which establishes itself in a 
general and permanent fashion , is the result of the fun-
damentally classificatory and "arbitrary" nature of nomi-
nation. When the object to which one makes reference is 
The Perceived and the Named 
the automobile (the automobile seen or spoken of) , the 
wheel intervenes only as a trait for recognition, on the 
level of the steering wheel, for example. But the object to 
which one refers in other circumstances can be the wheel 
itself (for instance, in the case of a flat tire and its repair): 
it then is the thing which functions as a recognized ob-
ject, or that to be recognized, and requires in its turn 
those traits of recognition (e.g., circular exterior form, 
marked by a "center" and radial structure). 
In sum, a single material element can operate at two 
distinct levels of coding: as seme and as sememe, as 
"identificans" and as "identificatum" (or "identifican-
dum"). Objects which must be recognized constantly 
serve in the recognition of other objects. According to the 
multiple and diverse exigencies of practice, perception 
and the lexicon reserve the right to regroup their basic 
traits in other ways, into "packets" which vary in content 
and size. Each packet, which barely seems to be stable, 
is frequently an object. Objects are always equal as ob-
jects, even if one is susceptible to being "lost" among the 
traits of another on occasion-and only on occasion-
when the second remains an object and the first, ceasing 
for a moment to be, contents itself to participate in the 
decoupage of the second. There never exist any objects, 
properly speaking, which might be included within 
others: what one finds are elements (semantic and per-
ceptual) which the code brings into play at one time as 
objects and at others as parts of objects. In any case, 
this same code sovereignly arranges the list of objects, 
not only those items on it which are occasionally 
eclipsed . 
Language Perception: Their Double Relation, 
lntercodal and Metacodal 
The preceding reflections show that the correspondence 
between vision and language establishes itself at two 
different levels: one among the sememes and optically 
identifiable objects, the other among the semes and per-
tinent traits of visual recognition. The full significance of 
this duality merits a slightly more thorough examination. 
Transit by Signifieds 
Insofar as the sememes correspond to optical objects (or 
vice versa), the intercodal transit-the reciprocal articu-
lation of the linguistic code and the perceptual code-
proceeds through the two signifieds. In language, the 
sememe is a specific unit at the level of a signified. In 
perceptual activity, the "object" is equally a signified: an 
already found signified once the object has been recog-
nized, and a sought-after signified when the object is felt 
to be identifiable as such but has not yet been identified. 
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Within the code of visual recognition, the signifier is 
never the marked or suspected object, but the set of ma-
terial responsible for its being marked or suspected: 
forms, contours, outlines, shadings. This is the visual 
substance itself, the material of expression in the sense of 
Hjelmslev. 
If one considers the correspondences between lan-
guage and vision a result of a social process of in-
tellectual production which exists in an active fashion 
precisely to establish them, the transit by the signifieds 
represents the final, directly observable level, the final 
product of this set process. Thanks to pertinent traits of 
the iconic signifier, the subject identifies the object; it 
establishes the visual signified. From there, it passes to 
the corresponding sememe in its native language, the 
linguistic signified. This is the precise moment of nomina-
tion, of clearing the intercodal bridge. By the disposition 
of the sememe, the word or the lexeme which is attached 
to this sememe can be pronounced, producing the 
(phonic) signifier of the linguistic code. The loop is 
thus looped. 
The intercodal bridge can also be crossed in another 
sense, from the phonic signifier to the perceptual mark-
ing of the corresponding object and then to optical traits; 
or, in the absence of all real or iconic· "stimuli," to the 
mental evocation of the object; that is, again, of its perti-
nent optical traits. These two operations are so very 
common in daily life that one does not consciously think 
of them. Nevertheless, without them one would not be 
able to understand the following situations: if I say to a 
friend, "Pass me the pencil sharpener which is some-
where on the table," he finds it and gives it to me. Or, if 
someone tells me, "My sister is wearing sunglasses," I am 
capable of imagining a glasses-like object, even if my 
conversational partner's sister is absent and I know noth-
ing whatever about the exact model of the glasses she is 
wearing. 
When the perceptual signifier (trait~ of recognition) 
journies to the linguistic signifier (phonic emission, itself 
either real or mental), this is nomination. When it goes 
from the linguistic signifier to the visual signifier, as in the 
examples given above, one is dealing with visualization, 
which is the inverse and inseparable correlate of nomina-
tion (that is why this last term, in a slightly larger sense, 
can conveniently designate the entire phenomenon in-
dependently of its orientation in each case). The point 
common to the two orientations is that the passage from 
the linguistic to the perceptual, or vice versa, lies at the 
level of the two respective signifieds, the sememe and 
the object. 
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visual signifier 
(forms, contours, etc.) 
with pertinent traits 
1 
visual signified 
recognizable object ~ 
As long as one considers it from this vantage point, 
which is not the deepest but which has its own reality, the 
connection between the visual lexicon and visual percep-
tion remains on the level of ordinary transcodage. As a 
defining trait of the latter, I propose retaining the 
achievement of the transit by the signifieds. Transcoding 
is a highly ordinary sociosemiological operation, whose 
most typical form is translation; that is, a subcase of 
transcod)ng where the two codes are two l~nguages. 
The transit by the signifieds is neither an empirical 
peculiarity nor an exceptional act. On the contrary, it rests 
on a permanent and fundamental given: if the varying 
codes in use distinguish among themelves-if there are 
several, obviously-it is through the material and the 
internal organization of their signifier (visual codes, au-
ditory codes, etc.), or even by its organization alone when 
the material is identical (e.g., the plurality of languages), 
or, in any case, by the organization of their signifieds 
(Hjelmslev's "form of the contents") since it is the direct or 
indirects correlate of the organization of the signifier. But 
it is not through the material of the signified ("material 
content"), which is common to all codes and which is 
always the "sense," the semantic fabric. The sense, also, 
constitutes the universal intercodal footbridge. One can 
switch from one code to another when two units of form of 
the signified, belonging respectively to each of the two 
codes (which are never, in fact, superimposable), 
nevertheless occupy an adjacent position in the material 
of the signified (or, as one says these days, "have very 
nearly the same sense"). This happens when the trans-
lator takes a word from the source language and looks for 
an equivalent word in the target language. In sum, there 
definitely exists a level of relationships between codes 
which always justifies saying that the passage is accom-
plished across the signifieds. 
Representation as Metalanguage 
In many cases, and notably in those which occupy us 
here, this level of relationships is neither the only nor 
necessarily the most important one. Certain intercodal 
relations are really more than transcodage. The relation-
ship between language and perception is very different 
than that between two languages (=translation), because 
in this case the two codes no longer have an identical 
semiological status and no longer occupy the same 
place within the general process of socialization. 
I linguistic signifier 
I phonic emission perceptual I linguistic of themes 
code I code 
I 1 I I I 
I linguistic signified 
I ~ sememe designating 
observable intercodal transit the object I 
Compared with all nonlinguistic codes, and with itself 
when necessary, language is in the position of a 
metalanguage: a universal, nonscientific metalanguage, 
a "major equivalent" exchangeable with all other codes, 
as is money against all other goods. There are also scien-
tific metalanguages (formalized languages, mathemati-
cal notation, chemical notation), but it is still language 
which is used to introduce them, to preliminarily explicate 
them, and to define their field of validity. And within other 
domains, language itself, subject to a specific task which 
tranforms it in terminology-that is to say, in theory-
directly supplies the scientific metalanguage outside all 
specialized notation, or in simply taking one of them as 
an intermittent auxiliary title. This metalanguage consists 
then of a body of linguistic statements of fact; it can pass 
for the language of science itself. Thus the metal inguistic 
inclination of language, universal at the nonscientific 
level, is strongly reaffirmed at the scientific level. The two 
things go together, and the current social classifications 
are those of science. This is the problem of pensee sauv-
age, "the savage mind," so well posed by Levi-Strauss 
(1962): all societies are societies of "savages," all people 
are indigenes of some culture. 
If language is the principal metalanguage, this is obvi-
ously so because no other code is situated so tightly in 
daily social communications as a certain (abstract, ex-
plicit) form of thought. This is not the only operation but is 
by nature the most apparent among the operations of 
metalanguage. Every semiologist has noted that lan-
guage, through its relationship with other codes, oc-
cupies a nonsymmetrical and privileged position9 in that 
it affects the quantitative extension of the material of the 
signified (the total field of "things that one can say"). 
Language can say, even if sometimes only with approxi-
mation, what all the other codes can say, while the in-
verse is not true. (There exists, for example, no degree of 
approximation, if it were imaginable, from which one 
could allow that a reed pipe tune or a set of colors is 
capable of "saying" even so simple a phrase as "The 
train arrived at Lyon three quarters of an hour late.") Each 
code "occupies" one part, and only one part, of the total 
semantic material, which is to say, of the ensemble of 
socially possible assertions, while language occupies 
them all . Between language and the nonlinguistic codes, 
the proportion of "translatability" equalizes itself rather 
badly, leaning largely to one side. The advantage of this 
semantic extension has a great deal to do with the social 
status of language as universal commentator. 
The Perceived and the Named 
One of the most notable consequences of this situation 
in everyday life (the flow of perception, deciphering the 
numerous images which offer themselves to view in 
modern cities, spontaneous conversations about them 
etc.) is that language does much more than transcode' 
vision. Translation is another signifier of the same rank 
(the "verbalizer," as it is sometimes called by aud iovisual 
specialists). Language accompanies vision in perma-
nence; it is the continuous gloss of it, it explains it, 
clarifies it, to the extent to which it accomplishes it, 
whether spoken aloud or by simple mnemonic evocation 
of the phonic signifier. To speak of the image is in reality 
to speak the image; not essentially a transcodage but a 
comprehension, a resocialization where the transcodage 
is only the occasion, the necessary occasion. Nomination 
completes the perception as much as it translates it; an 
insufficiently verbalizable perception is not fully a per-
ception in the social sense of the word. 
If I mentally dis pose of a sememe (he I icopter, for 
example) and then I am unable to draw the correspond-
ing object on a piece of paper, it is not a matter of acci-
dental clumsiness; I am someone who "does not know 
how to draw," and no one suspects that I do not know what 
a helicopter is. But if the helicopter is drawn on another 
piece of paper and I am not able to name it-or, in any 
case, to find the sememe, lacking the phonic signifier, as 
when one has the word "on the tip of the tongue"-the 
situation, turned around 180 degrees, becomes much 
more serious. I have not understood the drawing, I actu-
ally do not know what it is, I am incapable of making it 
exist (at least at the level of representation I am discuss-
ing in this study). Language is not only another code; it is 
the metacode. 
To Transcode/Metacode: Relations between the Two 
Operations 
It is necessary then to distinguish the metacodal relation-
ship (relationship of the metacode to its object-code) 
from the intercodal relationship, which unites two codes 
on the same level, when each can function on occasion 
as "interpreter" of the other, but the situation can always 
be reversed. In the metacodal relationship the transit by 
the signified (where the equality of the status of the two 
codes becomes explicit) is not the main point. We know, 
following Hjelmslev (1953:Chapter 22), that the signified 
of the metacode articulates itself across the total 
signifier/signified of the object-code. There it is another 
sort of transit, a dissymmetrical type, which engages, in 
the case of more than two signifieds, one signifier and 
one only (that of the object-code). As for ·the signifier of 
the metacode, it constitutes, in this "unhooked" structure 
that is so well known today, the part which "exceeds," that 
which speaks the object-code in its entirety. Thus, in an 
oral statement, the phonic emissions of the English lan-
guagd help me to describe the signifiers and the 
signifieds of the iconic code. 
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signified of signifier of 
object-code object-code 
signified of metacode signifier of metacode I 
The simple intercodal relationship can be represented in 
the following manner: 
I code X signifier code X signified 
code Y signified code Y signifier I 
Only the signifieds ensure the contact between the two 
codes. The signifiers "exceed" both of them-each one 
can "translate" the other. The dissymetry cancels itself. 
These theoretical reflections find a striking illustration 
in the problem which occupies us. Evoking the cultural 
taxonomy of visible objects, Greimas (1968) considers 
that the pertinent traits of the iconic signifier ("traits of 
recognition" in Umberto Eco's terms) coincide with those 
of the linguistic signified-that is, with the semes of the 
sememe. This proposition seems to me of great impor-
tance. From a perspective of visual semiology I return to 
the linguistic analysis which Greimas made (1966:43--50) 
of the French word tete in one of its senses ("material 
object"). Permit me to simplify a little, in order to abbre-
viate the exposition. Greimas proposed four semes for 
this sememe: extremity (of a more immense object); dis-
continuous extremity (culturally felt to be distinct from the 
rest of what one would voluntarily call "the body"); super-
lative extremity (superior and/or anterior); and spherical 
extremity (or "swelling"). 
These are four pertinent traits of the linguistic signified. 
But there are alscr-and at this point the two things be-
come confused-four pertinent traits of the iconic 
signifier. If in an ethnographic film we perceive an object 
which is unknown to us (a hunting weapon, for example, 
or a musical instrument), and if this object presents at its 
anterior extremity a distinct part with a rounded form, we 
would not hesitate to perceive it as being the "head," or 
tete, of this utensil which was previously impossible to 
identify. All that our gaze would comprehend would be 
that one of the parts of the object consists of a known 
object, a "head." The four semes would then correspond 
to four physical (optical) characteristics of the visual 
signifier, that is, the visible "spot" which on the screen 
forms the photograph of this "head." In the same way, we 
recognize a "house," which could be seen in an image or 
next to a walkway in the countryside, thanks to certain 
perceptual traits which are separable from the entirety. 
The silhouette which we have before our eyes evokes an 
object constructed by man. It contains several walls, has 
a roof, a door, and so forth. These different features are 
also the semes of the word "house" in one of its senses 
(edifice). 
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The Return of the Signifier 
It is thus confirmed that the articulation between the 
taxonomies of vision and the visual part of the lexicon, in 
the bosom of a single culture, establishes itself at two 
levels simultaneously. The first is between the respective 
signifieds (object and sememe ), insofar as one considers 
this the ordinary intercodal relationship, simple "transla-
tion," the terminal list of surface correspondences. The 
second is between the pertinent traits of the signifier (on 
the side of the object-code) and those of the signified (on 
the side of the metacode) when one envisages the cul-
tural classification of objects as an active operation of the 
metacodal type in which the main point plays itself 
against units "smaller" than the whole object and 
"smaller" than the whole sememe, at the outcome of con-
crete nomination. One conceives of this articulation as 
the historical production of nomination, a production in 
which language, the universal commentator, comes to 
state the law and its partitions, even though in the final 
analysis it would itself be, like the visible world, entirely 
informed by social forces. In the following table, I repre-
sent the double relationship of language and vision. One 
ascertains that the two sides of the object-code (signifier 
and signified) articulate themselves toward the signified 
of the metacode, and toward it only. The signifier of the 
metacode, formed from phonetic sequences which des-
ignate the perceptual units, bears no direct relation to the 
object-code. It can only "speak" globally, and from the 
exterior, through the intermediary of its own signified , the 
metacodal signified. 
visual signifier 
(forms, contours, etc.) 
with its pertinent traits 
visual signified 
recognizable object 
~ 
linguistic signifier 
phonic sequences 
deep correspondences 
between pertinent traits 
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linguistic signified 
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From Objects to Actions 
Until now I have spoken only of "objects." But visually 
recognizable "actions" exist as well. The problem of 
nomination thus moves from the noun toward the verb, at 
least for Western societies and languages, where the 
noun and the verb, the object and the action, are clearly 
distinct. Except for that point, the principle of analysis 
remains the same. Thus, in a film in which the images are 
blurred and difficult to read, it is sufficient for our pur-
poses that certain optical traits are clearly marked in 
order to perceive that someone has thrown something. In 
this example, it seems to me that the pertinent traits of the 
perceptible action, and of the lexeme "to throw" in the 
corresponding sense, are two in number (a minimal de-
duction but set in a potentially larger paradigm). 
1 Material object which distances itself from the body of the 
person (the opposite of "to catch ," "to reach," etc. , in 
which the object approaches the person). 
2 Muscular action on the part of the person (the opposite of 
"to let fall," "to let escape," "to let loose," etc., where the 
object distances itself but the person is passive). 
Clearly the analysis should be pushed further, moving 
closer and closer to the larger group of verbs of move-
ment, and to the larger organization of the visual world (or 
at least the principal gestural units). For example, the two 
traits which I have noted as the most immediately striking 
presuppose two others by an implied relationship: the 
"material object," or at least an inert one, here the pro-
jectile, and its opposition to an "animate being," a person 
or animal , or even another material object conceived and 
perceived as "active" (a catapult can also throw some-
thing). 
Noises . .. Sound Objects 
The perspective which is proposed here is equally appli-
cable to the world of recognizable noises and the corre-
sponding sector of the lexicon. This aspect of the prob-
lem is particularly important in the case of sound film 
(which in our age is all cinema), television, radio broad-
casting, and so on. Even so, it has been studied much 
less until now, because our culture grants a strong pref-
erence to the visual and does not pay attention to the 
audio sphere, except when the subject is the sound of 
language; of the two, the "noise" is often left behind.10 
How is it explainable that in the soundtrack of a film set 
in the countryside, or in the noisy confusion of a forest 
where we are walking, we would be capable of recogniz-
ing and isolating a lapping sound (clapotis) , even if we 
did not know its origin, and even if we identify as " lap-
ping," from one occasion to another, noises which are 
very different? One must admit that the " lapping" exists 
as an autonomous sound object, with pertinent traits of its 
acoustic signifier corresponding to those of the linguistic 
signifier, from the semes to the sememe "lapping ." Four 
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appear rather quickly, resulting from the "nearest" com-
mutations: 
1 The noise is relatively weak (as opposed to an uproar, 
howl, din, crash, etc.). 
2 It is discontinuous, which a distant hum, a whistling, or a 
background noise is not. 
3 It is acoustically "double," or, in any case, not simple, as 
each of its emissions can be decomposed into two suc-
cessive sounds/--!····!--····!--/. (In this respect, the 
first two phonemes of the French linguistic signifier c-1-
apotis can be considered onomatopoeic). The commu-
tation shows that the other identifiable noises do not have 
this character and that each of their emissions is "simple," 
as in "detonation," or even "blow" or "shock" in their au-
ditory sense. It is the opposition between floc and tac, or, 
to give some English examples, "plop" and "plip."11 
4 This noise is experienced as being liquid, or as being 
provoked by a liquid; the opposite of "rubbing" or "scrap-
ing" in their auditory sememe, which presents the trait 
"solid," or even "sizzling" and "hissing," with the trait 
"gaseous." 
These four traits, and all those of the same genre which 
I have forgotten, are common to both auditory perception 
and language. There would be no point whatever in ask-
ing whether they define the "lapping" (clapotis) as 
characteristic sound or as the French word clapotis, 
since the noise and the word exist only by virtue of each 
other. Our four traits constitute a level of articulation 
where the two things coincide, under the metacodal stat· 
ute of language. 
Ideological Reduction of the Sound Dimension 
There is a difference, however, between the visual and 
the auditory in our cultural definition. When I recognize a 
"lamp" and can name it, the identification is terminated. 
All that could be added would be on the order of adjec-
tives or determiners. On the contrary, if I distinctly hear a 
"lapping" or a "whistling," and if I can say that, I only have 
the feeling of making a first identification, a marking as 
yet incomplete. This impression disappears when I rec-
ognize that it is the lapping of a river or the whistling of 
the wind in the trees. The recognition of a sound leads 
directly to the question "What makes the noise?" There is 
something of a paradox there, since the sememes of the 
initial identification ("whistling," "sizzling," "rubbing," etc.) 
correspond to actual sound profiles, while those of the 
final identification (the wind, the river), which are not at all 
auditory, articulate the source of the noise and not the 
noise itself .. 
Within language as the metacode of noises, the most 
perfect identification is obviously that which simulta-
neously designates the sound and its source ("rumbling 
of thunder"). But if one of these two indicators must be 
suppressed, it is curious to note that it can be the sound-
object which suffers the least damage in overall recogni-
65 
tion. If I perceive a rumble, without further precision, there 
exists some mystery and a sense of suspense (horror 
films do not miss playing on this); the identification is 
only roughly sketched. If I perceive "thunder" without pay-
ing the least attention to its acoustical characteristics, the 
identification is sufficient. 
One might perhaps reply that the example is tenden-
tious because thunder is an object which is nothing other 
than sound (one cannot see it; lightning is what one 
sees). But the situation stays the same with objects which 
do not exhibit themselves through their noise. If I allude to 
the "throbbing of a machine," my conversational partner 
may consider that he does not know exactly what I am 
talking about and may ask, "What machine?" I have 
nevertheless been precise in the clarification of the 
noise, but remained vague on that of its source. It will 
suffice that I reverse my axes of precision by saying,"lt's a 
jet airplane noise," in order for everyone to then be of the 
opinion that I have explained myself clearly, and to feel 
satisfied. From the moment when the sound source is 
recognized (jet airplane), the taxonomies of noise them-
selves (throbbing, whistling, etc.) can only be supplied, 
at least for our age and in our latitudes, as supplementary 
precisions, not felt to be indispensable, basically in the 
nature of adjectives, even when they express themselves 
linguistically as nouns. At the level of discourse, one is no 
longer entirely within nomination, but already is moving a 
little way into description. 
Ideologically, the sound source is an object, the sound 
itself a character. Like all characters, it is attached to the 
object. Simply because the identification of the latter suf-
fices to evoke the noise, the inverse is not necessarily 
true. "To comprehend" a perceptual given is not to grasp 
it exhaustively in all its aspects, but to be capable of 
classifying it, of putting it in a pigeonhole,12 to designate 
the object of which it is one occurrence. Noises are also 
classified much more according to the objects which 
produce them than according to their own properties. 
But this situation is not at all natural: from a logical 
point of view, the "throbbing" is an object, an acoustical 
object, on the same level that the tulip is an optical ob-
ject. Language takes this into account elsewhere--or at 
least the lexicon does, failing discourse-since a great 
number of recognizable noises, reduced nevertheless to 
the level of characters, still correspond to nouns. It is a 
sort of compromise, which does not prevent auditory 
traits from participating more feebly than others in the 
dominant principle of recognition of objects. Further-
more, when one wishes to name the same concept as the 
sound-object, it is necessary, as I have just done and as 
the supporters of musique concrete often do, to add to 
the word "object" the attributive adjective "sound," when 
no precision at all is required for what should logically be 
called "visual object." We consider it evident that a flag is 
an object, but we hesitate about the ullulation of owls: this 
is an infraobject, only a sound-object. 
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"Sur un substantialisme sauvage" The "Off-Screen Sound" in Cinema 
Thus there is deeply implanted in our culture (and doubt-
less in others, although not necessarily all of them) a sort 
of wild "substantial ism," which distinguishes fairly strictly 
the first qualities that determine the list of objects (sub-
stances) and the second qualities that correspond to as 
many of the attributes as are susceptible to being linked 
to these objects. It is a conception reflected throughout 
the entire tradition of Western philosophy, starting with 
the notions of Descartes and Spinoza, which recaptures 
the preceding phrase. It is equally clear that this "world-
view" has something to do with subject-predicate struc-
ture, particularly strong in Indo-European languages. 
One can think that for us the first qualities are on the 
order of the visual and the tactile-tactile because touch 
is traditionally the very criterion of materiality;13 visual 
because the guide marks necessary to daily life and to 
techniques of production emphasize naming by eye more 
than by any other sense (it is only in language that the 
auditory order, as if to compensate, finds "rehabilitation"). 
The subject is too immense to be approached usefully 
here. It is even now possible, however, to begin to encir-
cle certain qualities which seem to be "second": thus ·for 
noises, evoked a moment ago, or the olfactory qualities (a 
perfume is hardly an object), or even such subdimen-
sions on the visual order as color.14 
In a clothing store, if two articles are of an identicar cut 
but distinguished by color, one considers that it is "the 
same pullover (or the .same pair of pants) in two shades." 
Culture feels the permanence of the object, language 
affirms it; only the attributes vary. But if two articles are of 
the same color and a different cut, no one would say or 
think that the boutique offers "the same color in two gar-
ments" (incorrect formula, and not by accident, in which 
the color will be in the position of grammatical subject). 
Rather, one will announce that these "two garments," this 
scarf and this skirt, for example, ".are of the same color." 
The articulation restores the color to its place, that of the 
predicate; these are two distinct objects which have one 
attribute in common. 
The division of first and second qualities plays a large 
role in one of the classic problems of film theory, that of 
"off-screen sound." In a film, a sound is considered off-
screen (literally, outside the screen) when it is actually the 
sound source which is off-screen. So, one defines the 
"off-screen voice" as that of a person who does not ap-
pear visually on the screen. One forgets that the sound 
itself is never "off"; either it is audible or it really does not 
exist. When it exists, it cannot be situated inside the rec-
tangle or outside it, since the property of sound is to 
diffuse more or less throughout the total environmental 
space. The sound is simultaneously "on" the screen, in 
front of it, behind it, around it, and in the whole theater.15 
On the contrary, when one says that a visual element of 
a film is off-screen, it really is. One can reestablish it by 
inference from what is visible within the limits of the rec-
tangle, but one does not see it. A well-known example 
would be that of "the bait"; one predicts the presence of a 
person where one only perceives, on one side of the 
screen, the hand or the-shoulder; all the rest is really out 
of the field of view. 
The matter is clear: the language of technic ians and 
studios, without their realizing it, applies a conceptuali-
zation to sound which only makes sense for the image. 
One pretends to speak of sound, but one in fact thinks of 
the visual image of the sound source. 
This confus ion finds itself obviously favored by a 
characteristic of noise which is physical and not social. 
The spatial anchorage of sound "givens" is much more 
vague and blurred than that of visual "givens." The two 
sensory orders do not have the same re lationship to 
space. Sound is much more constrained , even when it 
indicates a general direction (but rarely an entirely pre-
cise placement, as it is the contrary of the rule for the 
visible). One understands that film technic ians have 
based their class ification on the less elusive of the two 
elements. (It must nevertheless be remembered that the 
phylogenetic choice of an acoustical material , the sound 
of a voice, for the signifiers of human language, probably 
derives from the same reasons: phonic communicat ion is 
not interrupted by obscurity, by the night; one can speak 
to someone who is behind oneself, or is hidden by an 
obstacle, or is in an unknown place, etc. The relative 
weakness of the relation to space procures here multiple 
advantages of which the human race would lose the ben-
efits should it choose a visual language.) 
But to come back to off-screen sound in film, the physi-
cal "givens" do not suffice to explain the persistent con-
fusion between the sound-object itself and the visual 
image of its source; from the most literal definition, the 
concept of off-screen sound lies in this confusion. There 
is something else behind it which is cultural and which 
we have already encountered : namely, the concept of 
sound as an attribute, as nonobject, and the tendency to 
neglect its proper characteristics for the benefit of those 
of the corresponding "substance," the vis ible object emit-
ting the sound. 
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Conclusion 
In this study I have wanted to show that the perceptual 
object is a constructed unit, socially constructed, and in 
one sense a linguistic unit. Here we are already far from 
the ';adverse spectacle" of the subject and the object, of 
this there is, cosmological as much as existential (at any 
rate transcendental) within which phenomenology 
wished to establish our presence to objects, and the 
presence of objects to us. I am not so sure that this "dis-
tancing" is so great only on certain axes and does not 
carry along a complete rupture of the horizon. Obviously I 
spoke of semes, of pertinent optical traits, and so on; that 
is, of elements which have the property of not having one 
single existence and which are, on the contrary-on the 
contrary or precisely?-the conditions for the possibility 
of real life, the structures of production which shape it 
and which lose themselves in it, which find in it the place 
of their manifestation and their negation simultaneously: 
the objective determinations of subjective sentiment. To 
concentrate interest on this inconspicuous stratum is to 
stray from the path of phenomenology. But the obvious 
stratum-apart from the fact that it has its own reality, 
authorizing possible studies or already having led to 
benefit-is equally the only one which arranges from the 
outset those studies which its movement will then dis-
tance itself from. 
I have tried my best to comprehend why perception 
proceeds through objects. But I felt from the first, and still 
feel keenly, that it proceeds (and the phenomenologists 
do not say anything different) in effect as follows: in order 
that I try to analyze the "objects" which are so striking to 
the native (and from the start, in order that I be able to feel 
them), it was necessary that I myself be the native and 
that I be struck by the same things as he was. One knows 
that every psychoanalytic enterprise begins through a 
"phenomenology," following the term of the analysts 
themselves. That is not true in this domain. Each time that 
one wants to explain something, it is most advisable to 
begin by experiencing it. 
Translation Notes 
* This essay was originally published as Le per9u et le nomme, in Pour 
une esthetique sans entrave; Melanges Mikel Dufrenne (Hommage 
collectif) , Paris: Editions 10/18, 1975, pp. 345-377. It was then reprinted 
in Metz's collected papers, Essais Semiotiques, Paris: Klincksieck, 
1977, pp. 129-163. The present version modifies the original footnotes 
to separate references cited from actual footnotes relating to the text. 
t Diegesis (French, diegese) is a term coined by the French writer 
Etienne Souriau to indicate the denotative material of film. The concept 
is discussed in Metz 1968 (Eng. transl.1974:97-98). 
:t: ·Micheline is an autorail with tires invented by the Michelin Tire Com-
pany and used for the Paris Metro. 
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Notes 
1 I'm thinking of course of the famous Sapir-Whorf hypothesis and also of 
isolated attempts such as Sommerfelt's (1938) on the language and 
culture of the Aranta tribe of Australia. 
2 President day sociolinguistics, situated after generative tranforma-
tional linguistics, rightly tries to exceed the purely lexical stage. It also 
would like to exceed the Chomskyan distinction between "compe-
tence" and "performance," which rejects as pure performance impor-
tant social variations in the usage of a single national language. On the 
intersection of these two perspectives and the idea of constructing 
proper grammars (syntactic and/or phonological) as for example Black 
English (English as spoken by Black Americans) or that of other 
sociolinguistic groups, cf. the work of Labov and the variationist 
school. 
3 Is a sememe each "sense" of a lexeme (Greimas 1966: 43-45) or of a 
paralexeme (1966:38)? The paralexeme of Greimas corresponds 
closely to the syntheme of Martinet (1968). Greimas does not propose 
a special term to commonly designate the lexeme and the paralexeme; 
Martinet calls this the "theme." I follow Martinet here, because his term 
is particularly useful to me. The perceptual object can correspond 
equally to either a lexeme or a paralexeme (syntheme) , but only on the 
side of the signified and only in a single sense. Here, the Greimasian 
term sememe is the only one available. 
4 Greimas (1968) speaks of figures and "natural signs." The context 
shows that what he means by "natural" is "perceptual." (It is a bit like 
when linguists speak of "natural languages" as opposed to formalized 
languages or metalanguages, without a thought that these languages 
are also really natural.) In my text I prefer to avoid the word "natural." 
5 The same idea is found in Schaff (1965). It is that language is an 
"instrument" because it contributes to the decoupage of perceptual 
units, but it is also (like perception itself) a product, a product of social 
life. 
6 In Eco (1970:16)--a French translation of part of Eco 1968--"We select 
the fundamental aspects of the perceived following the codes of rec-
ognition: when we are at the zoo and we see a zebra far away, the 
elements that we recognize immediately (and that our memory retains) 
are the stripes and not the silhouette which vaguely resembles that of a 
donkey or mule. ( ... ) But suppose there exists an African community 
where the only known quadrupeds are the zebra and the hyena, and 
where horses, mules, and donkeys are unknown. In order to recognize 
the zebra it will not be necessary to perceive the stripes( ... ) and in 
order to draw a zebra it will be more important to emphasize the form of 
the snout and the length of the legs, in order to distinguish the quad-
ruped represented from the hyena (who also has stripes; the stripes 
thus do not constitute a factor of differentiation.)" 
7 In Metz (1971 :207-209) I distinguished two exactly similar cases by 
taking up and more precisely specifying the traditional comparison 
between the cinematographic image and the ideogram. I noted that in 
the former case it is the spectator himself who "makes" the schema; in 
the latter it is already made, or at least, in certain of its forms, notably 
the pictogram and morphogram. 
8 It is direct when each formal unit of the signified corresponds to a 
formal unit of the signifier; without either one or the other having fol-
lowed proper internal articulations (codes of the "symbolic " type fol-
lowing Hjelmslev). It is indirect in the contrary case (" linguistic" codes 
in the larger sense, formed by "signs" and not by symbols) when the 
level of the signifier and the level of the signified each have their 
"figures" (units smaller than the sign) which are not isomorphic; thus 
the internal organization of the signified is not transferred from that of 
the signifier. They are nevertheless dependent (from wh ich I derive my 
expression "indirect correlate") because the form of the signifier and 
that of the signified continue to coincide on the level of the sign, even if 
this entails diverging later on the level of the figures. In this concep-
tion, the symbol is a sign without figures (or the sign a symbol without 
figures). Proper languages are the best example of a system of the 
linguistic type, with figures: there is no bi-univocal correspondence 
between the phonemes or the phonic traits (figures of the signifier of a 
sign) and the semes, figures of the signified of the same sign 
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(Hjelmslev 1953). The Hjelmslevian distinction between symbolic sys-
tems and linguistic systems is better known by the name "symbolic 
systems/semiotic systems" or "symbolic systems/languages" (which 
fiqures elsewhere in my work) . 
9 See Benveniste (1969:130-131). Language is the only semiotic system 
that can be universally " interpreted." The same idea figures in the total 
work of Hjelmslev; see his paper "Structural Analysis of Language," 
appended in Hjelmslev 1953. Different codes other than languages are 
"restrained languages"; languages are "non-restrained languages." 
10 A widely held view insists that the privileged position of phonic lan-
guages leads in our culture to an underdevelopment of visual richness. 
And this is not mistaken. But this is even more true of the sonic rich-
ness of "noises," which are very directly in competition with language 
by virtue of the fact that they also have an auditory signifier. 
11 Onomatopoeia, which takes exception to the "arbitrariness" of linguis-
tic signification, represents the case where a direct link exists between 
the signifier of the metacode (language) and the set of the object-code 
(perceptual code) . On cases of this sort where there appears a "moti-
va'Lion" for the linguistic signifier, see the important work of Pierre 
Guiraud (1961 , 1962, 1967). 
12 In the field of semiology this idea has been developed in a particularly 
clear and demonstrative fashion by Luis Prieto (1966, especially chap-
ter 2, "Le mecanisme de I' ind ication," pp. 15-27). Every indication is an 
indication of a class. A class only has meaning in relationship to a 
complementary class (or classes) in the presupposed universe of dis-
course. 
13 I have already led up to this remark by an entirely different route in my 
"On the impression of reality in the cinema" in Metz 1968 (translated 
1974). 
14 It is not without reason that noncolor film, i.e. , black and white film, was 
possible (culturally as a result of demand) for many years and that in 
large measure it still is. Smell film does not correspond to any strong 
and generalized expectation. Sound and talking film, ordinary film 
today, is almost always more filled with speech than sound, so much 
so that the noises found therein are poor and stereotyped. In fact, the 
only cinematographic elements which interest everyone, and not only 
a few specialists, are image and speech. 
15 This is related to another characteristic fact of cinema today. The visual 
givens are only reproduced there by condition of certain perceptual 
distortions (the absence of binocular factors of relief, the presence of a 
screened rectangle which marks, on the contrary, the absence of real 
vision, and so forth). The auditory givens are reproduced on the condi-
tions that the sound recording has been properly done, and does not 
suffer a single phenomenal deficit in relation to the corresponding 
noise in the real world . Nothing, in principle, distinguishes a gunshot 
heard in a film from a gunshot heard in the streets. "Sounds do not 
contain the image" as film theoretician Bela Balazs said. Even so, the 
sounds of cinema diffuse within the space as do the sounds of life, or 
very nearly so. This difference in perceptual status between that which 
one calls "reproduction" when dealing with the visual , and that which 
one qives the same name, when dealing with the audible, is discussed 
in my "Problemes actuels de theorie du cinema," pp. 57-58 in Metz 
1973; also see Metz 1971 :209-210. 
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Nikola Tesla Radiated a Blue Light 
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Applied Optimism 
1 
Mobil's series of TV commercials on the theme "The Spirit 
of America Is the Spirit of Achievement" (excellent both in 
concept and realization) is an example of the Applied 
Optimism in the best trad ition of Steichen's Family of 
Man. 
2 
I am suspicious toward the subjects of Optimism, Health, 
and Patriotism. 
Happy bi rthday. 
But this hag is two hundred years old, and still so lively. 
Eternal youth. 
It's good you squeezed out those boils. The clean face is 
important. Scars are less ugly than those red-greenish 
carbuncles. 
Here's mud in your eye. 
The Chinese are said to count years backward: you al-
ways have the number of years remaining to you, not the 
number of years you have spent. At birth, you are 
seventy-five; afterward your years diminish. After 
seventy-five you show clear profit. 
But, anyhow, they have no intention of asking for anyone's 
permission. 
Ousan Makavejev is a Yugoslavian filmmaker. Among the 
films he has directed are WR-Mysteries of the Organism 
(1971) and Sweet Movie (1975). 
Th is paper was original ly read at the 1976 International Conference 
"The United States in the World ," September 27 to October 1, in 
Wash ington, D.C., at the Smithsonian Institution. 
3 
The story about the elephant in the china shop. Who 
cares about china anymore? It's pure Buster Keaton, a 
merry chaos. 
Ask children: do they want small porcelain figurines 
forever or a five-minute ride on the elephant's back? 
The elephant who wanted to stamp out a mosquito even-
tually came out as that mouse who wanted to fuck a cow. 
4 
The Principle of Socialist Realism: speak about Positive 
Hero, Reflect Reality (but recognizing the elements of 
Future in it). 
Comparing most popular Russian and American films we 
shall easily ascertain that Hollywood is much better at 
understanding and realizing the Principles of Socialist 
Realism. 
5 
Popeye the Sailor influenced me positively, and, already 
in my fourth decade, I still inordinately love spinach. 
Among the animals I like mice best. In every mouse hides 
the Spirit of Mickey Mouse. 
Ambivalent Memories 
1 
I was five years old. My uncle Steva took me to the 
movies. Mickey, Goofy, Horatio, and Clarabelle and 
Company formed an orchestra. They started playing and 
then a terrible wind , a storm, came. They flew in all di-
rections, still playing. That was irresistible. 
The audience giggled and I was choking with laughter. 
Then horror began. Something was leaking down my leg, 
wet and warm, a puddle was spreading. Luckily, it was 
noisy in the cinema and people around me didn't notice 
anything. 
Out of enthusiasm I have wet myself. Oh, shame! 
Uncle Steva took me out in a hurry. 
2 
My mother is seventy-two and she still likes telling how I 
was as curly as Shirley Temple-forty years ago. 
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3 8 
Around my eighth year, after seeing Robin Hood, I be-
lieved I was in love with Olivia de Havilland. 
In fact, I wanted to be like Errol Flynn. That is to say, I 
wanted to be like Robin Hood. 
Then Young Tom Edison came, and I wanted to publish 
my own newspaper, i.e., I wanted to be like Mickey 
Rooney, i.e., like Tom Edison, i.e., like Andy Hardy. 
4 
A novel entitled Chicago was coming out in the form of 
Tuesday and Friday booklets. In it, a mad scientist had 
invented a matter called crystalopyr, which reflected sun-
rays in such a way that, on one side, everything turned 
into ice, while everything burned on the other. A crys-
talopyr plane was in production; the destruction of the 
world was in preparation. 
5 
A year later, at 6 a.m. on April 6, 1941, German incendiary 
bombs made the prophecy of Chicago come true and 
burned 30 percent of Belgrade. Twenty thousand inhabi-
tants of Belgrade died on that day, before breakfast, as 
Fodor's guide puts it. The town was turned into congeries 
of dolls' houses-houses without fronts disclosed intact 
apartments, dining rooms with chandeliers, dentists' of-
fices. 
6 
German occupation began. My school was taken to see 
Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs. Snow White and the 
dwarfs spoke German. According to German custom, the 
film was dubbed in their language. We were offended. 
7 
Easter of '44 was a beautiful, sunny day. Humming came 
from the sky, the squadrons of Liberators sparkled. 
People waved at them, happy with the near-end of the 
war. Bombs started to thunder and raise dust. A maternity 
clinic in our neighborhood was hit. Babies were found in 
the tree-tops. There were thousands of dead civilians, but 
~verybody was still glad to see the Allied planes. 
The liberation came, Tito's part isans, and the Red Army. 
Roosevelt died. New peoples' power proclaimed three-
day national mourning, cinemas were closed, there was 
no music in restaurants, for three days flags fluttered at 
half-mast. I wondered: have they buried him in his wheel-
chair? 
9 
People were overjoyed with American food packages (we 
had not seen chocolate for four years). However, one item 
caused consternation and general mockery-pork in the 
apple sauce. If you are really interested in "the absence 
of the U.S. influence," here it is: my people will never taste 
such muck as pork in the apple sauce. 
10 
What is the magic of chewing gum? 
11 
For months on end we ate powdered eggs (there were 
barrels and barrels of them). Everybody called this food 
"Truman's balls" (in our language we have the same word 
for "balls" and "eggs"). 
12 
Twenty years later, Belgrade youth weekly Mladost con-
ducted polls trying to find out who were the heroes of the 
contemporary young. At the top of the list: Che Guevara 
and John F Kennedy. 
13 
Late sixties. The policy of open frontiers. With a Yugoslav 
passport you can travel to over fifty countries-without a 
visa. 
The foreign influences become more complex every day. 
Young playboy and criminal Milan Milosevic (one of the 
legion of adventurers who went into the world after run-
ning around American crews making films in Belgrade) 
was found dead in the bathroom of Mickey Rooney's Hol-
lywood house. 
In a nice casket his body reaches Belgrade airport, ex-
penses paid by Alain Delon. It is met by dozens of hyster-
ical teen-age girls. 
Milosevic 's mother tells all about her son, in a weekly 
magazine series. 
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Among other things, she produces a morbid detail: a few 
months later ("around Christmas," says Mom), Delon sent 
to his friend's mother a plastic bag with Milan's intestines, 
taken out during the embalming. 
14 
I live in Belgrade, at the corner of Lenin Boulevard and 
John F. Kennedy Street. 
My mother-in-law lives in Charlie Chaplin Street. 
15 
Late sixties. Godard uses the following metaphors: "Walt 
Disney and blood," "the children of Marx and Coca-Cola." 
16 
In my last film, Sweet Movie , lovers make love in sugar; it 
ends in murder. Blood mixes with sugar (during the shoot- . 
ing we called this scene "the jam session"). I had in mind 
a scene from Resnais' Hiroshima, Man Amour with lovers 
plastered with sand; the effect was very sensual-and 
unpleasant. I strived to make it pleasant. 
Has this scene also been fathered by a need to "surpass" 
(or interpret) the ambivalence of the image-concept 
"Disney-blood"? 
"Orang Nach Westen" and Dangers of linear 
Thinking 
1 
"To catch up and overtake America"-Stalin. In early and 
innocent days of my school activism, we read in Stalin 
what a communist should be. 
He should display, says Uncle Joe, the combination of 
Bolshevik persistence and American practicality. 
2 
America served as a model to both Russian futurists and 
Lenin. 
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3 
"To catch up and overtake America" is a fatal slogan. We 
already know from the ancient Greeks that even a rabbit 
cannot overtake a turtle. I know that many of my American 
friends do not enjoy having to run so much. I guess they 
were told as children: "Run so that nobody can overtake 
us." 
4 
I like Instant Coffee and Instant Soup. 
When Instant Death was introduced, in 1945, as applied 
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, I caught myself, a thirteen-
year-old boy, in a dilemma: I liked it very much, although I 
knew it wasn't nice that I liked it. Then everybody got 
Instant Excuse: Instant Death has brought Instant End of 
War. 
Instant Beginning and Instant End. 
5 
The production of Absolute Happiness comes next. It is 
curious that this concept (the guided creation of genera-
tions of completely happy human beings) did not appear 
in Pavlov-oriented Soviet psychology, but at Harvard, with 
B. F. Skinner. 
6 
Where does it come from, this striving of America to make 
other nations happy-against their will? 
7 
The last three big wars were conducted by the USA in 
Asia: Japan, Korea, Vietnam. Did the first really bring the 
absolute victory? Did the second really secure status 
quo? Why does America-with so much pain and 
confusion-refuse to recognize traces of the American 
Revolution and the Declaration of Independence in the 
establishment of the national identities of Vietnam and 
Cuba? 
8 
For years humiliated and offended, heretics and dream-
ers, the hungry and those who "think differently" thronged 
to the West, to America. From the East Coast to the Rock-
ies and beyond, there was always-more West. After 
World War II, this Orang Nach Westen has brought the 
Americans to the Far East. 
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We are scared by the discovery that the Far Westerners 
are identical with the Far Easterners and that they reject, 
"against their best interests," our concepts of time, history, 
nature, and civilization as well as our sado-masochistic-
Christian concept of life, the best (and only) in the world. 
10 
Czech humorist Jaroslav Hasek has somewhere a group 
of people meeting every day in a beerhouse. 
There, in the beerhouse, they found "The Party of the 
Moderate Progress within the Law." 
The Americans could be considered members of the 
Party of Immoderate Progress outside Any Law. 
The Factory of Universal Dreams 
1 
Hollywood. 
The national pride of Yugoslavs: Slavko Vorkapich, Karl 
Malden, Peter Bogdanovich. 
2 
Another contribution of our national genius to Hollywood: 
Vampir, the only Serbian word that has entered all the 
languages of the world. 
Vampire (F, fr, G vampir, of Slav origin; akin to Serb vampir 
vampire, Russ upyr) 1: a bloodsucking ghost or reanimated 
body of a dead person believed to come from a grave and 
wander about by night sucking the blood of persons asleep 
and causing their death. 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
3 
A real vampire: the biggest living WW II war criminal 
Andrija Artukovic, the creator of the well-known extermi-
nation camp Jasenovac (Croatia, Yugoslavia), personally 
responsible for the execution of 500,000 Serbians, Jews, 
and Gypsies, lives, scot-free, in Los Angeles. 
4 
On the occasion of America's 200th birthday, David 
Robinson writes about the American Cinema as the Uni-
versal Dream. 
In fact, the everyday life of America in its paradisaical 
aspects of Freedom and Affluence, in its infernal aspects 
of Freedom of Sin, Greed, and Lust, with its bursting of all 
dams preventing Orgy of Desires-represents the wide 
open playground of the Universal Dream. All practical 
operations (economic, social, cultural, and private) are 
performed in the oil of the Universal Dream, providing 
everything with damping and acceleration. 
6 
A fascinating situation: a TV commentator blows out his 
brains on camera. After this, I cannot watch TV news in 
America without hoping, in some dark corner of my soul, 
that maybe now this commentator I am seeing and hear-
ing . .. 
7 
In America there is no shame of desires. Since a half 
century ago, Europe has scientifically ascertained the 
immorality of desires, but it still retains the repression of 
desires. Legitimacy of desires in America makes it pos-
sible to use them as fuel. 
Energy 
1 
Does America know certain secrets of mobilizing human 
energies which are unfathomable to the "rest of the 
world?" 
Discontinuity? 
2 
A self-mocking Serbian story from World War I. At the 
time of the Saloniki front, a child is drowning in the harbor 
of Saloniki. 
A crowd watches from the shore. 
Suddenly, a heroic Serbian soldier is in the water; he 
saves the child and reaps the applause of the spectators. 
Afterward, on the shore, someone overhears him swear-
ing: "If I get my hands on the motherfucker who pushed 
me in!" 
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3 
Has not the whole of America come into being by a sort 
of voluntary "Who-Pushed-Me-In" technique? 
Millions swam across the ocean and, once on fhe other 
shore, went on living as best as they could. 
They were applauded from the ancient shore. 
To bring oneself to the point of no return. 
4 
Starting from zero. 
The national income of Bangladesh is 70 dollars a year 
per inhabitant; of Yugoslavia, 1,060; of the USA 7,020. 
But still everybody behaves as if starting from zero. Al-
though the American "zero" is-7,020. 
5 
The childhood dream of Nikola Tesla, in a deep province 
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (today: Lika, Croatia, 
Yugoslavia) was to go to America and install a gigantic 
wheel at Niagara Falls which would produce unheard 
quantities of energy. 
In 1884, Nikola Tesla (twenty-eight) comes out from the 
Immigration Office in Castle Garden, Manhattan, with 
four cents in his pocket. He works as an electrician, digs 
holes for two dollars a day, founds Tesla Electric Com-
pany, and creates the polyphase system of alternating 
current. 
At the same time Edison and John Pierpont Morgan work 
steadfastly on the development of the direct current sys-
tem. Edison's direct current has a maximum reach of one 
mile from the power station. 
According to some stories, Edison and Morgan go 
around New York killing chickens with the alternating cur-
rent in order to prove how dangerous it is. In 1888, with a 
million dollar check, George Westinghouse buys forty 
patents from Tesla-the complete system. Using the al-
ternating current system, Tesla illuminates, on Westing-
house's behalf, the whole 1893 World Columbian Exposi-
tion in Chicago. Westinghouse obtains the contract to 
build the Niagara power station. In 1896, Buffalo is illumi-
nated by the alternating current coming from Niagara, 
22 miles away. 
Soon the whole of America is covered with pylons-the 
cheap energy can be obtained, like water, out of the wall, 
in evory house. 
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Tesla's ultimate dreams were of the wireless transmission 
of electric energy, a system of interplanetary communica-
tion, and radio contact with the cosmos. In 1899, in Col-
orado Springs, he lighted two hundred bulbs, without use 
of wires, from a distance of 25 miles. He also produced 
manmade lightning flashes. 
It was a poor eighty-year-old man who, in the early forties, 
fed pigeons every day in front of New York's Plaza Hotel 
and led a lonely I ife with a female pigeon at the Waldorf 
Astoria. 
Seventy years earlier, he was a young man who had vi-
sions and nightmares, who had attacks of nausea at the 
sight of a peach, went berserk at the sight of pearls, and 
became ecstatic when faced with even, smooth surfaces 
or spark! ing crystals, who could not work with numbers 
not divisible by three. 
He claimed that in the moments of heightened creativity 
he was radiating a blue light. 
6 
In 1968 Life magazine published a cover photo of an 
astronaut on the Moon. Gary Burnstein (Ph.D. in Psychol-
ogy, a passionate researcher of Nikola Tesla and Wilhelm 
Reich) draws my attention to the blue halo around the 
astronaut in the atmosphereless moonscape. 
The experts convinced themselves that this blue halo 
was caused by some fault in the negative. 
7 
As far back as 1934, Reich explained to Erik Erikson that 
all living creatures radiate a blue light. Erikson did not 
believe him. Reich invited Erikson-it was in Denmark, 
during the summer vacation-to observe with him 
couples making love on the beach, in darkness. He as-
serted that the blue radiation, which becomes more in-
tense during the sexual act, can be observed by the 
naked eye. From then on, Erikson considered Reich mad. 
Many others considered Reich mad at the time of his 
death in Lewisburg prison, Pennsylvania, in 1956. 
8 
In the early fifties Reich was trying to draw public atten-
tion to poisonous masses of static air, hovering over cities 
like black clouds. A few years after his death, people 
started talking about the struggle against the pollution of 
the atmosphere and about black masses of static air. 
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It is quite superfluous to speak about freedom in America 
in old European terms of freedom as democracy. 
In regard to the freedom of information, "free circulation of 
men and ideas," legal security of the individual, America 
is a few shades freer than the most progressive European 
democracies. This freedom, however, represents just a 
tiny part of American freedom, if we speak of Freedom 
understood as the radiation and chain reaction of Human 
Energy. 
The old Europe expends enormous energies defending 
itself from the "abuses of freedom": public disorder, 
"chaos," "bad taste," "immorality," "nonsense," "stupidity." 
The public and private life of the people in the European 
democracies is cut by series of meshes of invisible cen-
sorships. 
In order to comprehend the energy of American creativity 
one cannot just stand and stare dumbfounded at the 
Brooklyn Bridge, as did Mayakovsky, who wrote an ode to 
the Brooklyn Bridge as a marvel of modern technology. 
America is the Brooklyn Bridge plus the London Bridge 
transferred and installed in the Arizona desert. 
10 
The freedom of physical and spiritual risk should be 
measured on the frontiers where that risk turns into failure, 
self-destruction, madness, nonsense, game. These are 
the Open Frontiers of America. 
11 
If the elegance and functionality of the Hoover Dam are 
America's response to the perfection of Mona Lisa's 
smile, let us talk then about the end of Western 
Civilization. 
The monstrous beauty and uselessness of San Simeon 
represent the moment in which the stupidity of shameless 
richness explodes into a new formula, according to which 
it is allowed to turn everything upside down in order to 
start from scratch. 
The secret of the fascinating and "inhuman" qualities of 
Manhattan, which are stubbornly conserved and regen-
erated, consists in the chaos which stubbornly refuses to 
be ordered and thereby keeps open all roads toward the 
permanent creation of new beginnings. 
The freedom of risk is paid in blood and enjoyment of life, 
which is nothing but a healthy nonsense. 
Perhaps we are dealing with machinery that has a built-in 
acceleration mechanism, while someone forgot to install 
a brake? 
That remains to be seen. 
13 
During the past two hundred years greedy pioneer 
America brought over from black Africa a multimillion 
Gulag of unpaid slaves. Now, at the center of the begin-
ning of America's new identity, there is a living reservoir 
of beautiful and dangerous black energy which will bring 
new beginnings. Or new ends. 
Like so many other centers, radiating sti ll invisible blue 
rays. 
Discovery of Man on the Moon 
1 
It was the night between August 20 and 21 , 1969, on the 
open Atlantic. 
Bojana and I were on our way back from America to 
Europe, on the Italian ocean liner Rafaele. 
Two days earlier, apart from the sea, there was nothing 
around us. I was waiting for the Azores to appear, on 
account of Mayakovsky. 
The Azores duly appeared and state ly sailed past us, on 
their way to America. 
"And life will pass by, like the Azores did." 
It seemed as if we were sailing through the lines of the 
Great Vladimir. He did not sail out of this life like a tame 
lazy island ; he blew out his brain with a revolver bullet. ' 
But that's another story. 
That evening in the ship's cinema we saw Toshiro Mifune 
and Lee Marvin in Boorman's Hell in the Pacific . It was 
strange, it was a good prelude to what was going to 
happen to us that night. 
~n the n:iddle of the ocean-a ship, a cinema in the sh ip, 
m the cmema-an ocean, but not this ocean, the other 
ocean, at the Antipodes. 
Nobody slept that night. 
Nikola Tesla Radiated a Blue Light 
All the ship's drawing rooms were full of people, in 
semidarkness and silence. Everybody was watching 
Armstrong and Aldrin, the first steps of the men on the 
Moon. 
It all came in poetically smudged video-images, like 
Norman Maclaren's Pas de deux. Our compatriots, the 
earthlings, did not walk, it was more like hopping and 
floating in the no-atmosphere of the Moon, it was more 
like that time when we were fish than when we ventured 
on our first steps, being one year old. 
It was very solemn, that TV watching, and it went on for 
hours. This was not watching but being present, accom-
panied by the awareness that at the same moment hun-
dreds of millions of other men, maybe even a billion of 
them, were doing the same thing. 
In that act of mass baptism, we were becoming, all to-
gether, compatriots-earthlings, soaked in highly primitive 
emotion, the feeling that we, the men of Earth, have set 
out on a new journey. Sitting by a TV set on that night 
meant the approval of that risk, acceptance of all new 
worries and perils, readiness to be surprised: we are off, 
come what may. 
State and national frontiers were ajar, slackened. All to-
gether, we were following the Earth Team, not the Ameri-
can Team. (The term "Race with Russians" retains a 
sense only in the dumb linear logic of people still believ-
ing that the earth is flat, still seeing the world from "here" 
to "there." What "race" is possible, once you start in all 
directions?) 
Later, the coming out of the astronauts from the space-
craft and walking-floating in Space showed even more 
obviously-with that so prominent umbilical cord-that 
we were faced with a dramatization of the act of birth, that 
the whole fantastic-science-fiction theater performance 
was, in fact, a celebration of human birth. 
In that way the discovery of man was performed on the 
Moon. 
2 
The ship was sailing silently over the ocean, there were 
people in the drawing rooms in the ship, TV sets in the 
drawing rooms, and the Moon on TV screens. I was com-
ing into these drawing rooms full of silent people, and I 
was going out to watch the Moon from the deck. 
Jules Verne." 
We have descended twenty thousand leagues under the 
sea and we have stepped on the moon. We went to the 
center of the Earth and we have entered the human brain. 
3 
Far, far away, Jules Verne floated in the dark sky, dis-
guised as the Moon, and very lonely. 
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Presidentes Municipales 
Richard Tichich 
There have been many portrait series which display a 
consistent expression of the photographer, for example, 
the work of Julia Margaret Cameron, Richard Avedon, 
Karsh, and Judy Dater. In this type of series the subjects 
play a secondary role to the creative style and presenta-
tion of the photographer. 
The history of photography also reveals an endless 
rendering of the human subject. Once techniques were 
sufficiently sophisticated, nine out of ten daguerreotypes 
featured a person. Sometime these photographs were 
only faint shadows with no special "artistic" treatment, 
but their surfaces captured the spirit of the subject. For 
the most part, our ancestors have become nameless 
faces photographed by anonymous photographers. But 
when we consider the portrait in a series, the hand of the 
artist is eventually revealed. As individual images, E. J. 
Bellocq's photographs of the ladies of New Orleans allow 
us to enter gently into the elegant houses and from a safe 
distance become detached voyeurs. We are free to look 
as long as we wish, we can freely take whatever we want, 
but we can never ask any questions. The photographs are 
silent and all the information must come out of our own 
experience, our own prejudices. As with a Rorschach 
test, we eventually see only ourselves reflected in the 
surface of the photograph. With an extended series such 
as Bellocq's we can begin to know as much about the 
artist as we do about his subjects. 
It was my intention to conceptually construct the most 
neutral position possible when photographing the Presi-
dentes. The idea of doing a portrait series of the mayors 
of Mexican cities came to me suddenly. There was no 
reflection on historical precedent or the feasibility of the 
project. Through the concerned efforts of Tita Valencia, 
Cultural Coordinator of the University of Mexico in San 
Antonio, Texas, I was awarded a grant to travel and to 
photograph in Mexico. I made no official application or 
proposal. Up until the last minute it was uncertain 
whether the money would actually be made available. 
Ms. Valencia's motivation was very idealistic: the artist, 
through his or her art, can function as a cultural ambas-
sador if given the freedom to interact with another culture. 
I was free to photograph anything I wished. Her original 
concept was to have a photographer work with children 
because it was the closing of the International Year of the 
Child. I didn't like that idea. I'm not sure why, but I was 
certain that to work comfortably in a strange country and 
to produce a substantial series of photographs in a short 
time, my concept would have to be as narrow as possi-
ble. It would have to be a project that defined its own 
boundaries. I was totally unfamiliar with the political 
structure of the country and curious about the people 
who ran the cities of Mexico. In the face of limited knowl-
edge of the history of Mexico a certain myth seemed to 
Richard Tichich is Director of The Galveston Arts Center 
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surround the political leaders. When I first began telling 
people about the scope of the project, they all seemed 
interested in seeing the final outcome. Tita Valencia was 
both apprehensive and pessimistic about the idea. Given 
that I didn't speak Spanish and had no experience with 
the culture. she felt that it was an impossible project. 
In retrospect I had two previous experiences that seem 
to have led me to this idea. The first is that, living in 
Galveston, Texas, with a population of 70,000, I had 
known the last three mayors of the city. Not one was a 
professional politician. The office is part-time and non-
paying. Most cities seem to try to elect someone from the 
community who has exhibited a willingness to work un-
selfishly for the good of the community and who will ap-
proach problems more with common sense than with ex-
ceptional learning. I am not afraid to work with anyone 
who approaches problem solving with these credentials. 
I suspected that the elected officials of the Mexican cities 
would have the same qualities as any other leaders. 
The second experience is my knowledge of the career 
of Paul Gittings, the Houston, Texas, photographer. Years 
ago I happened to read his autobiography, and in it he 
detailed his business and artistic philosophy. In particu-
lar, to establish his portrait business Gittings would ar-
range to photograph the political leaders of a city such as 
Houston, then exhibit the work in the most traveled of 
galleries, the local airport. The politicians loved the idea, 
and there was usually ample time for the traveler to view 
the work. Gittings's aesthetic approach gives the por-
traits a uniform look and says much more about the tal-
ents of the photographer than about the individuals being 
photographed. With this merchandising concept, other 
members of the community were willing to pay to join the 
elite club and be photographed according to the same 
aesthetic. 
When I worked with the Mexican politicians, my ap-
proach was to neutralize as much as possible my own 
aesthetic input. In my case there was no need to sell the 
portraits or rely on merchandising the aesthetic treat-
ment. My goal was merely to present the individual in his 
or her own surroundings. I did not want to idealize the 
major politicians with dramatic lighting and artificial set-
tings, then use a totally different aesthetic when dealing 
with a small farming community. I wanted to standardize 
each sitting to allow for all the photographs to be com-
pared with one another on an equal basis. When possi-
ble, I wanted to photograph the individual in his or her 
normal place of power-usually sitting at a desk. Unless 
the spirit of Benito Juarez objected, I utilized the same 
approach for each photograph. I felt free to violate the two 
primary rules of executive portraiture: first, never to shoot 
a businessman at his desk, and second, never to center 
the individual in the frame. With this obvious method of 
standardization I felt that the surrounding environment 
would provide as much information as would the indi-
viduals. I went to Mexico to fill in the blanks. On entering 
an office, I could readily see that the Presidente at his 
desk and what immediately surrounded it did all the 
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work. My role was that of a technician working to com-
plete the one concept rather than make each photograph 
a single creative experience. 
If anything, the major pictorial thrust of the series came 
through the selection of the cities to be photographed. 
Logistically, my approach was to select the largest cities 
in Mexico and to address a cover letter to the Presidente 
asking permission to take his portrait. Half of the Presi-
dentes responded, and the typical reply was that they 
would be more than willing to participate and merely to 
contact them to arrange the sitting when I arrived. With 
the series in mind I felt it was extremely important to 
photograph the Presidente of Mexico City. The series 
would be incomplete if I obtained a small farming com-
munity without a photograph of the mayor of the largest 
city in the country to provide the necessary contrast. 
When crossing the border I still had not heard from 
Mexico City. I had 10 weeks to complete the shooting. 
Knowing that I wanted to photograph the largest cities in 
the country, I designed an itinerary by filling in the lines 
between these cities. 
The first town I visited was Sabines Hildago, and any 
apprehensions I had about the feasibility of the project 
were immediately dispelled. The Presidente owned an 
auto parts store, and the sheriff was a mechanic who 
spoke English and had worked in Detroit. In the photo-
graph, the Presidente is actually on the phone with the 
mayor of Cienega De Flores arranging the second por-
trait for that day. On my first day in Mexico I finished two 
portraits and knew that the series would be possible. The 
Mexican politicians seemed as interested in participat-
ing in the project as the people in the States in viewing 
the series. The response "Si como no" became a familiar 
one to my request. Throughout the trip it didn't seem as if I 
were traveling a lot. The next city was only about 5 miles 
away, and I had the option to stop whenever I wished; in 
every city there was a lec.der. 
The title "mayor" does not conveniently translate into 
Spanish. My concept of the mayor of a city is the primary 
elected official. In the larger towns this title is Presidente 
Municipal; in the smaller, the elected official is the 
Agente Municipal, Sheriff, or Comisario. It is sometimes 
difficult to locate an inexpensive hotel, but to find the 
mayor of the city the search can start with asking the first 
person you meet. Everyone knows the Presidente and 
where his office is. There were times when, after I asked a 
policeman the location of the mayor's office, he would 
provide a police escort. In a smaller town an assistant 
rode off on a bicycle and brought the mayor back from 
lunch. I welcomed their cooperation, and they were hon-
ored to be included in the series. 
The mayor of Mexico City presented the biggest chal-
lenge. As it turned out, arranging the portrait session was 
as easy as walking into his office and, through a series of 
intermediaries, merely asking for permission. I always 
carried a letter of introduction from Tita Valencia describ-
ing the scope of the project. Unless someone spoke Eng-
lish the mayors were unable to ask very detailed ques-
tions. In Mexico City the shooting sesion lasted not more 
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than 5 minutes. I was given an appointed time and asked 
to return. In the Presidente's office I arranged the camera 
and adjusted the I ights. The presidente came into the 
room, greeted everyone, sat down and smiled as if he 
were addressing a classroom, and the photograph was 
taken. When work was completed, he immediately left. 
This brief encounter was a contrast to the session with the 
Presidente of Ciudad Victoria. Here the Presidente ar-
ranged a 2-hour lunch and a personal tour of the city. 
Most of the Presidentes did not seem to realize that my 
sole mission in Mexico was to take their portrait. They 
were all proud of their cities and were quick to point out 
the more traditional photographic opportunities. 
There certainly is a difference in scope between com-
munity problems in Mexico City and in the small farming 
community I later used. The officials of one large city 
were skeptical of the feasibility of arranging the portraits. 
The mayor's executive secretary seemed unwilling to dis-
rupt the mayor's schedule and said that the smaller cities 
would certainly cooperate because their Presidentes had 
nothing to do, but it would not be possible to arrange 
portrait sessions with the officials of the larger cities. His 
advice came quite late in the project, and, in fact, I had 
not been turned down by any city. Once I mentioned that I 
had already completed the Presidente of Mexico City, he 
seemed to adjust his ideas, and within 5 minutes I was 
lighting the mayor's office. 
Each photograph has its own narrative, each Presi-
dente ruled with his or her own sense of command. None 
seemed out of place. Their executive presence made my 
meetings with them comfortable experiences. I was sur-
prised at their willingness to allocate time for a project 
they knew little about. To me they seemed to exhibit a 
natural sensitivity to working with someone who has 
an idea. 
Mexican culture is revealed in many ways. Experienc-
ing the Indian ruins, open markets, and cathedrals builds 
a fascinating mystique. The mixture of European and In-
dian cultures paints the country as brightly as the murals 
which cover the Presidentes' offices. The opportunity to 
gain access to those offices allowed me and, I hope, the 
viewer of the series to get a new view of the country. 
I am now working on the second half of the portrait 
series and plan to photograph the mayors of Texas. The 
combined effort will demonstrate the visual differences 
between the cultures. I am interested in exploring the 
differences between the large and small towns in Texas 
as well as drawing cultural comparisons between the 
two countries. 
The photographs of the Presidentes can tell their own 
stories, and within the series each can contast itself with 
the others. I don't believe I should add anything to the 
photographs now. It's too late to add silver back to the 
image or to ask the Presidente to adjust his position. I 
think it best to remove this narrative from the photographs 
and allow the viewer to look inside the image for all 
the information. This text is merely a footnote to the 
photographs. 
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Figure 1 
Cesar Santos Santos 
Presidente Municipal 
Monterrey, N.L. 
Population: 2,000,000 
Occupation: Lawyer 
Figure 2 
Jose Castillo Pombo 
Presidente Municipal 
Cuernavaca, Moralez 
Population: 256,000 
Occupation: Lawyer 
studies in Visual Communication 
Presidentes Municipales 
Figure 3 
Jesus Martinez Alverez 
Presidente Municipal 
Oaxaca de Juarez, Oax 
Population: 100,000 
Occupation: Lawyer 
Figure 4 
Magdalena Vasquez 
de Huicochea 
Presidenta Municipal 
Chilpancingo, Gro. 
Population: 100,000 
Occupation: Elementary 
school teacher 
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Figure 5 
Homero Ibarra Montemayor 
Presidente Municipal 
Sabinas Hidalgo, N.L. 
Population: 32,000 
Occupation: Owns an auto 
parts store 
Figure 6 
Jose Garcia Cruz 
Presidente Municipal 
Dolores Hidalgo, Gro. 
Population: 25,000 
Occupation: 
Juiz Del Jigiatio Civil 
studies in Visual Communication 
Presidentes Municipales 
Figure 7 
Ecliserio Rosas Martinez 
Presidente Municipal 
Villa De Tehuitzingo, 
Puebla 
Population: 20,000 
Occupation: Farmer 
Figure 8 
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Humberto Arendono Herrea 
Presidente Municipal 
Nochixtpan, Oaxaca 
Population: 10,000 
Occupation: Pharmacist 
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Figure 9 
Panfi lo Sanchez Moralez 
Presidente Municipal 
Chila De Las Flores, Puebl.a 
Population: 9,000 
Occupation: Shoe salesman 
Figure 10 
Salomon Arroya Vasquez 
Comisario 
Xuchiapa, Puebla 
Population: 2,800 
Occupation: Farmer 
studies in Visual Communication 
Presidentes Municipales 
Figure 11 
Mariano Chavez Garcia 
Sheriff 
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Plan De Los Amates, Gro. 
Population: 1,300 
Occupation: Brick mason 
Figure 12 
Rogelio Aleman Garcia 
Comisario 
Lomas Chapultepec, Gro. 
Population: 300 
Occupation: Farmer 
Media Events: The Sense of Occasion1 
Elihu Katz 
Critics of broadcasting argue that it has robbed society 
of the sense of occasion. People used to dress up to g? 
out, the crit ics say, and now they stay in to watch televi-
sion only half-dressed and half-awake. The arts that 
brought people together-whether popular or 
highbrow-were associated with time and place and 
community, marking the passing of seasons, the bound-
aries between sacred and secular, and the structure of 
society. Now television provides culture nonsto~, with 
nothing more than station breaks and co~~erc1als to 
frame an experience in time, and only the l1v1ng room and 
the family to frame it spatially and socially. The dim 
awareness that everybody else is viewing the same pro-
grams surely does something to hold society together, 
but the sense of occasion-€specially that of communal 
occasion-has been dulled. This is not a judgment on the 
quality of television programs, it must be emphasized, 
but on their ubiquity. . 
Like all generalizations about the atomi.zing, ~eculanz­
ing, and tranquilizing effects of broad.cast1~g, th1~ one too 
deserves more careful formulation. It 1s unlikely, f1rst of all, 
that the media alone are to blame for the decline of the 
folk arts; all the pressures of modernization have had a 
share. 2 Moreover, the professional performing arts seem 
to be flourishing ; some people do go out.3 And as for 
occasions, the media are often at their best on holidays, 
such as Independence Day or Christmas, when high 
standards of performance are combined with a sense of 
festivity and a nostalgia for tradition. 4 
There is another sense, too, in which the media break 
the sun-never-sets pattern which they themselves have 
created. This history of broadcasting is punctuated with a 
series of programs which are so memorable that they 
captivated the attention of a nation or of the world. People 
dressed up to see them, and invited their friends to join 
them in listening or viewing . The tenth anniversary of the 
moon landing brings this genre of broadcasting to mind. 
Generically, the broadcasts are known as media 
events-though that is an ambiguous and overworked 
term. 1 call them the "high holidays" of the media. Each of 
them, for a brief moment, restored the sense of occasion 
to a society or to the world , and some of them may have 
had lasting effects. 
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Elihu Katz is Professor and Director of the Communica-
tions Institute at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, and 
Professor at the Annenberg School of Communications 
at the University of Southern California. 
1 should like to recall these events, and to discuss them 
in this paper. They include the moon landings; the visit of 
Sadat to Jerusalem; the weekend of mourning following 
the assassination of Kennedy; the coronation of Elizabeth 
II ; the presidential debates of 1960 and 1976; an~ certain 
sport ing events. 5 Each nation will have its own l1st, al-
though the number of such events is remark~bly small. 
Occasionally, we get a glimpse of the potent1al of such an 
event which is denied us: the visit of Pope John Paul II to 
Poland, for example, or the Moscow Olympics. 
Media Events Defined 
There are a number of defining characterist ics that are 
associated with these events. First of all, they are broad-
cast live . They are before our eyes as they are happening, 
and thus the unique attribute of broadcasting, as dist inct 
from those of the other media, is brought into fu ll play. The 
cameras and the microphones are on the spot and trans-
port us simultaneously to where the event is taking place. 
Second, we are talking about events wh ich are typi-
cally not initiated by the med ia. Somebody else has or-
ganized them-the Space Agency, or a political lea~er, 
or the Olympic committee. To be sure, they are organ1zed 
with media coverage in mind , but unlike Boorstin's 
pseudo-event,6 it is likely that these events would take 
place even if the cameras were not there. There may be 
certain exceptions to th is: the Eurovision contest, for 
example, in which all Europe joins in the judging of popu-
lar songs. Such events might not happen at al l if the 
media do not organize them, but they are borderline 
cases. The paradigmatic media event is one organ ized 
outside the media but which may well be transformed in 
the process of transmiss ion. 
The element of high drama or high ritual is essential: 
the process must be emotion-laden or symbol-laden, and 
the outcome be rife with consequence. Most fireside 
chats, like most parades or football games or political 
conventions, do not qualify in th is sense. Although they 
may be broadcast live and may be organized by major 
political or soCial agenc ies, they lack the electrifying 
element which attracts a mass audience to something 
especially moving. Indeed, the essential characterist ic of 
media events may be the communal insistence that one 
abandon one's other roles and commitments in favor of 
viewing TV. "Stop everything and join us in the making of 
history" is the compelling theme of these events. Viewing 
is obligatory; nothing is more important. 
That means, of course, that the events must be pre-
planned. They are ne ither spontaneous nor unexpected. 
Part of the drama, of course, may be that the outcome is 
unknown, but the event itself is expected and well adver-
tised . Typically, the media do the advertising, just as the 
1984 Olympics in Los Angeles (and, until the boycott, the 
Moscow Olympics of 1980) are already be ing advertised. 
Sadat came to Jerusalem on very short notice, but there 
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was enough time to electrify the world with the news of 
his coming. His decision to come was news; his arrival 
was a media event. Kennedy's assassination was news; 
his funeral was a media event. 
These events are framed in time and space. They do 
not, for example, include the Vietnam War, whatever one 
thinks of the role of the media in bringing its horror into 
the living rooms of the world. They do not include the 
films of the Khomeini revolution. 7 They do not include the 
broadcasting of Parliament, except on those very rare 
occasions when the fate of the nation is being debated. 
The Watergate Hearings, in which a president was faced 
with impeachment proceedings, or the un-American Ac-
tivities Committee of Senator Joseph McCarthy, or the 
trial of Adolph Eichman may qualify. The event must be 
focused enough to sustain the- attention of the 
aud ience-which can sometimes be held for days in a 
row-and circumscribed enough to permit a small 
number of television cameras to encompass it. 
Finally, one must note the centrality of personality. Each 
event has a hero-an individual, two individuals, or a 
team. The Salt II talks, even if they had been offered to 
television, would have been accepted very reluctantly, for 
they dealt in abstractions rather than personalities. This 
is not to deny television's ability to dramatize and per-
sonalize even abstract issues, when called upon to do so. 
These, then, appear to be the necessary conditions: (1) 
live transmission, (2) of a preplanned event, (3) framed in 
time and space, (4) featuring a heroic personality or 
group, (5) having high dramatic or ritual significance, 
and (6) the force of a social norm which makes viewing 
mandatory. These conditions may not be sufficient to en-
sure the success of the event in sustaining the attention of 
a mass audience or in accomplishing its political or ritual 
purpose. But they are basic ingredients. 
High Holidays 
Events, of course, are central to individuals, families, and 
communities: birthdays, anniversaries, holidays. They 
are central, too, to the profession of journalism. Indeed, 
the daily newspaper or the evening newscast is a colla-
tion of essentially discrete events or happenings, and it is 
by no means certain-as we shall note below-that this 
is the best way to report what is going on in the world. It is 
like waiting for a hurricane to report the weather, or wait-
ing for Mother's Day to decide how one feels about 
mother. 
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Western journalism differs from Eastern journalism in 
its emphasis on negative events, on things that go wrong. 
If the opening of a factory is news in Eastern Europe, it is 
the closing of a factory that is news in the West. Free-
world journalism is about conflict: nation against nation, 
man against man, man against nature. A news event, 
typically, is the story of some conflict. The conflict may be 
institutionalized, as in parliaments or sports, or it may be 
spontaneous, as in a terrorist attack or an earthquake. 
Such stories, more than any other, define the news. 
Media events, however, appear to differ. Rather than 
reporting conflict, they appear to celebrate the resolution 
or overcoming of conflict, or if they deal with conflict, it is 
conflict of the most institutionalized sort. Consider, for 
example, the moon landings or Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, 
or-even if we only had a glimpse of the real thing-the 
visit of John Paul II to Poland. All these celebrate the 
attempt to overcome conflict. Similarly, the mourning 
after Kennedy's death was a period of reuniting of the 
nation and reduction of tension. Even the Olympics, the 
presidential. debates, or events such as the Eurovision 
song contest are in the nature of a gathering together of 
rivals to watch a ritual conflict, rather than a story of bitter 
hostility. 
Thus, media events appear to differ from news events 
in that they are more concerned with the bringing to-
gether of rivals, that is, with the process of reconciliation. 
Moreover, if one analyzes the rhetoric of media events 
one will find, I believe, a reverence which is wholly atypi-
cal of everyday journalism. In his daily rounds, the 
reporter, typically, is cynical: he distances himself from 
the event. The presenter of a media event, however, often 
takes a priestly role, acting as a master of ceremonies. He 
whispers as Mr. Sadat takes his pi'ace on the rostrum of 
the Knesset, or pronounces respectfully "the Egyptian na-
tional anthem" as the music begins. And then he is silent. 
There is no chatter or commentary while the ceremony is 
taking place. The narrator or commentator considers 
himself-and is often considered by participants-a 
member of the wedding, a celebrant. 
Moreover, there are often no commercials. Even 
Holocaust was screened with commercials. But not dur-
ing the speeches of Sadat and Begin in Jerusalem, and 
not for the whole of the weekend of mourning after John 
Kennedy's assassination. 
It is in this sense, too, that it is useful to think of these 
media events as "high holidays." They have a sacred air, 
a reverential character which differs both from the every-
day world of public affairs and from the minor holidays of 
everyday conflict or everyday merriment. It is as if they 
are trying to tell us something about the nobility of man 
and the unity of society. 
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Typology of Media Events 
It is clear, of course, that there are different kinds of 
events grouped together here, and it is worth trying to 
sort them out. Three distinct forms seem discernible. 
The most noble type is what might be called the heroic 
mission. It includes the astronauts, Sadat, John Paul II, 
perhaps Nixon's visit to China. It is the story of a hero 
defying natural law-entering the enemy's camp un-
armed, flying beyond the atmosphere of the earth-Dn a 
mission of exploration or reconciliation in the name of 
humanity. Of course, history is full of such exploits. What 
is new is our ability to follow the process of these heroic 
deeds, step by step, before anyone can know what the 
outcome will be. 
A second type of media event is the occasion of state. 
But it is only under particular circumstances that such 
occasions will be treated as media events. When the 
occasion marks the beginning or end of an era, such as 
the funeral of Churchill, or when it opens a well of uncer-
tainty, as in the funeral of Kennedy and the anxiety over 
the succession, the nation or the world will participate, 
transfixed, in the ceremony. Similarly, when the Israel-
Egypt peace treaty was signed at the White House, there 
was a sense of a new beginning, and indeed many ob-
servers likened it to a wedding. Michael Arlen has 
likened all such events to parades, even including such 
secular and minor events as the Hollywood Academy 
Awards. 
The third type of event is the more familiar contest, but 
only when the confrontation has important symbolic 
meaning. Thus, the Kennedy-Nixon or Ford-Carter de-
bates, or the World Cup, or the Eurovision song contest 
are events of this sort. Traditional rivalries are enacted 
before audiences of hundreds of millions, but these rival-
ries are subject to shared and enforceable rules, and the 
sense of what there is in common typically outweighs the 
partisanship. 
Dramatic Elements 
Classifying media events in this way reveals the dramatic 
elements which inhere in them. There appear to be three 
such elements. First of all, there is the question of "pro-
grammedness": how much do we know in advance about 
the choreography of the event. The moon landing, in this 
sense, was highly programmed; the timetable of the 
Sadat visit was much less clear. 
But even where we know exactly what is supposed to 
happen, there is a question of whether things will work 
out as planned. Thus the risk that the program might 
abort is a second element of drama: Will they make it to 
the moon? Will moonmen attack them? Will they infect 
the earth's atmosphere? Will they return safely? And simi-
larly: Is Sadat really on the plane or is it a Trojan horse? 
Will he leave Israel alive? Will there be a coup in Egypt 
before his return? 
Even where we know the program, and the chances of 
aborting are small, there is a mystery in the actions of 
great men, even at their funerals, which enthrall us. Will 
somebody arise to attack the Queen on her coronation? 
Wi II the Pope be stricken by a heart attack? Is the body 
still in the coffin?8 
The Live Documentary: Dilemmas of 
Telling the Story 
Media events are live, including state funerals, and face 
the problem of how to tell a story while it is happening. 
The director must choose among various pictures, the 
narrator must decide what actions to remark upon, the 
commentators and instant-analysts must provide a con-
text. The media must face up to a paradox which might be 
called "the I ive documentary." 
Several major problems face the producers of such 
programs, and each of them is implicit in what has been 
said in these pages so far. 
First of all, there is the problem of the choice of the 
event itself. Journalism, as was noted, deals in events but 
it is occupationally blind to the fact that historians do not. 
History, in recent times, has abandoned events as in-
adequate explanations. Thus, the impulse of the jour-
nalist is to see history in Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, while 
the impulse of the historian is to look to the plight of the 
Egyptian economy or to the hopelessness of another war 
with Israel, and so on. Historians would not assign the 
onset of World War I to the assassination of Archduke 
Ferdinand in Sarajevo. Sophisticated journalists, surely, 
are aware of this dilemma, and it must influence them, 
aware or not, in the narration of the media event. Is it 
merely ritual or really critical? Of course, ritual and the 
emotional response of an expectant world 1s more than 
enough justification for a media event. But how often 
should one use the word "historic?" 
A second problem of the producer of media events is to 
cope with the tension between the journalist and priestly 
roles. The occasion, ostensibly, requires priestliness; 
there is something of an unwritten pact between the or-
ganizers of the event and media producers. The media 
are there to "celebrate" the event. But what if something 
goes wrong? Or, to take a more complicated example, 
what if there is something dissonant going on offstage 
which a journalist might be expected to cover? 
An example of this dilemma could be seen in the 
coverage of the signing of the peace treaty between Is-
rael and Egypt. Not far from the White House, there was a 
meeting of people protesting the signing of the treaty. 
The loudspeakers from the rally could be heard clearly as 
background against the voic€s--of the participants and 
the. broadc~sters. The journalist role obviously called for 
an 1nterrupt1on of the ceremony and the dispatching of a 
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camera to the demonstration; the priestly role, however, 
implied a commitment to the integrity of the cerem~ny. 
The Washington Post suggests that two of the Amencan 
networks indeed interrupted the ceremony to cover the 
demonstration while one of them did not. This difficult 
choice, incidentally, confronted the Western sportscast-
ers present at the Moscow Olympics as well: should they 
keep their cameras fixed on the scheduled events, or 
report unprogrammed observations, even political ones, 
as well? It is obvious, from this discussion, why totalitar-
ian countries are so wary of media events except for 
those over which they have complete control. It is no 
coincidence that, even if John Paul II was shown live in 
Poland, we saw so little of the crowds who cheered him. 
One can also be used to influence the outcome of the 
event: this, of course, is the aim of the participants. NASA 
could justify the cost of its space program by showing 
man's first step on the moon live; Sadat wanted to 
mobilize American public opinion. Sometimes it is more 
cunning than that, as when journalists thought they were 
misbriefed on the progress of President Carter's visit to 
Jerusalem in order to bring pressure on Israel, or at least, 
to enhance the drama of Carter's ultimate success. 
Being used, of course, is a two-way street. The media 
have much to gain from the magic of their own presenta-
tion of far-away events. Legitimacy, power, glory devolve 
to the media in the performance of their role, and 
sometimes-not always-this credit outweighs the in-
come foregone from the commercial sponsorship of the 
programs that have been canceled. 9 All the world is there 
to see the close association of the stars of the fourth 
estate with heroics and with majesty. 
But the most difficult problem of all is what story to tell: 
how can one tell a story without knowing how it is going to 
progress and how it is going to end? Part of the anxiety 
over this problem is reflected in the search for criteria of 
what is to be judged as success and what to consider 
failure: the search for such criteria is evident in the days 
prior to the Sadat visit or in the days before any important 
presidential primary. But more interesting is the fact that 
one cannot tell a story without a "hypothesis" or a "model" 
to guide the story in the telling. The narrators need not 
necessarily have an explicit model in mind, but there is 
good reason to believe that they-and their listeners a~d 
viewers-must have recourse to such models. Academic 
analysis of journalistic coverage of the death of John 
XXIII, for example, reveals the latent conflict between the 
Pope and the angel of death, in one version, and between 
the doctors and death in another.10 If our typology of the 
subgenres of media events is correct, it is reasonable to 
suppose that the narrator draws on the heroic mission, 
the state occasion (or parade), and the contest in for-
mulating his script and in placing his cameras. But be-
yond journalism, there are deeper sources for the telling 
of such stories. There is a fountain of folktales and sacred 
texts which narrators share with their audiences. The 
story of Mission: Impossible, which underlies the report-
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ing of the moon landing of the astronauts and the meeting 
of Sadat and Begin, exists not only in the iconography of 
television, and not only in science fiction, but in mythol-
ogy and perhaps in scripture. Such puzzles are attracting 
increasing attention in the scholarly community. 
Effects of the Media 
The problems just recounted reflect the effect of media 
events on the media and anticipate the kinds of effects 
which the media may have on the events themselves and 
on the vast audiences which attend them. Some research 
has been done on certain media events, and more 
research-including our own-is now in progress. For the 
moment, most of what there is to say is speculative. 
As for the events themselves, it is evident, first of all, 
that they are shaped in part by the media. In totalitarian 
societies, perhaps, it may be possible to keep the cam-
era focused squarely on the dias, without zooming in, or 
searching for reaction shots, or showing the behavior of 
the audience. The technology of the media is such, how-
ever, that this is probably impossible to control abso-
lutely, and this is so, a fortiori, in free societies .. ~edia 
treatment of the event begins long before the off1c1al start-
ing time, and while focusing attent.ion and excite~ent on 
what is about to happen, also prov1des a context 1n terms 
of which the event will be presented and explained. The 
media edit the event even as it is being transmitted, and 
however reverent, show dimensions of the event which 
were unanticipated by the organizers and concealed 
from persons present. As the Langs establ.ished in their 
early study of MacArthur's return to the Un1ted States, t~e 
television viewer saw a story which built slowly to the 
climax of an emotional welcome at City Hall, while the 
onlooker at the street corner saw only a motorcade flash-
ing by. 11 Similarly, the millions of Americans watching 
Sadat's arrival in Jerusalem had seen and read days of 
preparatory messages, and just before the touchdown 
heard a commentator explain parallels in the careers of 
the two men and speculate about their "chemistry." One 
could see Sadat, from closeup, reacting to the playing of 
the Egyptian national anthem on Israeli ~oil, and ~e in-
structed in the symbolism of an El AI sta1rway be1ng. 
locked to the door of an airplane of the Arab Republic of 
Egypt. 
It is equally well known that the presence of cameras 
makes a difference. This is as evident in the decorum of 
parliaments or of national political conventions as it was 
in the orchestration of angry enthusiasm from pro-
Khomeini demonstrators in the streets of Tehran. 
The 1 ive broadcast of an event shapes the event in the 
making and in the telling, and arouses emotion. This 
much is certain. But what difference does that make? 
First of all, as has been argued from the outset, it 
creates a sense of occasion. People sense not only them-
selves but each other, and the unity of society, nation, 
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world. They identify with heroes, and celebrate them and 
their achievements. 
Thus, the media event provides a focus for the expres-
sion of emotion. It provided a focus for grief, as Schramm 
shows in his study of the weekend of mourning after Ken-
nedy's assassination. It provided a focus for euphoria, as 
in the Sadat-Begin talks; or for the expression of wonder, 
as in the moon landing; or of loyalty, as in a contest. The 
emotionality of the media event is probably its central 
effect. 
But there are also cognitive effects. Sadat's statements 
changed Israel's image of Egypt's intentions. While they 
did not succeed in changing attitudes toward the ·idea of 
a Palestinian state, there was a dramatic shift in the per-
ception of Egypt. Sadat's image in the United States im-
proved even more dramatically than in lsrael.12 
The channeling of aroused emotions and changed 
opinions may well have political effects. There is reason 
to believe, for example, that the mobilization of public 
support liberated Sadat and Begin-at least for a time-
from the constraints of their own bureaucracies and polit-
ical parties; they were freer men. They may even have 
sensed that their constituencies had suddenly grown now 
that they were actors on the stage of the world. 
Such speculation suggests that the broadcasting of 
events may make the events themselves not only different 
but more important. Perhaps historians will take more 
notice of the realm of the symbolic when the symbolic 
and the real become so interlaced. But there are dangers 
as well. The media transmit failure as well as success. 
They note error immediately, as when Gerald Ford was 
pinned to his mistaken statement about relations among 
countries in the Eastern bloc. They may exacerbate con-
flict, if the priestly role is abandoned to commentary and 
instant analysis. Abba Eban suggests that the danger of 
"open diplomacy" is that each side sees only what it is 
losing and may despair of the bargain before it is made.14 
There is the danger that public opinion may become so 
inflamed that leadership may lose control, as was feared, 
apparently, when Willy Brandt visited East Berlin and 
when John Paul II visited Poland. 
There is the danger that the media--<;ooperating with 
the principal actors-may so dramatize an event as to 
increase its likelihood of failure. Consider Carter's much 
publicized retirement to Camp David to discover rem-
edies for the American economy where the promise im-
plicit therein is that he will succeed in doing so. Consider 
the pressure on the Camp David negotiations on the 
Middle East, however secret, with the media waiting in 
the wings for the negotiators to emerge. 
But most of all consider the danger of blurring political 
and ceremonial processes. Walter Benjamin (1978) wrote 
that communism is the making of aesthetics into politics 
while fascism is the making of politics into aesthetics. 
With all the positive functions of media events, examples 
of media being impressed into the service of aesthetizing 
politics are still fresh in our minds. Common sense is 
sometimes more important than even the sense of occa-
sion. 
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with the rise of Khomeini is Tehranian (1979). 
8 This was rumored after Lincoln 's funeral. See Lewis (1929) . 
9 The internal controversy over whether to cancel scheduled (and 
commerc ial) programs in favor of a cr it ical congress ional hearing is 
discussed by Friendly (1967). 
10 This is the account of Jules Gritti (1966) . 
11 See the early paper, "The Unique Perspective of Television, " ex-
panded by Kurt and Gladys Lang (1968). 
12 Findings from the Continuing Survey of the Israel Institute of Applied 
Social Research and the Communications Institute of the Hebrew 
University. 
13 Thus, near the close of Sadat's grand day in Jerusalem and during a 
break in the private discussions of Sadat and Begin, Walter Cronkite 
asked the two men how they proposed to solve the problem of Pales-
tinian representation in the autonomy talks, and Barbara Walters 
asked about the status of Jerusalem. These provocative questions-
which were circumvented in the public events-were posed to show 
that reality was fraught with unsolved difficulty. That journalists focus 
on conflict, even on such ceremonial situations, was remarked by 
Professor Hilde Himmelweit in commenting on an early version of 
some of the ideas in this paper. 
14 In a public lecture at the Institute of Advanced Study, Princeton . See 
Eban (1978). 
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Reviews and Discussion 
Paul Bouissac. Circus and Culture: A Semiotic Approach. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976. 
Reviewed by Jean Alter 
University of Pennsylvania 
Is drcus a form of communication? Does it offer a mes-
sage on top of entertainment? Is it a language? Does it 
use one or several semiotic codes which are decoded by 
the audience? Is it possible to insert the circus, as a 
system of signs, in the larger networ-k of signs which de-
fine our culture? Paul Bouissac answers all these ques-
tions with a resounding YES, then expands his answer in 
an extraordinary collection of essays, which despite 
some disparity, manage to add up to an integrated whole. 
In fact, they are arranged like individual circus acts in the 
circus program: each deals with a different area-
acrobats, "comedy horse," jugglers and magicians, lions 
and tigers, wild horses, clowns-but all have a common 
message, to wit: circus must be approached semiotically. 
And just as circus acts form a harmonious and stable 
pattern, so the various approaches used by Bouissac 
under the umbrella of semiotics complement each other 
quite convincingly. 
The entire book must then be judged on two levels. 
Does it tell us something interesting and/or new about the 
circus? And does it expand our appreciation of semiotics 
as a tool for the analysis of cultural phenomena which, 
like the circus, stress a public performance? There is 
little doubt about the first question. Bouissac's es$ays 
have been hailed as the first significant breakthrough in 
what used to be only a descriptive and historical/ 
anecdotal account of circuses, and this general admira-
tion is well deserved. Bouissac had the experience of 
running a circus himself, as many others had; he has 
been trained in linguistics, anthropology, and struc-
turalism, as have many others; but the combination is 
indeed unique. The average semiotician, when he leaves 
the safe academic fields with which he is familiar, must 
deal with secondhand material and, however brilliant his 
presentation, always risks being countered on factual 
grounds. In Bouissac's case, theory and praxis go to-
gether. As a result, no one, after reading his book, will see 
circus with the same eyes as before. Of course, if one 
liked the "magic" and the "wonder" of the big top, the 
enlightenment provided by Bouissac will result in a feel-
ing of loss. But the passing of the world of make-believe 
is more than compensated for by an initiation to semiotic 
processes underpinning the illusions. An adult can now 
return to the circus in a spirit of eager exploration: to 
check on Bouissac, and perhaps to add to his findings. 
Since circus is a form of communication, Bouissac's 
preferred model is linguistic. In any circus act, and in 
complete programs, he detects the operation of the 
"double articulation," i.e., the use of a finite number of 
signs in a way that generates an infinite number of ~ean­
ings. In that sense, circus is (or has) a language w1th 
multimedia signs of a visual, auditive, and even olfactory 
nature. Separately, they have no fixed meaning, but their 
various combinations produce specific messages. For 
example, the same acrobatic feat performed by an artist 
dressed in a "brightly colored leotard" will classify him as 
a superman and evoke "anxiety and admiration," ulti-
mately referring to "survival through biological superior-
ity," whereas performed by an artist "dressed as a tramp," 
it will provoke "laughter" and refer to "survival through 
chance" (p. 19). Furthermore, like the Russian folktales 
studied by Propp, circus acts and programs have a 
grammar: a stable succession of stages-from the iden-
tification of the performer, through a series of tests, to 
public acknowledgment of his triumph-a pattern which 
may be (purposely) disturbed but eventually goes back 
to its expected progression. Within this pattern, however, 
performers (and/or circus owners/managers) present in-
dividual speech acts which, says Bouissac, are never the 
same except by rare intentionality (p. 23). They address a 
message to the audience, and the fact that it is appre-
ciated, and hence understood, "presupposes that the re-
ceiver shares with the sender a knowledge of a system of 
rules" (p. 14), i.e., a general circus code, made up of 
various subcodes corresponding to types of circus signs: 
linguistic, behavioral, musical, technical, along with 
those involving costumes, lighting, accessories, and so 
on. 
While this general model raises a theoretical question 
(see below), its application to concrete types of acts 
yields unquestionably seminal results, though not always 
of equal interest or equal faithfulness to the model. Thus 
the analysis of acrobatic acts applies mainly to cyber-
netic concepts leading to a kinematic representation of 
transformations. Bouissac follows Ashby on stable equi-
librium, instability, and disturbance, and ends with for-
mulas accounting for ways in which an acrobat creates 
and corrects/controls a disturbance in his state of equi-
librium: a technical notation of a rather obvious slow-
motion description of the act. At this point semiotics 
intervene to qualify the technical behaviors as signifiers 
which (with other surrounding signifiers) relate to 
signified aptitudes for survival. Hence, as mentioned 
above, the real acrobat refers to biological superiority 
and the clown to biological inferiority. All this seems cor-
rect, but hardly new: we always knew that we laughed at 
clowns because they appeared inferior (and often flat on 
the ground) and admired acrobats because they ap-
peared superior (way up there). No need for a semiotic 
approach here. 
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The essay on the performing horse is more revealing 
and controversial. Bouissac says the act contains two 
separate communications, each with its own code: one 
between the trainer and the horse, the other between the 
two performers and the audience. One may ask: does 
animal training, based on the principle of a "conditioned 
reflex" (p. 56), qualify as communication, and does the 
stimulus, with its one-to-one automatic response, qualify 
as a sign? Or even as a "signal"? Can one speak of 
communication without some semiotic intentionality 
and/or consciousness on both sides? If I have con-
ditioned the horse to nod when my hand moves slightly 
toward its ear, do I view my gesture as a sign which the 
horse understands because we share a semiotic code, or 
as a triggering step in a mechanical sequence compara-
ble to turning the key to start a car? A well-trained horse 
has no choice but to give the expected response, but 
interhuman communication always entails a degree of 
uncertainty as to a correct understanding and, a fortiori, 
the resulting response. Of course, one may argue that 
this uncertainty (this choice) only means that we have not 
learned our codes well enough, that, in a perfect society, 
all communication would be conditioned. Perhaps. I sus-
pect that the study of communication, and its very notion, 
would then disappear. Bouissac's description of the con-
ditioning which goes into the horse act is fascinating, but 
really belongs neither with communication nor with cul-
tural semiotics (though perhaps with natural semiotics, 
which study relations between, say, volcano smoke and 
eruption, or thermometer reading and fever). On the other 
hand, if that conditioning were to be assimilated to the 
conditioning of an acrobat or a juggler, and the horse 
viewed as a prop over which the trainer has control, 
Bouissac's 'analysis of the act as communication between 
the performer and the audience would still retain all its 
startling pertinence: we could still receive the message 
that man's superiority over animals can be reversed, es-
pecially when the horse appears to be more intelligent 
than the trainer; and we could still laugh at the latter 
while admiring his skill. 
Not all acts however refer to biological differences. 
Jugglers and magicians, according to Bouissac, subvert 
the Western belief in the manual production of goods, 
since prestidigitation evokes a production without any 
real work, and juggling represents work without any real 
production. This is why, Bouissac says, magicians pro-
duce items related to economic activity (weaving, gar-
dening, animal breeding: handkerchiefs, flowers, rabbits) 
and jugglers juggle useless objects or objects as-
sociated with the leisure class (cigar boxes, bowling 
pins, billiard balls). In turn, the "cat act" (lions, tigers) is 
compared to a text where the "heroes" are modified by 
names, costumes, behavior patterns, and the "villains" by 
their species, size, props. The text is narratively seg-
mented by ritual bows of the tamer, and articulated by a 
poetic structure, which, in its "realistic" style, works with 
metonymy-i.e., danger by contiguity (as when a I ion is 
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forced to jump through an ignited hoop)-and reaches 
"poetry" by the means of metaphors-i.e., anthropomor-
phic similes (as when a lioness kisses the tamer). In still 
another essay, treatment of animals in zoos and circuses 
is differentiated as referring respectively to a mythical 
and ritual attitude; by stressing the ritual uniqueness 
through repetition, circus is said to restore the continuity 
of life. The wild-horses act, through the iconization of 
animals, expresses on the contrary various semantic ten-
sions between social and antisocial behavior, freedom 
and servitude, order and transgression ... and so on. 
The arguments vary, but all point to a deep connection 
between the message of the act and the contextual 
culture. 
The vitality and success of the circus, according to 
Bouissac, do not lie in any "passive enjoyment" but in 
these culturally determined and shared messages. This 
conclusion takes us back to the theoretical question 
raised by Bouissac's model. Indeed, most of his demon-
strations are quite convincing, but rely almost exclusively 
on what I shall call "secondary" circus signs (costumes, 
music, gestures, lights, props), which accompany the 
"primary" sign (technical behavior). Clowns are an ex-
ception to this rule, but then Bouissac himself views the 
clowning act as quite exceptional. In most other cases, 
the message is conveyed by the secondary signs. When 
a dog pushes a baby carriage, he is indeed humanized 
and serves to "restore a biological continuity denied by 
the contextual culture" (p. 121), perhaps evoking laughter. 
But the "primary" interest of the trick lies in the technical 
behavior: a type of walk that dogs normally cannot per-
form (the humanlike erect position is only serendipitous). 
The question is: what about the "primary" sign, if indeed 
it is a sign? Is the technical behavior a form of communi-
cation? Does it convey a message? Or does it satisfy only 
a single need, being consumed in the process? Let us 
compare the enjoyment of a circus act with the enjoyment 
of a gourmet meal served in a restaurant reputed for its 
cuisine. Now, like the circus, gourmet meals also have a 
"double articulation" at work in individual types of dishes 
and the total meal: they too follow a traditional sequence 
(appetizers, fish, meat, etc.) and bring variations to each 
type of dish (there are no two identical Dover soles). 
Furthermore, they also have secondary messages aimed 
at the cultural context (from ethnic values up to patriotic 
allusions and down to low comedy, as with the "cas-
soulet"). And then there are the right and wrong wines, 
with all their literature. In that sense, gourmet meals may 
and should be viewed as a form of communication to be 
studied semiotically (we are applying for a grant). But, in 
the primary sense, the gourmet meal remains an experi-
ence for the mouth, the eye, and the nose, appreciated for 
its own sake and not for its messages. More specifically, it 
is appreciated for its "quality," which means a culinary 
performance whereby (skill/art overcoming difficulty) the 
meal offers a positive difference from the normal meal. 
Normality and appreciation of the difference are cultur-
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ally determined, but the desire for the performance, and 
its appreciation, appear to be universal. In fact, aren't the 
same desire and appreciation at work when we pay to 
applaud an acrobat, a juggler, or a lion tamer, who (art/ 
skill overcoming difficulty) performs acts beyond our 
normal powers? In semiotic terms, any such perform-
ance, and all of them, may still be considered a sign, but 
autotelic, almost totally collapsed on itself, drawing atten-
tion to its signifier-i.e., what we see, hear, or taste. The 
signified only specifies that the particular signifier is in-
deed a performance-i.e., positively different in degree 
from normality. And the referent is that performance-i.e., 
the sign, i.e., mainly the signifier. Any other referential 
messages will come from the outside and through sec-
ondary signs. But then, isn't the primary sign at the center 
of circus? By means of costumes, varied messages can 
be grafted on the acrobatic act, which starts with the 
performance; without the performance, there would be no 
circus, only theater or pantomime. And again: does one 
communicate a performance? 
The questions raised by the circus prompt interest in 
other types of public "shows" which value performances 
and hence draw attention to the signifier. One could at-
tempt to order them within that perspective. In theater, for 
example, despite some stress on the performance-
quality of acting, beauty of a face or figure, harmony or 
extravaganza of sets-the referential function of second-
ary signs dominates to the point that they are generally 
viewed as primary, and priority is given to the text. A 
one-person act, on the other hand, although it may use 
referential material, is mainly appreciated for the 
performance-not for the content of jokes but for the 
manner of their telling. The circus operates like a many-
people show: it stresses the performance but also con-
veys messages. Bouissac's book shows that these are 
subtle and concerted, and powerfully grounded in our 
culture. I am not sure, however, whether they really ac-
count for the success of the circus, or whether they play 
second fiddle to the sheer enjoyment of the performance. 
Michael Greenhalgh and Vincent Megaw, eds. Art in 
Society: Studies in Style, Culture, and Aesthetics. New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1978, xiii + 350 pp. (cloth). 
Reviewed by Marie ·Jeanne (Monni) Adams 
Harvard University 
As befits a pub I ication on art this is a handsome book, 
with an attractive print layout, sprinkled with photo-
graphs, drawings, and graphs, firmly bound, and appro-
priately heavy but compact in the hand. How it weighs in 
as a contribution to the subject cannot be stated as a 
simple sum of its parts, for a few brilliant sections out-
weigh the whole. 
The title sweeps across a wide intellectual horizon, but 
in fact the twenty-two essays stay neatly within the 
bounds of art studied by anthropologists; that is, they 
concentrate on small-scale societies, living, dead, or dy-
ing. The contributions stem from a symposium on art and 
society, sponsored by the editors, held at Leicester Uni-
versity in early 1975, with the addition of three papers, all 
but one drawn from Brit!sh backgrounds. 
Few anthropologists focus their primary effort on visual 
art in the same way they might on ritual or oral tradition, 
and fewer art historians concentrate on the art of exotic 
peoples. The result is that ethnoart is a bit of everybody's 
business, and the inevitable resulting miscellany shows 
up clearly in this kind of book, which lacks a specific 
theme or regional focus and includes a philosopher, art 
historians, archaeologists, social anthropologists, 
museum ethnographers, and practicing artists who are 
teachers or collectors. 
The resulting range of viewpoints and topics may give 
this book, as the cover claims, a wide appeal, but their 
juxtaposition and the ensuing seesawing quality can in-
duce vertigo even in a tolerant reader. The extremes in 
levels of expression and research caliber that charac-
terize this compendium are illustrated by the first two 
selections. Philosopher of aesthetics Richard Wollheim 
offers a worthy if obscurely abstract admonition that 
gleams with fashionable terms as he dismisses the 
taxonomic or distinctive feature approach in favor of the 
"generative," for the proper analysis of art works. This is 
followed by the trivial statements of Michael Cardew, the 
potter who served as a craft development teacher in 
Nigeria, to the effect that pre! iterate art is comparable to 
the art of children and that "others" do not have our habit 
of conceptual thinking. The entire first section, with nine 
essays on appreciation and aesthetics-none longer 
than five pages-resembles a slightly awry Hungarian 
cake with several dark tasty layers interspersed with light, 
airy ones. The remaining longer articles are loosely 
grouped under two headings: Methodology and Stylistic 
Analysis (six pieces) and Some Ethnographic Samples 
Reviews and Discussion 
(seven articies). It will be more revealing of the book's 
qualities and generally useful to the reader to review the 
contents in relation to the specific topics currently in favor 
by those who study art in anthropology (see Silver 1979). 
Four essays in this book stand out for their insights into 
another culture and for a disciplined method and mes-
sage that can inspire and guide future studies. The first 
three, by Vastokas, Kaeppler, and Mcleod, can be 
grouped as the search for cognitive order. Scholars of 
European art assume that an art object is ordered and 
that a conceptual schema I ies at the genesis of a work of 
art; they proceed to discuss fine points of that order, such 
as the precise relationship of twelve apostles on a 
painted ceiling, or the invisible diagonal organizing a 
Michelangelo scene, or the horizontal composition of an 
impressionist landscape. In ethnographic art, however, 
compositional devices are not readily grasped by our 
viewers, so that, beginning with Boas in the early twen-
tieth century, ethnographers have accepted the burden of 
demonstrating the presence of structure or composition. 
The further step of linking these compositional orders to 
organizing principles in other fields of social activity was 
taken but slowly in the mid-twentieth century, the major 
efforts having been made by Panofsky and Levi-Strauss. 
As early as 1970, Fernandez (1977), in an analysis of 
the Fang of Gabon, compared the structure of an African 
village layout and the popular game board and figural 
sculpture of the Fang with the conceptions villagers held 
of the zones of their surroundings and the shape of their 
past. My own field work in Indonesia yielded such a study 
(1973), in which I found a structural homology between 
the tripartite compositional layout in East Sumba men's 
textiles, the structure of the village and the imagined 
cosmos, and the concepts regarding relationships 
among marriage and trading groups. So, for Kaeppler or 
Vastokas to find corresponding forms in artistic efforts 
and in social order or cu:tural dynamics is not new. How-
ever, their studies are exemplary. 
Vastokas concentrates on demonstrating the special 
character and the primacy of tripartite and quadripartite 
divisions in Northwest Coast architecture, admirably in-
dicating her evidence in objects and ritual action and 
demonstrating at each step the theoretical influences on 
her own thinking. (However, I would qualify her en-
thusiasm for Arnheim's visual thinking.) In conclusion, 
she reduces this complex analysis to a single theme: a 
tension or ambiguous movement in the works of art that in 
her view expresses latent cognitive-cultural tensions 
characterizing the economy, social organization, and re-
ligion. This sounds too much like "total ism," the earlier 
tendency to sum up a style and a civilization in one 
phrase. The interpretive stress on tensions, stemming 
from the work of Levi-Strauss and Victor Turner, is a 
healthy reaction to many earlier studies that found har-
mony and stability the quintessence of art-and-society. In 
most art and society there is an interplay of stability and 
tension; we need to get beyond this level of generality. 
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The lasting value of this essay lies in the sophisticated 
analysis of certain features of Northwest Coast art style. 
Using "ethnoscientific structuralism" and an elegant 
compression of style, Kaeppler focuses on a specific 
structure in vocal music which is given explicit formula-
tion by Pacific Tongans as melody, drone, and decora-
tion. She finds similarly structured sequences in work 
patterns and designs of bark cloth, in social domains of 
ranking, political relationships, and, exhibited on a grand 
scale, in major communal ritual. She also makes the in-
teresting proposal that these forms yield an aesthetic ex-
perience because at some level the people comprehend 
the underlying structure. Because of the clarity and 
freshness of insight cutting across various domains of 
activity and because of my own interest in work patterns 
(1971, 1977), I find this essay exceptionally stimulating 
and an excellent model for studies elsewhere. 
The third essay differs in its investigatory focus. In-
stead of accounting for what is presented to the eye, 
Mcleod, Keeper of the Department of Ethnography at the 
London Museum of Manki, in an interesting turnabout of-
fers an explanation-that is, a principle-that accounts 
for the absence of certain motifs, mainly domestic crea-
tures, in Asante figurative goldweights earlier used as 
units to weigh gold dust in exchange. transactions on the 
former Gold Coast, West Africa. He points to the signifi-
cant dichotomy between village and bush that is basic to 
Asante ritual, proverbs, and myths, and then suggests 
that domestic animals are representative of the category 
"vi II age," and as such they are kept out of the money 
system because money functions to blur or equalize 
categories. This is an excellent example of how an-
thropo!ogical theories deriving from Levi-Strauss, Leach, 
and Douglas about cognitive orders can clarify problems 
in ethnoart. 
The fourth essay I have singled out, Wilkinson's "Carv-
ing a Social Message," deals with visual art forms as 
signs in a social system, perhaps the most familiar ap-
proach to art in society by anthropologists. Wilkinson, 
who taught literature on Tabar Island, part of New Ireland 
in Papua New Guinea, studied their Malanggan ritual 
carvings and shows that particular combinations of 
motifs belong to certain owners and identify both kin and 
status groupings. The understanding of Malanggan 
sculpture, the most complex carving in Melanesia, has 
been plagued by lack of thorough documentation, first on 
the level of what is represented, and further, on what any 
item means. This article, richly informative on these 
points, is clear evidence that Wilkinson's work deserves 
fuller publication. 
Gathercole, who works in the museum at Cambridge 
University, also would see art in the frame of social sign. 
Deploring the lack of information on early collections, he 
recommends that we look at the motifs repeated on many 
Maori objects, not only as general reminders of the 
ideological continuum of gods, ancestors, and human 
life, but also as signs of ethnic identity which increased in 
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elaboration during the nineteenth century as accultura-
tive pressures mounted on the Maori people. 
Based on the work of the Stratherns (1971) on the body 
decoration of the Mt. Hageners of Papua New Guinea, 
Layton constructs a chart of the Hageners' sensory signs 
to show how they combine to communicate status posi-
tions and wearers' intentions. His essay also reflects the 
current fashion for elements of communication theory. He 
would distinguish art from visual communication by the 
features of symbol ism and redundancy, a reductive posi-
tion that is further weakened by the distortion required for 
the concept of redundancy when applied to art. 
Faris, who provided such a splendid analysis of Nuba 
body painting (1972), based on his field work in the Su-
dan, East Africa, spins an argument that represents 
another current influencing the analysis of art; that is, a 
Marxist emphasis on mode of production, the underlying 
thesis being that the significant social relationships 
which must be symbolized for purposes of maintenance, 
celebration, socialization, and mystification stem from 
·productive activities. According to Ppris, if people control 
their means of production, art will celebrate human pro-
ductive activity, as indeed was the situation he found 
among the Nuba. Where producers lack control, such 
circumstances need to be justified, and symbols will be 
used for mystification in order to legitimize the exploita-
tion . With these theorums, Faris proposes to tell why cer-
tain people use ancestor figures and to account for the 
expressive character of some West African masks. He 
claims that the Dogon create ancestor figures as part of 
the mystique of the clan, which, having no kin or material 
basis, is an ideological construct to favor the elders; the 
Dan produce masks of cool arrogance because they 
have a politically powerful Poro society, while lesser local 
men's societies have to employ frightening masks. These 
explanations were prepared before 1975, and it is hoped 
that in the interval, besides correcting other errors in his 
article, Faris has had a chance to reread Harley (1950) to 
learn that the forceful Poro society (among the Mano) 
makes much use of frightening masks, and that there is 
no true Poro among the Dan (ibid.:42)-a point reiterated 
in several publications by field workers Himmelheber 
and Fischer. What evidence there is about Dogon human 
figure sculpture does not limit them, for example, to clan 
rituals, temples, or groups. With several Africanists at 
hand, the editors must be faulted for permitting these 
hypothetical arguments based on misinformation to be 
cast in permanently accessible form. More attention 
needs to be given to art in relation to power structures, in 
spite of this miscarried effort. 
Two essays cater to the increasing interest in the situa-
tion of the living artist. Nettleship offers a fine descriptive 
account of the social context of women's weaving arts, 
which are no longer functional, among the Atayal of 
Taiwan. His concern with creativity, presented in a vague 
and groping manner, leads to the following points: the 
weaver, influenced by aesthetic or nonaesthetic values, 
can make selections at various points in the work process 
and, to assess their innovation, these decision points de-
serve close study. Gerbrands, known for his publications 
on the Asmat artist, continues his search for the master 
artist, this time among the Kilenge of New Britain, and 
provides some interesting anecdotes about a wood-
carver's relations with his big-man patron and the efforts 
of his apprentice. 
A modest experiment in cross-cultural aesthetics is re-
ported by Nelson Graburn, who is best known for his 
studies of Eskimo art in a changing commercial context. 
He asked museum audiences at Berkeley to respond to 
two commercial forms of art-crafts: wooden implements 
of the Cree Indians and the soapstone figures of the 
Canadian Arct ic Eskimos. Judgments of the works were 
markedly affected by preconceptions about Indians and 
about Eskimo culture. The neat, clean wood carvings did 
not fit respondents' notions of authentic Indian objects, 
and their negative reactions were frequently cast in terms 
of guilt about commercialization. Eskimo stone imagery, 
however, fulfilled their ideas of art as evocative and illus-
trative of the Eskimos' imagined way of life and strugg le 
with nature. Strangely enough, in this case political re-
grets did not come to mind. 
Another issue in cross-cultural aesthetics-more 
commonly called artistic influence--concerns the possi-
ble effects of African art on the artists of Paris in the early 
twentieth century. It is patently absurd , as Donne points 
out, to discuss the influence of African art on the Cubists 
on the basis of pieces and even styles that the artists of 
the time did not and could not know. Donne gives a sam-
ple of the kind of detective work required to identify which 
actual pieces came to the notice of artists of that time. 
Greenhalgh, one of the editors, takes up a rarely dis-
cussed problem in cross-cultural aesthetics: why Euro-
peans in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were 
indifferent to influences from Pre-Columbian art. Not sur-
prisingly, he reasons that the Graeco-Roman framework 
of Renaissance Europe precluded recognition of the 
alien style as aesthetic experience. In an erudite sketch 
of scholarly work of the time, Greenhalgh shows that the 
tendency to see alien art works as something which can 
explain religion or society had already begun in the 
sixteenth century. 
However changed our aesthetic appreciation may 
be, archaeologists continue to use art as a revealing ar-
tifact. Two essays in this book give a glimpse of ar-
chaeologists at work on style analysis. Roaf seeks differ-
ences in hands among a row of similar figures at Perse-
polis, and Frankel looks for similarities in pottery designs 
to determine contacts and trade routes in 2nd millennium 
B.C. Cyprus. Using familiar assumptions in style studies, 
both men argue, in brief contributions, for more precise, 
credible results by use of mathematical methods, 
couched in a variety of charts and diagrams, than were 
possible by precomputer assessment. 
Reviews and Discussion 
Korn, an art historian, fulfills Wollheim's directive not to 
rely on distinctive features by offering a computerized 
formal analysis of an extensive array of design units she 
has derived from the colorful Abelam paintings collected 
some 20 years ago by Anthony Forge. Most of her article 
is taken up with arguing against the use of linguistic 
models for art analysis, in favor of a comprehensive count 
of visual regularities. 
Art as a qualitative experience is difficult to deal with in 
social science terms, although a few anthropologists 
have attempted it. Here Swinton and Herman, who are 
artists and connoisseurs, carry out this mission in a style 
of personal conviction . 
Most speculat ive of all investigations into art is the 
study of its ori g ins, a topic rarely addressed by art histo-
rians. In tune with the recent emphasis on the biologi-
cal contribution to human behavior, several scholars are 
finding a promising source of designs in the dancing 
flickers of light, called phosphenes, that appear in interior 
vision. This view is represented by Reichei-Dolmatoff's 
favorable comparison of the drawings of drug-experi-
enced visions among a small group of Amazonian 
Indians with the fifteen phosphenes standardized in 
a study of European subjects. 
In summary, we find that most topics in ethnoart are 
touched upon in these essays: the search for cognitive 
order, art as social signs, the artist and the social matrix 
of production, cross-cultural aesthetics, and qualitative 
experience. The notable exception is an example of psy-
chological or psychoanalytical study. The best work be-
longs to those in search of cognitive order. A new note 
appears in a number of the essays that is worth special 
comment; that is, an awareness of negative results or a 
cautionary attitude. We should not hold to a unitary view 
of the Eskimo aesthetic when Swinton states that, among 
the Eskimos he knows in the Baker Lake area, carvings 
are admired for the very reasons they are disdained in 
Graburn's reports on Arctic Quebec. Wollheim's admoni-
tion against the use of distinctive feature analysis, 
Greenhalgh's consideration of a lack of diffusion, Donne 
on the need of proof for claims of artistic influence, Vas-
takas's and Korn's warnings against the use of linguistic 
models, and most vivid of all , ThurstonBhaw's well-
reasoned challenge to established theories on the 
chronology of Benin bronzes-all these introduce critical 
notes that were absent from the positive propositions 
presented in two earlier anthologies on ethnoart (Jopling 
1971; Otten 1971). On this point, Art in Society represents 
an advance in sophistication about methods that is 
worthy of wide attention. 
95 
References 
• Adams, M. J. 
1971 Work Patterns and Symbolic Structures. Southeast Asia 
Quarterly 1 (4) :321-334. 
1973 Structural Aspects of a Village Art, East Sumba, Indonesia. 
American Anthropologist 75(1 ):265-279. 
1977 Style in Southeast Asian Materials Processing ; Some 
Implications for Ritual and Art. In Material Culture. Heather 
Lechtman and Robert Merrill , eds. St. Paul: West. 
• Faris, James C. 
1972 Nuba Personal Art. Toronto: University of Toronto. 
• Fernandez, James 
1977 Fang Architectonics. Philadelphia: ISHI. 
• Harley, George 
1950 Masks as Agents of Social Control in Northeast Liberia. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Peabody Museum of Archeology and 
Ethnology. 
• Jopling, Carol , ed . 
1971 Art and Aesthetics in Primitive Societies. New York: Dutton. 
• Otten, Charlotte 
1971 Anthropology and Art. Garden City, N.Y: Natural History. 
• Silver, Harry 
1979 Ethnoart. Annual Review of Anthropology 8:267-307. 
• Strathern, Andrew and Marilyn 
1971 Self-Decoration in Mount Hagen. Toronto: University of 
Toronto. 
96 studies in Visual Communication 
Nahumck. Introduction to Dance Literacy: Perception 
and Notation of Dance Patterns. 
To the Editors 
In the Spring 1980 issue of Studies, Diane C. Freedman 
reviews the book Introduction to Dance Literacy: Percep-
tion and Notation of Dance Patterns, by Nadia Chilkovsky 
Nahumck. In so doing, she takes Dr. Nahumck to task on 
several points, notably on the question of what is meant 
by "literacy" in dance. As a pragmatic practitioner of 
Labanotation and an ardent advocate of dance literacy, I 
find myself disturbed by high-level quibbling. Nahumck's 
book is a welcome step forward in dance literacy by its 
very attempt to make people aware of this valuable end 
product in the use of notation. It is a tool through which a 
greater understanding of and access to information in 
dance is made possible. 
In reading the book I too questioned at whom the book 
was aimed: if for those already knowing Labanotation, 
then the basic explanations were superfluous; if for those 
knowing none, then insufficient. But the general focus of 
the book was in the right direction, and it should arouse 
enthusiastic support as an important step forward-who 
else has written such a book? Nahumck is breaking new 
ground. Perhaps the book needed more working through; 
such books can well use trial periods before publication 
to gather general reactions and eliminate the inevitable 
typographical errors. There is so much that is commend-
able in the book, however, that seems to have been 
given scant treatment in Ms. Freedman's review. 
I question whether it is necessary to experience 
movement sequences physically in order to become 
dance literate. My husband reads Russian yet cannot 
speak it, and his is not an unusual case; others read 
foreign-language publications without speaking the lan-
guage fluently. Would they be called illiterate in that lan-
guage? In dance there may be full understanding of the 
content without the physical ability to bring the move-
ment to life. Must one be able to act to understand 
Shakespeare's plays? 
Notation is not yet an integral part of the study of 
dance. A few have made a start, but there is sti II a long 
way to go before we achieve anything comparable to the 
use of music notation in the study of music. Nahumck has 
contributed a book which I see as an important step in 
the right direction. It is her fate to be a pioneer, to break 
new ground, and hence risk much criticism. It is possible 
that others who follow may produce better books, build-
ing on her groundwork. I would like to see a review which 
gathers together the positive elements in the book, pro-
viding incentive to others to produce similar works. 
Dr. Ann Hutchinson Guest 
The Language of Dance Centre, 
London 
Reviewer's Reply 
My review of Nahumck's book was directed at an aud i-
ence of scholars interested in visual commun ication. 
This relatively new field is composed of participants 
from many disciplines; communication among mem-
bers of such a diversified group is dependent on con-
ceptual -clarity. Scholarship must be evaluative if our 
understanding is to advance. 
Guest is unhappy with my criticism of what she con-
siders a pioneering effort. Yet to leave the inadequacies 
of basic works unnoted wou ld be a disservice, since the 
function of such works should be to provide the most 
solid possible basis for further development of the f ield. 
I do not consider insistence on conceptual clarity to be 
"high-level quibbling ." 
Guest's response is based on the undefended as-
sumption that language and movement are precise ly 
analogous, an assumption with which I disag ree for rea-
sons elaborated on in my review. I did not mean to imply 
that one must be able to duplicate dance movements to 
understand them. But competence in a symbolic system 
based on movement depends on a kinesthetic sensitiv-
ity. One way to develop this sensitivity is through study 
of the Laban system. 
I share with Guest and Nahumck the desire to promote 
future research in this field . But I be lieve that our cause 
is best served by careful scrut iny and evaluat ion of all 
contributions. 
Diane C. Freedman 


